This study argues that the spread of violent extremism cannot be fully understood as an ideological or social phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process that integrates the two forces in a coevolutionary manner. The same forces that make an ideology appealing to some aggrieved group of people are not necessarily the same factors that promote its transfer through social networks of self-interested human beings. As a result, radicalization inexorably intertwines social and ideological forces in systemic fashion. The coevolutionary nature of the social and ideological spheres presents a unique challenge and is one of the reasons that rigorous efforts to identify a radical or terrorist profile have not yielded significant return. Efforts to develop an archetype often focuses on individual traits, but it may be that profiles based on social and ideological behavior need to be considered simultaneously in developing a theory that is actionable for counter-terrorism practitioners. Key insights from the theoretical and empirical discussions that follow provide new insights into the social patterns of violent extremists over time, which are important to understanding radicalization. The analysis of domestic terrorism data shows that, to date, there is little evidence of lone wolf jihadists. There are very few people who progress to violent action in isolation, and those that do so are often motivated by other forces such as mental health issues or other political grievances. Many radicals have a history of social contact or reaching out to develop relationships with like-minded individuals. Social relationships follow a nonlinear pattern. They are increasingly important in the early stages of radicalization and peak when people accept a violent doctrine. Developing new relationships becomes less important once individuals come to adopt radical beliefs. The empirical analysis suggests that the search for external validation of radical ideas is most important in the early stages of an individual's radicalization and declines in importance once the barriers to entry are overcome. There is also a nonlinear relationship observed in the data analyzed here between social ties and ideological affinity, whereby those primed for affinity through exposure to radical ideas in early schooling have as many close social ties as those with completely secular schooling. Individuals in between these two extremes averaged fewer close connections, which challenges conventional wisdom about ideological predisposition and social relationships. The importance of self-serving extremism has not been well recognized. Individuals who recruit others gain social status for their efforts, meaning that the spread of extremism may be just as much a function of self-interest as ideological fervor. This has important implications understanding and countering violent extremism. The growth of radical groups is a self-organizing process driven by aggregation of individual behavior, where the entry catalyst into an extremist cell most likely takes the form of someone who recruits one, two or three other participants. This self-organization produces cells that have many close-knit people, or can easily access others, meaning that such groups are well suited to facilitation and monitoring. By contrast, such cells are much less likely to have many gatekeepers or brokers who operate between cliques.

The year 1996 was a watershed moment for Usama bin Ladin. It was a time of transition in which he fled Sudan in exile, returned to Afghanistan with the leadership of al-Qaida and wrote a letter (risala) declaring war against the Saudi Kingdom and the United States. Prior to publishing his risala in August of that year, Usama bin Ladin sought legal backing for a declaration of jihad against the ongoing American presence in Saudi Arabia from prominent religious scholars (ulama) including Yunus Khalis. The scant available evidence suggests that at that time Bin Ladin and Khalis had a friendly relationship dating back to the days of the anti-Soviet jihad, when Yunus Khalis had led one of the most important mujahidin political parties in eastern Afghanistan. In fact, Bin Ladin was probably staying in a residence at Khalis's Najm al-Jihad neighborhood shortly before he issued a call for support for his forthcoming declaration of jihad. But if Bin Ladin was hoping for a positive response on the basis of his personal connection to Khalis, he was to be disappointed. In his answer to Usama bin Ladin, Khalis reasoned that as long as the lawful government in Riyadh continued to allow the Americans to stay as guests, then no jihad was permissible. Additionally, Khalis argued that it was foolish to work for the overthrow of the Saudi government since any replacement would probably be a less enthusiastic supporter of Islamic law (shari a). In other words, Khalis apparently rebuked Usama bin Ladin's extremist ideology at the precise moment when the al-Qaida leader had chosen to publicly declare an international jihad against the Saudi Kingdom and its American allies. Abd al-Kabir Talai expands on this anecdote by explaining that Yunus Khalis had initially attempted to mediate between the Saudi government and Usama bin Ladin after the relationship between the two parties soured earlier in the 1990s. According to Talai's account, Khalis was able to get the Saudis to agree to negotiate with Bin Ladin, but the talks fell through because the al-Qaida leader set unacceptable conditions for a normalization of relations. Even though Bin Ladin apparently appreciated Khalis's friendship and personal support enough to refer to him as "the Father Sheikh," the only known primary sources relate that every time Khalis offered Bin Ladin political advice, the al-Qaida leader ignored him. These episodes, never before reported in the secondary literature, come from a group of several previously unstudied primary sources in Pashto on the life of Yunus Khalis, which form the basis of this report. These sources are an excellent starting point for a critique of the current literature on Khalis's connection to al-Qaida, in part because they depart so radically from the currently dominant depictions of Yunus Khalis as an ultraconservative sexual predator who became the key al-Qaida supporter in Nangarhar when Bin Ladin fled Sudan.

This scarce antiquarian book is a selection from Kessinger Publishing's Legacy Reprint Series. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment to protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature. Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

This manual is a guide for commanders and instructors in presenting instruction and training in the mechanical operation of the M1 rifle. It includes a detailed description of the rifle and its general characteristics; procedures for dis-assembly and assembly; methods of loading; an explanation of functioning; a discussion of stoppages and immediate action; a description of the ammunition; and instructions on the care and cleaning of both the weapon and ammunition. The material presented is applicable, without modification, to both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare.

This scarce antiquarian book is a selection from Kessinger Publishings Legacy Reprint Series. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment to protecting, preserving, and promoting the worlds literature. Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!