This book brings new ideas to bear on the classical psychological problem of the self. A distinguished interdisciplinary group of contributors explore Neisser's hypothesis that each of us has an "ecological self" based on our immediate situation in the environment and an "interpersonal self" established through social interaction. These aspects of the self, which are based on accurate perception, appear early in infancy. They have implications for topics ranging from motor development to psychopathology to nonverbal communication, to social philosophy. The Perceived Self explores these notions with topics that range from the perceptual and social development of infants to autism and blindness; from mechanisms of motor control to dance and nonverbal communication; as well as from ecological theory to the work of social philosophers such as G.H. Mead and Martin Buber.

In Remembering Reconsidered, the new ecologically oriented study of memory makes contact with more traditional approaches. The emerging result may be what several of the authors have begun to call 'functionalism': a concern with the adaptive significance of memory in ordinary life coupled with a careful analysis of the variables on which it depends. In different ways, the chapters reflect this concern. The editors bring together a diverse collection of studies on remembering, using subjects ranging from folk songs to 'crib talk'. Introductory chapters weave these themes together, developing an underlying sense of the project of the volume as a whole. This is the second volume in the Emory Symposia on Cognition. The Emory Cognition Project, directed by Ulric Neisser, emphasizes an ecological approach to problems in theoretical, experimental, and applied cognitive psychology.

First published in 1967, this seminal volume by Ulric Neisser was the first attempt at a comprehensive and accessible survey of Cognitive Psychology; as such, it provided the field with its first true textbook. Its chapters are organized so that they began with stimulus information that came 'inward' through the organs of sense, through its many transformations and reconstructions, and finally through to its eventual use in thought and memory. The volume inspired numerous students enter the field of cognitive psychology and some of the today's leading and most respected cognitive psychologists cite Neisser's book as the reason they embarked on their careers.

First published in 1967, this seminal volume by Ulric Neisser was the first attempt at a comprehensive and accessible survey of Cognitive Psychology; as such, it provided the field with its first true textbook. Its chapters are organized so that they began with stimulus information that came 'inward' through the organs of sense, through its many transformations and reconstructions, and finally through to its eventual use in thought and memory. The volume inspired numerous students enter the field of cognitive psychology and some of the today's leading and most respected cognitive psychologists cite Neisser's book as the reason they embarked on their careers.

What is the self-concept and how does it develop? Do people in different cultures have sharply different concepts of self? Can we believe what our informants tell us on this point? What is known about the self-concepts of depressives? of schizophrenics? How does meditation affect the sense of self? Is there an inner 'self of selves' as James once suggested? These are, of course, hotly debated questions in the social sciences. In this book a prestigious group of psychologists, linguists, anthropologists and philosophers addresses these questions and presents some surprising answers. This is the third and last of the Emory Symposia organized around Ulric Neisser's cognitive theory of self-knowledge, it goes beyond The Perceived Self and The Remembering Self to deal with psychological and philosophical questions surrounding the self.

Recollections of unexpected and emotional events (called 'flashbulb' memories) have long been the subject of theoretical speculation. Previous meetings have brought together everyone who has done research on memories of the Challenger explosion, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of flashbulb memories. How do flashbulb memories compare with other kinds of recollections? Are they unusually accurate, or especially long-lived? Do they reflect the activity of a special mechanism, as has been suggested? Although Affect and Accuracy in Recall focuses on flashbulb memories, it addresses more general issues of affect and accuracy. Do emotion and arousal strengthen memory? If so, under what conditions? By what physiological mechanisms? This 1993 volume is evidence of progress made in memory research since Brown and Kulick's 1977 paper.

This book brings different ideas to bear on the classical problem of the self. Self-perception, both ecological and social, is the earliest and most fundamental form of self-knowledge. In his introduction, Ulric Neisser describes the 'ecological self' as based on direct and realistic perception of one's situation in the environment; the 'interpersonal self' as established by social interaction with other people. He argues that both of these 'selves' appear in early infancy, long before anything like a self-concept or a self-narrative is possible. In subsequent chapters, fifteen contributors - psychologists, philosophers and others - elaborate on these notions and introduce related ideas of their own. Their topics range from the perceptual and social development of infants to autism and blindness; from mechanisms of motor control to dance and non-verbal communication. The combined contributions of these leading individuals creates an unusual synthesis of perceptual, social and developmental theory.

