Although the US Army War College Department of National Security and Strategy and other departments use several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its core courses, this is not a textbook. It does reflect, however, both the method and manner the War College uses to teach the formulation of national security strategy to America's future senior leaders.

The U.S. Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2011 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information as Power. This is the sixth volume of an effort that began in 2006. The anthology is an important component of an effort to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into a curriculum to prepare our students for senior leadership positions. Broken into sections emphasizing information effects in the cyberspace domain and the cognitive dimension as well as information sharing, the anthology provides a holistic overview of important national security issues in that regard. We hope that "Information as Power" will serve not only to showcase the efforts of the College but to inform the broader body of knowledge as the Nation considers how best to operate effectively and proactively within this environment while countering our adversaries.

The U.S. Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2011 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information as Power. This is the sixth volume of an effort that began in 2006. The anthology is an important component of an effort to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into a curriculum to prepare our students for senior leadership positions. Broken into sections emphasizing information effects in the cyberspace domain and the cognitive dimension as well as information sharing, the anthology provides a holistic overview of important national security issues in that regard. We hope that "Information as Power" will serve not only to showcase the efforts of the College but to inform the broader body of knowledge as the Nation considers how best to operate effectively and proactively within this environment while countering our adversaries.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Field Artillery branch, more than any other branch in today's Army, has been asked to conduct in-lieu-of missions rather than its core fire support mission during conduct of the war. The associated potential deterioration of core competencies could possibly have a major impact in future operations.

The U.S. Army heavy conventional ground capability that crushed Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 no longer exists, and further reduction of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams are proposed based upon assumptions that there are no enemies willing to challenge alleged U.S. conventional warfare supremacy, or that if challengers arise, precision long range fires will neutralize them. A US Army War College student argues in this research paper that recent examples of hybrid warfare prove beyond any reasonable doubt the worth and utility of a robust, scalable heavy combined arms capability.

In the last few years, notions like 'asymmetric warfare, ' and, more recently, 'hybrid warfare' have become as common and pervasive as to appear like new orthodoxy in military thought. This U.S. Army War College International Fellow student author examines these theories through the lens of critical thinking and argues that these 'new' constructs are anything but original. Analyzing two historical case studies, the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE) and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902 CE), he demonstrates that asymmetry and hybridism have been common characteristics of war through the ages since the very beginning of humanity.

This strategy research project defines hybrid threats, examines the emergence of hybrid warfare, postulates reasons why hybrid warfare will be the dominant form of warfare that most sovereigns will apply in the twenty-first century, and analyzes U.S. Joint and Service hybrid warfare doctrine. The U.S. Army War College student author then recommends changes in strategy and doctrine to ensure the US military is prepared to counter this dangerous, growing threat for the next 25 years.

The United Kingdom Strategic Defense and Security Review published its findings on 20 October 2010. The central tenet of this review is that hybrid conflict, as seen most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the dominant feature of warfare in the twenty-first century. Speeches by senior British politicians and military leaders indicate that their vision for the future may be either misinformed or driven by economic factors rather than a comprehensive assessment of the future operating environment. With future force structures, organization and equipment procurement programs dependent on this vision, it is essential that they are based on the correct assumptions.

The 'hybrid' theory of war set forth in this document is the result of combining the best aspects of existing war theories with the unique influences of the current strategic environment to produce a refined theory of war for the modern international arena. The foundation of all war theories stems from four basic questions: What is war? Why and by whom are wars fought? What constitutes the nature, character and characteristics of war? How are wars won?

Within the North American community the hybrid threat of crime, terrorism and insurgency is an understudied area in terms of policy, strategy, and doctrine. In an effort to begin to address this area, and exploring those ideas in the particular context of Mexico, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute together with the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership co-convened a symposium on the subject in Washington D.C. in October 2011. This report on the symposium is a compilation of those proceedings, including the presentations that helped inform and generate the discussions.

This U.S. Army War College student author believes that a strategic stationing plan for existing THAAD and JLENS missile defense assets must be developed concurrent with acquisition of new air and missile defense capabilities. He argues: ---- Although the Army has conceptual plans and requirements for the development of new air and missile defense capabilities, specifically THAAD and JLENS, the Army has not defined a strategic employment / deployment plan to meet Combatant Commanders' demands. ---- Throughout the 1990s, the Army deployed PATRIOT task forces to Southwest Asia and South Korea with little overarching strategic planning balanced against competing and evolving demands for missile defense capabilities. ---- The constant deployments had an adverse impact on the AMD force from personnel, training, and operational readiness perspectives. ---- This caused the Army to reevaluate its employment plan to sustain operational demand without breaking the AMD force. The Army used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model with 1:2 dwell time as means to sustain operational commitments. ---- Combatant Commanders' immediate demand for THAAD and JLENS, as they come off the production lines and lack of a clear stationing plan, could lead to a repeat of these 1990's challenges.

