The essential resource on military and political strategy and the making of the modern world The New Makers of Modern Strategy is the next generation of the definitive work on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft throughout the centuries. Featuring entirely new entries by a who's who of world-class scholars, this new edition provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy while devoting greater attention to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. The contributors evaluate the timeless requirements of effective strategy while tracing the revolutionary changes that challenge the makers of strategy in the contemporary world. Amid intensifying global disorder, the study of strategy and its history has never been more relevant. The New Makers of Modern Strategy draws vital lessons from history's most influential strategists, from Thucydides and Sun Zi to Clausewitz, Napoleon, Churchill, Mao, Ben-Gurion, Andrew Marshall, Xi Jinping, and Qassem Soleimani. With contributions by Dmitry Adamsky, John Bew, Tami Davis Biddle, Hal Brands, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Elizabeth Economy, Charles Edel, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew Ehrhardt, Lawrence Freedman, John Lewis Gaddis, Francis J. Gavin, Christopher J. Griffin, Ahmed S. Hashim, Eric Helleiner, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, Seth G. Jones, Robert Kagan, Jonathan Kirshner, Matthew Kroenig, James Lacey, Guy Laron, Michael V. Leggiere, Margaret MacMillan, Tanvi Madan, Thomas G. Mahnken, Carter Malkasian, Daniel Marston, John H. Maurer, Walter Russell Mead, Michael Cotey Morgan, Mark Moyar, Williamson Murray, S.C.M. Paine, Sergey Radchenko, Iskander Rehman, Thomas Rid, Joshua Rovner, Priya Satia, Kori Schake, Matt J. Schumann, Brendan Simms, Jason K. Stearns, Hew Strachan, Sue Mi Terry, and Toshi Yoshihara.

New details about the founding of China's Navy reveals critical historical context and insight into future strategy From 1949 to 1950, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) made crucial decisions to establish a navy and secure China's periphery. The civil war had been fought with a peasant army, yet in order to capture key offshore islands from the Nationalist rival, Mao Zedong needed to develop maritime capabilities. Mao's Army Goes to Sea is a ground-breaking history of the founding of the Chinese navy and Communist China's earliest island-seizing campaigns. In this definitive account of a little-known yet critical moment in China's naval history, Toshi Yoshihara shows that Chinese leaders refashioned the stratagems and tactics honed over decades of revolutionary struggle on land for nautical purposes. Despite significant challenges, the PLA ultimately scored important victories over its Nationalist foes as it captured offshore islands to secure its position. Drawing extensively from newly available Chinese-language sources, this book reveals how the navy-building process, sea battles, and contested offshore landings had a lasting influence on the PLA. Even today, the institution's identity, strategy, doctrine, and structure are conditioned by these early experiences and myths. Mao's Army Goes to Sea will help US policymakers and scholars place China's recent maritime achievements in proper historical context-and provide insight into how its navy may act in the future.

New details about the founding of China's Navy reveals critical historical context and insight into future strategy From 1949 to 1950, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) made crucial decisions to establish a navy and secure China's periphery. The civil war had been fought with a peasant army, yet in order to capture key offshore islands from the Nationalist rival, Mao Zedong needed to develop maritime capabilities. Mao's Army Goes to Sea is a ground-breaking history of the founding of the Chinese navy and Communist China's earliest island-seizing campaigns. In this definitive account of a little-known yet critical moment in China's naval history, Toshi Yoshihara shows that Chinese leaders refashioned the stratagems and tactics honed over decades of revolutionary struggle on land for nautical purposes. Despite significant challenges, the PLA ultimately scored important victories over its Nationalist foes as it captured offshore islands to secure its position. Drawing extensively from newly available Chinese-language sources, this book reveals how the navy-building process, sea battles, and contested offshore landings had a lasting influence on the PLA. Even today, the institution's identity, strategy, doctrine, and structure are conditioned by these early experiences and myths. Mao's Army Goes to Sea will help US policymakers and scholars place China's recent maritime achievements in proper historical context-and provide insight into how its navy may act in the future.

Alfred Thayer Mahan has been called America s nineteenth-century evangelist of sea power and the intellectual father of the modern US Navy. His theories have a timeless appeal, and Chinese analysts now routinely invoke Mahan s writings, exhorting their nation to build a powerful navy.

Economics is the prime motivation for maritime reorientation, and securing the sea lanes that convey foreign energy supplies and other commodities now ranks near or at the top of China s list of military priorities. This book is the first systematic effort to test the interplay between Western military thought and Chinese strategic traditions vis- -vis the nautical arena. It uncovers some universal axioms about how theories of sea power influence the behaviour of great powers and examines how Mahanian thought could shape China s encounters on the high seas. Empirical analysis adds a new dimension to the current debate over China s rise and its importance for international relations. The findings also clarify the possible implications of China s maritime rise for the United States, and illuminate how the two powers can manage their bilateral interactions on the high seas.

Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century will be of much interest to students of naval history, Chinese politics and security studies.

The Indian Ocean, with its critical routes for global commerce, is a potentially volatile location for geopolitical strife. Even as the region's role in the international economy and as a highway to conflict zones increases, the US has failed to advance a coherent strategy for protecting its interests in the Indian Ocean or for managing complex diplomatic relationships across the region. "The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy" presents a range of viewpoints about whether and how the US should alter its diplomatic and military strategies for this region.

Contributors examine US interests in the Indian Ocean, assess the relative critical importance or imperiled nature of these interests, and propose solutions for American strategy ranging from minimal change to maximum engagement. The book concludes with a comparative assessment of these options and a discussion of their implications for US policymakers. This volume's perspectives and analysis of the Indian Ocean region will be valued by scholars and students of US foreign policy, South Asia, and security studies as well as by diplomats, military officers, and other practitioners.

This is the first academic study of India's emerging maritime strategy, and offers a systematic analysis of the interplay between Western military thought and Indian maritime traditions. By a quirk of historical fate, Europe embarked on its Age of Discovery just as the main Asian powers were renouncing the sea, ushering in centuries of Western dominance. In the 21st century, however, Asian states are once again resuming a naval focus, with both China and India dedicating some of their new-found wealth to building powerful navies and coast guards, and drawing up maritime strategies to govern the use of these forces. The United States, like the British Empire before it, is attempting to manage these rising sea powers while preserving its maritime primacy. This book probes how India looks at the sea, what kind of strategy and seagoing forces New Delhi may craft in the coming years, and how Indian leaders may use these forces. It examines the material dimension, but its major premise is that navies represent a physical expression of a society's history, philosophical traditions, and culture. This book, then, ventures a comprehensive appraisal of Indian maritime strategy. This book will be of interest to students of sea power, strategic studies, Indian politics and Asian Studies in general. James R. Holmes is an Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. Toshi Yoshihara is an Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. Andrew C. Winner is Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

This is the first academic study of India's emerging maritime strategy, and offers a systematic analysis of the interplay between Western military thought and Indian maritime traditions.

By a quirk of historical fate, Europe embarked on its Age of Discovery just as the main Asian powers were renouncing the sea, ushering in centuries of Western dominance. In the 21st century, however, Asian states are once again resuming a naval focus, with both China and India dedicating some of their new-found wealth to building powerful navies and coast guards, and drawing up maritime strategies to govern the use of these forces. The United States, like the British Empire before it, is attempting to manage these rising sea powers while preserving its maritime primacy.

This book probes how India looks at the sea, what kind of strategy and seagoing forces New Delhi may craft in the coming years, and how Indian leaders may use these forces. It examines the material dimension, but its major premise is that navies represent a physical expression of a society's history, philosophical traditions, and culture. This book, then, ventures a comprehensive appraisal of Indian maritime strategy.

This book will be of interest to students of sea power, strategic studies, Indian politics and Asian Studies in general.

James R. Holmes is an Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. Toshi Yoshihara is an Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. Andrew C. Winner is Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

Alfred Thayer Mahan has been called America's nineteenth-century 'evangelist of sea power' and the intellectual father of the modern US Navy. His theories have a timeless appeal, and Chinese analysts now routinely invoke Mahan's writings, exhorting their nation to build a powerful navy.

Economics is the prime motivation for maritime reorientation, and securing the sea lanes that convey foreign energy supplies and other commodities now ranks near or at the top of China's list of military priorities. This book is the first systematic effort to test the interplay between Western military thought and Chinese strategic traditions vis-a-vis the nautical arena. It uncovers some universal axioms about how theories of sea power influence the behaviour of great powers and examines how Mahanian thought could shape China's encounters on the high seas. Empirical analysis adds a new dimension to the current debate over China's 'rise' and its importance for international relations. The findings also clarify the possible implications of China's maritime rise for the United States, and illuminate how the two powers can manage their bilateral interactions on the high seas.

Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century will be of much interest to students of naval history, Chinese politics and security studies.

