In the 77 days from 20 January to 18 March of 1968, two divisions of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) surrounded a regiment of U.S. Marines on a mountain plateau in the northwest corner of South Vietnam known as Khe sanh. The episode was no accident; it was in fact a carefully orchestrated meeting in which both sides got what they wanted. The north Vietnamese succeeded in surrounding the Marines in a situation in many ways similar to Dien Bien Phu, and may have been seeking similar tactical, operational, and strategic results. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the joint U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), meanwhile, sought to lure the NVA into the unpopulated terrain around the 26th Marines in order to wage a battle of annihilation with air power. In this respect Khe Sanh has been lauded as a great victory of air power, a military instrument of dubious suitability to much of the Vietnam conflict. The facts support the assessment that air power was the decisive element at Khe Sanh, delivering more than 96 percent of the ordnance used against the NVA. This work focuses mainly on fixed-wing close air support, or the support provided by jet and propeller-driven conventional aircraft, to the general exclusion of rotary-wing aircraft, also known as helicopters. There are several reasons for this, none of which are meant to belittle the contributions or heroism of the Marine, Army, and Air Force helicopter pilots who fought in the hills around Khe Sanh. First, until the arrival of the AH-1G Cobra in April 1969, there was no helicopter designed for dedicated close air support of Marines in Vietnam. The primary gunship during the battle of Khe Sanh was the UH-1E outfitted with machine guns and rocket launchers for the escort of unarmed helicopters. These helicopters were sometimes used for the direct support of ground troops with suppressive fires and were frequently used as forward air controllers, spotting and marking targets for fixed-wing aircraft with heavier ordnance. These roles are appropriately discussed alongside the contributions of the fixed-wing aircraft, but as a general rule, analysis remains focused on the heavier attack aircraft.

U.S. Marines as advisors have a long history, from Presley O'Bannon at Tripoli through Iraq and Afghanistan via Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Vietnam. While most Marines think of the Vietnamese Marine Corps as the primary advisory experience during that conflict, others served with various other advisory programs with the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Joint Special Operations, and U.S. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. One of these is the subject of this study: Marine advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). This narrative is a combination of experience, research, and reflection. While other journalistic or academic accounts have been published, this is a narrative of participants. Many historians consider the two most effective counterinsurgency organizations employed during the Vietnam War to have been the PRU and USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP). In both cases, U.S. Marines played a significant role in the success of these innovative programs. It should be pointed out, however, that the number of U.S. Marines assigned to these programs was small and the bulk of the forces were locally recruited fighters. Both programs used a small cadre of Marines providing leadership, training, and combat support for large numbers of indigenous troops, and in so doing, capitalized on the inherent strengths of each. The author believes that both of these programs have applicability in any counterinsurgency where U.S. forces are called upon to assist a host government. Obviously, adjustments to these programs would have to be made to take into account local conditions, but the core concept of providing U.S. Marines to command or advise local militia and special police units is one that has great promise for success. With a clear understanding of why the PRUs and CAPs worked, and with the necessary adjustments to take into account local conditions, similar units can be created to defeat future insurgencies. With this in mind, the author hopes that this work will provide U.S. military planners with insights into creating and managing units capable of defeating a well-organized and highly motivated insurgent political infrastructure.

Includes many full color illustrations and maps.

The author first served with Vietnamese Marines in 1972 when they came on board the U.S. Navy ships that Battalion Landing Team 1/9 was embarked on. They were preparing for an amphibious landing to counter the North Vietnamese Army's Spring Offensive in Military Region 1 (I Corps) in South Vietnam. They brought with them their U.S. Marine advisors who were known by the senior members of the battalion. They had already witnessed or heard of the exploits of then-Captain John Ripley and Lieutenant Colonel Gerry Turley in blunting the initial attacks of the Easter Offensive. As the Vietnamese were formed into helicopter or boat teams and fed a meal before going ashore, they bantered with the American Marines and Sailors, telling them to come along to "kill communists." After a turbulent start to the offensive, the Vietnamese Marines exhibited the fighting spirit that elite units create for themselves. This was reflected in the various names of their battalions that were the focus of their unit identification. The infantry battalions had a series of nicknames and slogans that were reflected on their unit insignia: 1st Battalion's "Wild Bird," 2d Battalion's "Crazy Buffalo," 3d Battalion's "SeaWolf," 4th Battalion's "Killer Shark," 5th Battalion's "Black Dragon," 6th Battalion's "Sacred Bird," 7th Battalion's "Black Tiger," 8th Battalion's "Sea Eagle," and 9th Battalion's "Mighty Tiger." For the artillery units, this was the 1st Battalion's "Lightning Fire," 2d Battalion's "Sacred Arrow," and 3d Battalion's "Sacred Bow." Support and service battalions followed this example as well. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade and its embarked troops provided helicopters, amphibious tractors, and landing craft support for a series of attacks leading to the recapture of Quang Tri City through the fall of 1972. In addition, command and control facilities and liaison were provided to the Republic of Vietnam's I Corps and Military Advisory Command Vietnam's 1st Regional Advisory Command in the sustained counteroffensive. This reinforced the impression made by the Vietnamese Marines themselves. This began the interest in the story that follows. The period after World War II saw a number of associated Marine Corps formed in the republics of China, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. They had been founded, with the help of foreign military aid, to fight the various conflicts to contain communist expansion in the region. Also present at various times were other Marines from the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. The beginnings of the Cold War witnessed this proliferation of amphibious forces in Asia, in part because of the reputation the U.S. Marines had earned in the cross Pacific drive against Japan and in other postwar confrontations. This is about one of them, the Vietnamese Marine Corps or Thuy Quan Luc Chien (TQLC). This occasional paper provides documents on the topics of the Vietnamese Marines and the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit from this period.

Includes FULL COLOR maps and illustrations. Presents a significant look at the cold weather and mountain training facility of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Sierra Nevada mountain range of California.

Illusrated with full color maps and photographs. U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism series. Covers the combat service support operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom between November 2002 and October 2003. Tells a story of reorganization, preparation, and execution by the 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups.

Illusrated with full color maps and photographs. U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism series. Covers the combat service support operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom between November 2002 and October 2003. Tells a story of reorganization, preparation, and execution by the 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups.

Includes many full color illustrations and maps.

Includes FULL COLOR maps and illustrations. Presents a significant look at the cold weather and mountain training facility of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Sierra Nevada mountain range of California.

Represents one of the earliest efforts to chronicle Marine Corps operations in Iraq between 2004-2005. Commissioned and written while U.S. forces were still engaged in combat operations in Iraq. Contains maps to help orientate and familiarize readers to Iraq, al-Anbar Province, and the two battles for Fallujah. Contains photographs of commanders, combat operations, equipment, and civil-military operations.