This recently declassified study from June 1965 outlines the role of Headquarters USAF in aiding the South Vietnamese effort to defeat the communist-led Viet Cong. The author begins by discussing general U.S. policy leading to increased military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. He then describes the principal USAF deployments and augmentations, Air Force efforts to obtain a larger military planning role, some facets of plans and operations, the Air Force-Army divergencies over the use and control of air power in combat training and in testing, defoliation activities, and USAF support for the Vietnamese Air Force. The study ends with an account of events leading to the overthrow of the Diem government in Saigon late in 1963.

Written in 1959, this study is based chiefly on the raw materials of historical vriting--messages and correspondence--and command and unit reports on the operations available at that time. State Department, JCS, Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps materials were used in its preparation. This study is of special significance in connection with planning and preparations for local wars and incidents. In this operation the American forces experienced no combat action, but the possibility of action was constant and the deployment of forces to the objective area was of first importance. To achieve a meaningful historical context for the military operations, the political and diplomatic background has been presented in some detail.

First published in 1968, this study reviews the political background and top level discussions leading to the renewed bombing campaign in early 1966, the restrictions still imposed on air operations, and the positions taken on them by the military chiefs. It discusses the various studies and events which led to the president's decision to strike at North Vietnam's oil storage facilities and the results of those mid-year attacks. It also examines the increasing effectiveness of enemy air defenses and the continuing assessments of the air campaign under way at year's end.

This recently declassified 1965 monograph covers generally the so-called national guided missile program that slowly evolved between the closing months of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War. More particularly, the monograph treats the interplay among the numerous national security agencies as it concerned guided missiles. The guided missile was among the first weapon systems to be subjected to the disadvantages as well as the advantages of constant scrutiny and intervention at the interservice level. Moreover, this condition was aggravated no little by the interest, but not the forceful leadership, of a number of joint and other national security agencies a niche or more above the level of the services. In a sense, then, the guided missile became the "guinea pig" from which grew the paradoxical situation of both a centralization and proliferation of authority and responsibility over weapon development and use.