For years, thinkers have debated the meaning and origin of the self-concept. Among contested issues are how people in different cultures can have sharply different concepts of self, what can be known about the self-concepts of depressives and schizophrenics, how meditation can affect the sense of self, and if there is an inner "self of selves," as James once suggested. In this collection, a prestigious group of psychologists, anthropologists, and philosophers addresses these topics and presents some surprising answers. This is the third and last of the Emory Symposia organized around Ulric Neisser's cognitive theory of self-knowledge; it goes beyond The Perceived Self and The Remembering Self to deal with some of the oldest--as well as some of the newest--psychological and philosophical questions surrounding the concept of self.

In Remembering Reconsidered the new ecologically-oriented study of memory makes contact with more traditional approaches. The problems considered by the authors include memory for randomly selected daily events, for folk ballads, for early childhood experiences, for thoughts, for events known secondhand, for knowledge acquired years before and subjected to "reminding" in the laboratory, and for a variety of stimuli presented with theoretical questions in mind. The theme unifying the contributions, which is developed by the editors in their separate introductory chapters, is concerned with the adaptive significance of memory in daily life together with careful analysis of the variables on which it depends.

The contributors to this book bring a surprisingly wide range of intellectual disciplines to bear on the discussion of self-narrative and the self. Using the ecological/cognitive approach, The Remembering Self relates ideas from the experimental, developmental, and clinical study of memory to insights from postmodernism and literature. Although autobiographical remembering is an essential way of giving meaning to our lives, the memories we construct are never fully consistent and often simply wrong. In the first chapter, the authors consider the so-called false memory syndrome in this context; other contributors discuss the effects of amnesia, the development of remembering in childhood, the social construction of memory and its alleged self- servingness, and the contrast between literary and psychological models of the self.

Recollections of unexpected and emotional events (called "flashbulb" memories) have long been the subject of theoretical speculation. The fourth Emory Symposium on Cognition brought together everyone who has done research on memories of the Challenger explosion, in order to gain better understanding of the phenomenon of flashbulb memories: How do flashbulb memories compare with other kinds of recollections? Are they unusually accurate, or especially long-lived? Do they reflect the activity of a special mechanism, as has been suggested? The book also addresses more general issues of affect and accuracy: Do emotion and arousal strengthen memory? If so, under what conditions? By what physiological mechanisms?

Categories straddle the boundary between the mind and the world: they are socially developed mental representations, but they must fit the properties of real objects in the real environment if they are to be useful. Concepts and Conceptual Development reflects the view that a full understanding of categorization must take all these constraints into account. Everyday terms and categories depend not only on the implicit theories that people have about the world (their 'idealised cognitive models'), but also on the objective properties of particular objects and the perceptible similarities among these objects. An understanding of these multiple relationships can reshape studies of concepts and conceptual development. Concepts and Conceptual Development draws together theorists from a wide range of theoretical orientations to consider many different aspects of 'the psychology of concepts'.

This book brings a surprisingly wide range of intellectual disciplines to bear on the self-narrative and the self. The same ecological/cognitive approach that successfully organized Ulric Neisser's earlier volume on The Perceived Self now relates ideas from the experimental, developmental, and clinical study of memory to insights from post-modernism and literature. Although autobiographical remembering is an essential way of giving meaning to our lives, the memories we construct are never fully consistent and often simply wrong. In the first chapter, Neisser considers the so-called 'false memory syndrome' in this context; other contributors discuss the effects of amnesia, the development of remembering in childhood, the social construction of memory and its alleged self-servingness, and the contrast between literary and psychological models of the self. Jerome Bruner, Peggy Miller, Alan Baddeley, Kenneth Gergen and Daniel Albright are among the contributors to this unusual synthesis.