|
Showing 1 - 6 of
6 matches in All Departments
On 13 July 2008, nine American Soldiers perished while fighting a
pitched battle in the village of Wanat in Afghanistan's Waygal
Valley. On that day, the men of Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d
Parachute Infantry Regiment, endured four hours of intense close
quarters combat and mounting casualties. The contingent of 49
United States and 24 Afghan National Army Soldiers valiantly
defended their small outpost against a coordinated attack by a
determined insurgent force armed with rocket propelled grenades and
automatic weapons. Despite the initial advantage of tactical
surprise and numerical superiority, it was the insurgents who
ultimately broke contact and withdrew from Combat Outpost Kahler.
Army historians recognized the need to better understand the Battle
of Wanat and ensure those who followed learned from the experiences
of the courageous Soldiers who defended their outpost with such
tenacity. As initial reports from the battle were received, the
Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas began to
prepare a historical analysis of the circumstances of the Battle of
Wanat, launching an exhaustive research effort that produced a
comprehensive and compelling example of contemporary history. This
study offers an objective narrative of the events surrounding the
Battle of Wanat. It does not seek to draw final conclusions or to
second guess decisions made before or during the heat of battle.
Rather, it is an implement of learning, allowing the reader to see
the events of that day through the eyes of the leaders and Soldiers
of Task Force Rock. It is meant to provide context to the chaos and
complexity of modern conflict, and to help the reader better
understand and appreciate the nature of operations in an era of
persistent conflict. Finally, this study serves to honor and
preserve the memories of the nine brave men who gave their lives at
Combat Outpost Kahler.
Disrupting an insurgent's access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a
critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent
forces. By denying an inurgent's access to safe havens early in the
conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over
the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of
how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural
borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the
counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to
accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical
terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the
overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce
success. Through the examination of the British experience in the
North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 and the counterinsurgent efforts in
the Sultanate of Oman's Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975, one can
develop techniques for applying border control operations to
disrupt insurgent safe-havens. Border control efforts are not the
decisive effort within a counterinsurgency, but they are critical
to defeating the insurgent's ability to maintain their ability to
conduct operations.
Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security
forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security
forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or
military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited
locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area.
Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other
available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of
themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be
effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering,
surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may
prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces
are no silver bullet to achieving success. Counterinsurgency is a
struggle for the support of the population against an active and
thinking enemy and therefore, there are no hard and fast rules.
Several counterinsurgency scholars and theorists do, however, agree
on several key principles that can aid counterinsurgents in
prosecuting their campaigns successfully. This paper seeks to add
to the body of knowledge by examining the key aspects that
counterinsurgents should take into account when considering raising
an irregular security force.
Originally published in 1990 by the U.S. Army Combat Studies
Institute. From April to June 1945, U.S. and Imperial Japanese Army
(lJA) forces fought fiercely for control of the island of Okinawa.
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHO) had determined
after U.S. strikes on Truk in February 1944 that sooner or later
the Americans would seize Okinawa as a forward base for the
invasion of Japan. The IJA 32d Army was established on Okinawa in
March 1944 to forestall this eventuality and immediately faced the
challenge of how to deal not only with superior numbers of U.S.
troops but also with overwhelming American firepower by air, land,
and sea. The 32d Army's innovative staff had one year in which to
invent and implement a new form of underground warfare that would
be proof against the Americans' abundant bombs and tanks. Their
methods were devised in the field in defiance both of the IJA's
traditional light infantry doctrine and of IGHO's preoccupation
with air power.
|
|