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This volume is a collection of original essays focusing on a wide
range of topics in the History and Philosophy of Science. It is a
festschrift for Peter Machamer, which includes contributions from
scholars who, at one time or another, were his students. The essays
bring together analyses of issues and debates spanning from early
modern science and philosophy through the 21st century. Machamer's
influence is reflected in the volume's broad range of topics. These
include: underdetermination, scientific practice, scientific
models, mechanistic explanation in contemporary and historical
science, values in science, the relationship between philosophy and
psychology, experimentation, supervenience and reductionism.
This volume is a collection of original essays focusing on a wide
range of topics in the History and Philosophy of Science. It is a
festschrift for Peter Machamer, which includes contributions from
scholars who, at one time or another, were his students. The essays
bring together analyses of issues and debates spanning from early
modern science and philosophy through the 21st century. Machamer's
influence is reflected in the volume's broad range of topics. These
include: underdetermination, scientific practice, scientific
models, mechanistic explanation in contemporary and historical
science, values in science, the relationship between philosophy and
psychology, experimentation, supervenience and reductionism.
Recent philosophy and history of science has seen a surge of
interest in the role of concepts in scientific research. Scholars
working in this new field focus on scientific concepts, rather than
theories, as units of analysis and on the ways in which concepts
are formed and used rather than on what they represent. They
analyze what has traditionally been called the context of
discovery, rather than (or in addition to) the context of
justification. And they examine the dynamics of research rather
than the status of the finished research results. This volume
provides detailed case studies and general analyses to address
questions raised by these points, such as: - Can concepts be
clearly distinguished from the sets of beliefs we have about their
referents? - What - if any - sense can be made of the separation
between concepts and theories? - Can we distinguish between
empirical and theoretical concepts? - Are there interesting
similarities and differences between the role of concepts in the
empirical sciences and in mathematics? - What underlying notion of
investigative practice could be drawn on to explicate the role of
concept in such practice? - From a philosophical point of view, is
the distinction between discovery and justification a helpful frame
of reference for inquiring into the dynamics of research? - From a
historiographical point of view, does a focus on concepts face the
danger of falling back into an old-fashioned history of ideas?
twentieth-century literature about the distinction between
explanation and und- standing)? Second, can we do justice to a
particular writer's notion of that category by taking at face value
what he writes about his own motivation for adopting it? In
response to both types of questions, there is by now a consensus
amongst many historians of science and of philosophy that (a)
intellectual history - like other kinds of history - has to be
careful not to uncritically adopt actors' categories, and (b) more
generally, even the actors' own thinking about a particular issue
has to be contextualized vis-a-vis their other intellectual
commitments and interests, as well as the complex conditions that
make the totality of their commitments possible. Such conditions
include cognitive as well as practical, institutional, and cultural
factors. The articles in this volume respond to these challenges in
several ways. For example, one author (Christopher Pincock) seeks
to read some of the nineteen- century philosophical writings about
Erklaren and Verstehen as standing for a more fundamental problem,
which he terms the problem of the "unity of experience.""
twentieth-century literature about the distinction between
explanation and und- standing)? Second, can we do justice to a
particular writer's notion of that category by taking at face value
what he writes about his own motivation for adopting it? In
response to both types of questions, there is by now a consensus
amongst many historians of science and of philosophy that (a)
intellectual history - like other kinds of history - has to be
careful not to uncritically adopt actors' categories, and (b) more
generally, even the actors' own thinking about a particular issue
has to be contextualized vis-a-vis their other intellectual
commitments and interests, as well as the complex conditions that
make the totality of their commitments possible. Such conditions
include cognitive as well as practical, institutional, and cultural
factors. The articles in this volume respond to these challenges in
several ways. For example, one author (Christopher Pincock) seeks
to read some of the nineteen- century philosophical writings about
Erklaren and Verstehen as standing for a more fundamental problem,
which he terms the problem of the "unity of experience.""
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