A "second nuclear age" has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakout in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must size up the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy - that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain - the book distinguishes itself from familiar net assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the emphasis varies from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor - the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, stimulate, and challenge readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, timeliness, and usefulness and interest to a wide readership. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

Mao Tse-tung counseled, "To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds." Few concepts mesh so contextually with Mao than the Chinese approach to Information Warfare (IW). As the People's Republic of China struggles with its national military strategy, IW offers opportunities to win wars without the traditional clash of arms. In this monograph, Mr. Toshi Yoshihara explores what he perceives to be China's pursuit of IW as a method of fighting asymmetric warfare against the United States. Largely imitative of U.S. thoughts, literature, and practices on IW, he believes the Chinese are seeking ways to adapt it to their own style of warfare. Paradoxically, he observes that the Chinese have not gleaned their intelligence through espionage, but through careful scrutiny of U.S. IW in practice. The Persian Gulf War and Kosovo conflict have provided ample largess to the Chinese ...

Mao Tse-tung counseled, "To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds." Few concepts mesh so contextually with Mao than the Chinese approach to Information Warfare (IW). As the People's Republic of China struggles with its national military strategy, IW offers opportunities to win wars without the traditional clash of arms. In this monograph, Mr. Toshi Yoshihara explores what he perceives to be China's pursuit of IW as a method of fighting asymmetric warfare against the United States. Largely imitative of U.S. thoughts, literature, and practices on IW, he believes the Chinese are seeking ways to adapt it to their own style of warfare. Paradoxically, he observes that the Chinese have not gleaned their intelligence through espionage, but through careful scrutiny of U.S. IW in practice. The Persian Gulf War and Kosovo conflict have provided ample largess to the Chinese archives. Mr. Yoshihara examines those aspects of IW-PSYOPS, Denial, and Deception-that China believes provides the greatest prospects for victory in a conflict. Not surprisingly, Sun Tzu is interwoven into this emerging theory. Targeting the enemy's "nervous system" at all levels, that is, his ability to gather and assess information and then transmit orders, provides significant advantages in the prosecution of a campaign. Targeting the enemy's homeland defenses and its citizens can potentially end a war before it even starts. He concludes that the extent of Chinese advances or intent regarding IW is difficult to ascertain given its closed society. Chinese IW may still be nascent, but the menacing intent is there and only vigilance will protect the United States. Much in the realm of IW remains speculative and conceptual. Aspiring nations can take advantage of the Revolution in Military Affairs by skipping generations of technology and becoming a modern, sophisticated threat, obviating the need for significant financial investments. The consequences of the threat are of great import to today's strategic leaders and thinkers. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate that will continue into the millennium. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute

The U.S.-South Korean alliance faces significant challenges caused by transitions in both countries, including political and demographic change in South Korea and fast-paced adjustments to America's national security strategy in the face of a new global and regional strategic landscape. These are stressful circumstances, but they also present opportunities for improving alliance relations. Careful planning and effective communication at various levels (including the public level) is needed to minimize the stress and to capitalize on the opportunities. The study examines the complex dynamics at work and explores how U.S. policymakers can work with their counterparts in Seoul to diversify the alliance and prepare it to better serve the national interests of both the United States and a future united Korea.

Combining a close knowledge of Asia and an ability to tap Chinese-language sources with naval combat experience and expertise in sea-power theory, the authors assess how the rise of Chinese sea power will affect U.S. maritime strategy in Asia. They argue that China has laid the groundwork for a sustained challenge to American primacy in maritime Asia, and to defend this hypothesis they look back to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theories, now popular with the Chinese. The book considers how strategic thought about the sea shapes Beijing’s deliberations and compares China’s geostrategic predicament to that of the Kaiser’s Germany a century ago. It examines the Chinese navy’s operational concepts, tactics, and capabilities and appraises China’s missile force. The authors conclude that China now presents a challenge to America’s strategic position of such magnitude that Washington must compete in earnest.

Asia is headed toward an uncertain and potentially volatile future in the maritime arena. The two rising Asian powers, China and India, dependent as they are on seaborne commerce for their economic well-being, have clearly set their eyes on the high seas. Yoshihara and Holmes offer a stark warning that many strategists in Beijing and New Delhi appear spellbound by the more militant visions of sea power. Indeed, both powers appear poised to develop the capacity to control the sea lanes through which the bulk of their commerce flows. If they enter the nautical environment with such a martial mindset, Asia could very well fall victim to regional rivalries that give rise to a vicious cycle of competition. Yoshihara and Holmes provide the first examination of the simultaneous rise of two naval powers and the potential impact that such an oceanic reconfiguration of power in Asia could have on long-term regional stability. Their study analyzes the maritime interests and strategies of the littoral states in Asia as they prepare for the expected reordering of nautical affairs. This long-overdue assessment revisits underlying assumptions that have prevailed among strategy-makers and provides a concrete policy framework for reducing the risk of confrontation in Asian waters.