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Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science
to analyse the factors which determine the fortunes of Cabinet
ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government
as a system of incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary
rule. The authors use a unique dataset of ministers from 1945 to
2007 to examine the structural and individual characteristics that
lead to the selection and durability of ministers. Sensitive to
historical context, it describes the unique features of different
Prime Ministers and the sorts of issues and scandals that lead to
the forced exit of ministers. The authors identify the structural
factors that determine ministerial performance and tenure, seeing
resignation calls as performance indicators. Probing the nature of
individual and collective responsibility within Westminster forms
of government, its rigorous analysis provides powerful new insights
into the nature of Cabinet government.
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