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Although the US Army War College Department of National Security
and Strategy and other departments use several of the chapters in
this volume as readings for its core courses, this is not a
textbook. It does reflect, however, both the method and manner the
War College uses to teach the formulation of national security
strategy to America's future senior leaders.
The U.S. Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of
selected student work from Academic Year 2011 representing examples
of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of
Information as Power. This is the sixth volume of an effort that
began in 2006. The anthology is an important component of an effort
to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration
of content and courses related to the information element of power
into a curriculum to prepare our students for senior leadership
positions. Broken into sections emphasizing information effects in
the cyberspace domain and the cognitive dimension as well as
information sharing, the anthology provides a holistic overview of
important national security issues in that regard. We hope that
"Information as Power" will serve not only to showcase the efforts
of the College but to inform the broader body of knowledge as the
Nation considers how best to operate effectively and proactively
within this environment while countering our adversaries.
The U.S. Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of
selected student work from Academic Year 2011 representing examples
of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of
Information as Power. This is the sixth volume of an effort that
began in 2006. The anthology is an important component of an effort
to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration
of content and courses related to the information element of power
into a curriculum to prepare our students for senior leadership
positions. Broken into sections emphasizing information effects in
the cyberspace domain and the cognitive dimension as well as
information sharing, the anthology provides a holistic overview of
important national security issues in that regard. We hope that
"Information as Power" will serve not only to showcase the efforts
of the College but to inform the broader body of knowledge as the
Nation considers how best to operate effectively and proactively
within this environment while countering our adversaries.
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Field Artillery
branch, more than any other branch in today's Army, has been asked
to conduct in-lieu-of missions rather than its core fire support
mission during conduct of the war. The associated potential
deterioration of core competencies could possibly have a major
impact in future operations.
The U.S. Army heavy conventional ground capability that crushed
Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 no longer exists, and further
reduction of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams are proposed based upon
assumptions that there are no enemies willing to challenge alleged
U.S. conventional warfare supremacy, or that if challengers arise,
precision long range fires will neutralize them. A US Army War
College student argues in this research paper that recent examples
of hybrid warfare prove beyond any reasonable doubt the worth and
utility of a robust, scalable heavy combined arms capability.
In the last few years, notions like 'asymmetric warfare, ' and,
more recently, 'hybrid warfare' have become as common and pervasive
as to appear like new orthodoxy in military thought. This U.S. Army
War College International Fellow student author examines these
theories through the lens of critical thinking and argues that
these 'new' constructs are anything but original. Analyzing two
historical case studies, the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE) and
the Philippine-American War (1899-1902 CE), he demonstrates that
asymmetry and hybridism have been common characteristics of war
through the ages since the very beginning of humanity.
The United Kingdom Strategic Defense and Security Review published
its findings on 20 October 2010. The central tenet of this review
is that hybrid conflict, as seen most recently in Iraq and
Afghanistan, is the dominant feature of warfare in the twenty-first
century. Speeches by senior British politicians and military
leaders indicate that their vision for the future may be either
misinformed or driven by economic factors rather than a
comprehensive assessment of the future operating environment. With
future force structures, organization and equipment procurement
programs dependent on this vision, it is essential that they are
based on the correct assumptions.
The 'hybrid' theory of war set forth in this document is the result
of combining the best aspects of existing war theories with the
unique influences of the current strategic environment to produce a
refined theory of war for the modern international arena. The
foundation of all war theories stems from four basic questions:
What is war? Why and by whom are wars fought? What constitutes the
nature, character and characteristics of war? How are wars won?
This U.S. Army War College student author believes that a strategic
stationing plan for existing THAAD and JLENS missile defense assets
must be developed concurrent with acquisition of new air and
missile defense capabilities. He argues: ---- Although the Army has
conceptual plans and requirements for the development of new air
and missile defense capabilities, specifically THAAD and JLENS, the
Army has not defined a strategic employment / deployment plan to
meet Combatant Commanders' demands. ---- Throughout the 1990s, the
Army deployed PATRIOT task forces to Southwest Asia and South Korea
with little overarching strategic planning balanced against
competing and evolving demands for missile defense capabilities.
---- The constant deployments had an adverse impact on the AMD
force from personnel, training, and operational readiness
perspectives. ---- This caused the Army to reevaluate its
employment plan to sustain operational demand without breaking the
AMD force. The Army used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model
with 1:2 dwell time as means to sustain operational commitments.
---- Combatant Commanders' immediate demand for THAAD and JLENS, as
they come off the production lines and lack of a clear stationing
plan, could lead to a repeat of these 1990's challenges.
This extract, the second chapter of a CSL's recently published book
Sustainability and National Security, examines the concept of
sustainability and its value as an explanatory variable in national
security issues. The authors argue that sustainability is a
valuable 'lens' which can help.
