International law is an underdeveloped branch of legal research: researchers still disagree over the proper understanding of several of its most fundamental issues, and genuinely so. This book helps to explain why. It brings clarity that will no doubt make international legal research more rational, which in turn vouches for a more productive legal discourse. The author, together with invited contributors, builds an argument around theories of epistemological justification. As chapters contend, in international legal discourse, the construction of knowledge about international law presupposes some notion of an international legal system. International legal discourse accommodates several such notions. Each notion derives from a different conception of law. Thus, depending on whether a researcher endorses a legal positivist's, a legal idealist's or a legal realist's conception of law, he or she will be constructing knowledge of international law under different epistemic conditions. The book sheds considerable light on these different conditions, with several chapters exploring how the different notions of an international legal system play out in the context of a series of concrete themes of legal practice. In doing so, the book helps to build a bridge between the practical and more philosophical aspects of this topic. This book will be an ideal companion for scholars of international law. Lawyers and students interested in legal theory and philosophy will also benefit from this thought-provoking study.

Whilst the concept of jus cogens has grown increasingly more important in public international law, lawyers remain hugely divided both over what precisely confers a jus cogens status on a norm, and what this conferral implies in terms of legal consequences. In this ground-breaking book, Ulf Linderfalk clearly and succinctly explores the reasons for this divide in order to facilitate more rational and productive future discourse. Offering a new focus for jus cogens research, this insightful work moves beyond traditionally designed investigations of the application of jus cogens in international law and instead analyses the many implicit basic assumptions held by participants in international legal discourse, and the way in which these assumptions explain their various claims. Clarifying the precise relationship between submitted propositions and a legal positivist or legal idealist frame of mind, this captivating book will influence not only the future understanding and practice of international law, but also its codification and progressive development. Scholars and advanced students of public international law, and international legal theory especially, will find this book a stimulating and novel read. Practitioners and judicial bodies will also benefit from a deeper understanding of the many issues and influences surrounding the concept of jus cogens.

This is the first comprehensive account of the modern international law of treaty interpretation expressed in 1969 Vienna Convention, Articles 31-33. As stated by the anonymous referee, it is the most theoretically advanced and analytically refined work yet accomplished on this topic. The style of writing is clear and concise, and the organisation of the book meets the demands of scholars and practitioners alike.

In the practice of modern international law, disputes as to the meaning of specific treaty provisions are a frequent occurrence. It is the assumption underlying any such dispute that in a process of interpretation a distinction has to be made between the legally correct and incorrect interpretation result. The legal correctness of an interpretation result is determined by reference to the relevant international law, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Articles 31-33. Hence, the regime laid down in VCLT Articles 31-33 will have to be described as a system of rules. This book investigates the contents and structure of this system. By importing knowledge from linguistics, and pragmatics in particular, a model is established giving representation to the concept of a rule of interpretation. Drawing on this model, the book then proceeds to reconstruct the contents of the various rules of interpretation.