This extract, the second chapter of a CSL's recently published book Sustainability and National Security, examines the concept of sustainability and its value as an explanatory variable in national security issues. The authors argue that sustainability is a valuable 'lens' which can help.

The concept of the responsibility to protect not only the peoples of one's own state but also those people of another sovereign state should that state fail to protect its people has emerged into the national and international debate. Many states, multinational organizations and the UN have adopted this concept to varying degrees. The U.S. has increasingly incorporated this concept into its political rhetoric. Military guidance, the QDR, along with statements from political leaders continue to stress the expectation that the U.S. will face the need to protect citizens of other states from humanitarian suffering from natural or manmade atrocities. The lessons learned from previous humanitarian crises, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur, and Burma have shaped the U.S.'s approach toward intervention. Trends and threats facing the nations of today have the potential to lead to destabilization of governments and threaten national, regional and global security.

For more than 3 decades, the term "hollow army" or the more expansive idiom, "hollow force," has represented President Carter's alleged willingness to allow American military capability to deteriorate in the face of growing Soviet capability. The phrase continues to resonate today. In this current period of declining defense resources, the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have articulated how the newly released strategic guidance and budget priorities signify a concerted effort not to "hollow out" U.S. forces. They have affirmed their dedication to preventing the recreation of the ragged military and disastrous deterioration in defense capability the Carter administration allowed to occur. However, it is also time to reexamine the term "hollow army" and its meaning as the inevitable tug of war over defense spending gets underway. This Paper places the "hollow army" metaphor within its historical context: barely 5 years after the United States finally disengaged from a major war (Vietnam), a struggling economy, and an election year in which a President was not only tenuously leading in the polls, but also confronted substantial opposition from elements of his own political party. Over the years, a specific political reading of these events has taken hold. It is the purpose of this Paper to re-read the historical events, and in doing so, come to a better understanding of the domestic political and geostrategic environment during Carter's presidency, the U.S. Cold War strategy, and the assertions made concerning the readiness of the U.S. Army to perform its missions.

Today's strategic environment on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. One roadblock to peace in Northeast Asia is a territorial dispute over a piece of terrain called Gando, which is located between the Korean peninsula and Chinese Manchuria and was a Korean territory until 1909. China currently controls the territory, but the controversy over control of Gando will reemerge if or when Korea is reunified. Gando is of such significant geopolitical and geostrategic importance that it could ignite a crisis among the nations of Northeast Asia that could potentially affect world stability. Thus a peaceful resolution to this dispute is critical to both Korea and China.

Emerging China is undoubtedly one of the biggest future security concerns for both Japan and the United States. The friction between China and Japan has recently grown, especially over territorial issues such as Senkaku Island. The United States also has disagreement with China over several issues such as human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, North Korea, and economic matters including currency and trade. The bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States will be instrumental for both countries to cope with China in the future. However, there is also friction within the Japan-U.S. alliance, and there are concerns within both countries. U.S. military bases in Okinawa have become a highly controversial issue in Japan, and Japanese criticism of the alliance has grown in recent years. In the United States, some opine that the United States should strengthen its bilateral economic relationship with China, signifying a diminution of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States identified the global security threat posed by failing states. The USG response for these threats in the past has vacillated between diplomacy and military intervention, with less than optimum results. Recognition of the need for a Whole-of-Government response led to the formation of the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability to "promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife." The organizations and processes implemented since 2005 provide a more integrated United States Government approach, but are primarily focused on crisis response to existing conflicts.

The U.S. Army War College Information in Warfare Group Information Operations Primer for Academic Year 2012 includes new sections dedicated to U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace, DoD strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, the Department of State Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, the DoD Chief Information Officer, and the U.S. Army Cyber Command.

Recent studies indicate that both states and warlords have been mining minerals to finance armed movements. This US Army War College student author explores the potential impact that gold, diamonds, and columbite-tantalite (coltan) have on regional stability in Africa.

Dr. Jim Hartman's chapter, extracted from a newly published book of the same name, examines the evolution of the Army's sustainability program and its contributions to the national strategic security objectives. Growing world population and an imbalance of natural resources are expected to affect U.S., as well as Army, interests. Dr. Hartman asserts sustainability is the nexus to ensure future security, which can only be achieved through the development and implementation of sound business practices. Dr. Hartman opines the Army, as a large institution, is well suited to lead a whole of government approach to sustainability.

The United States has maintained a stockpile of strategic and critical materials, primarily ores and minerals, since 1939. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States government has determined that most of the materials in the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) were excess to defense, industrial, and essential civilian needs, and has begun selling and otherwise disposing of most of the stockpiled materials. Recent concerns regarding the global availability of materials have caused a reexamination of the need for a stockpile and how the NDS might operate in order to serve the defense, industrial and essential civilian needs for materials.