The concept of the responsibility to protect not only the peoples
of one's own state but also those people of another sovereign state
should that state fail to protect its people has emerged into the
national and international debate. Many states, multinational
organizations and the UN have adopted this concept to varying
degrees. The U.S. has increasingly incorporated this concept into
its political rhetoric. Military guidance, the QDR, along with
statements from political leaders continue to stress the
expectation that the U.S. will face the need to protect citizens of
other states from humanitarian suffering from natural or manmade
atrocities. The lessons learned from previous humanitarian crises,
such as Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur, and Burma have shaped the
U.S.'s approach toward intervention. Trends and threats facing the
nations of today have the potential to lead to destabilization of
governments and threaten national, regional and global security.
For more than 3 decades, the term "hollow army" or the more
expansive idiom, "hollow force," has represented President Carter's
alleged willingness to allow American military capability to
deteriorate in the face of growing Soviet capability. The phrase
continues to resonate today. In this current period of declining
defense resources, the President of the United States, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have articulated how the newly released strategic guidance and
budget priorities signify a concerted effort not to "hollow out"
U.S. forces. They have affirmed their dedication to preventing the
recreation of the ragged military and disastrous deterioration in
defense capability the Carter administration allowed to occur.
However, it is also time to reexamine the term "hollow army" and
its meaning as the inevitable tug of war over defense spending gets
underway. This Paper places the "hollow army" metaphor within its
historical context: barely 5 years after the United States finally
disengaged from a major war (Vietnam), a struggling economy, and an
election year in which a President was not only tenuously leading
in the polls, but also confronted substantial opposition from
elements of his own political party. Over the years, a specific
political reading of these events has taken hold. It is the purpose
of this Paper to re-read the historical events, and in doing so,
come to a better understanding of the domestic political and
geostrategic environment during Carter's presidency, the U.S. Cold
War strategy, and the assertions made concerning the readiness of
the U.S. Army to perform its missions.
Today's strategic environment on the Korean Peninsula and in
Northeast Asia is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. One
roadblock to peace in Northeast Asia is a territorial dispute over
a piece of terrain called Gando, which is located between the
Korean peninsula and Chinese Manchuria and was a Korean territory
until 1909. China currently controls the territory, but the
controversy over control of Gando will reemerge if or when Korea is
reunified. Gando is of such significant geopolitical and
geostrategic importance that it could ignite a crisis among the
nations of Northeast Asia that could potentially affect world
stability. Thus a peaceful resolution to this dispute is critical
to both Korea and China.
Emerging China is undoubtedly one of the biggest future security
concerns for both Japan and the United States. The friction between
China and Japan has recently grown, especially over territorial
issues such as Senkaku Island. The United States also has
disagreement with China over several issues such as human rights,
Taiwan, Tibet, North Korea, and economic matters including currency
and trade. The bilateral relationship between Japan and the United
States will be instrumental for both countries to cope with China
in the future. However, there is also friction within the
Japan-U.S. alliance, and there are concerns within both countries.
U.S. military bases in Okinawa have become a highly controversial
issue in Japan, and Japanese criticism of the alliance has grown in
recent years. In the United States, some opine that the United
States should strengthen its bilateral economic relationship with
China, signifying a diminution of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States identified
the global security threat posed by failing states. The USG
response for these threats in the past has vacillated between
diplomacy and military intervention, with less than optimum
results. Recognition of the need for a Whole-of-Government response
led to the formation of the State Department Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stability to "promote the security of the United
States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation
for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states
and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil
strife." The organizations and processes implemented since 2005
provide a more integrated United States Government approach, but
are primarily focused on crisis response to existing conflicts.
Recent studies indicate that both states and warlords have been
mining minerals to finance armed movements. This US Army War
College student author explores the potential impact that gold,
diamonds, and columbite-tantalite (coltan) have on regional
stability in Africa.
Dr. Jim Hartman's chapter, extracted from a newly published book of
the same name, examines the evolution of the Army's sustainability
program and its contributions to the national strategic security
objectives. Growing world population and an imbalance of natural
resources are expected to affect U.S., as well as Army, interests.
Dr. Hartman asserts sustainability is the nexus to ensure future
security, which can only be achieved through the development and
implementation of sound business practices. Dr. Hartman opines the
Army, as a large institution, is well suited to lead a whole of
government approach to sustainability.
The United States has maintained a stockpile of strategic and
critical materials, primarily ores and minerals, since 1939. Since
the end of the Cold War, the United States government has
determined that most of the materials in the National Defense
Stockpile (NDS) were excess to defense, industrial, and essential
civilian needs, and has begun selling and otherwise disposing of
most of the stockpiled materials. Recent concerns regarding the
global availability of materials have caused a reexamination of the
need for a stockpile and how the NDS might operate in order to
serve the defense, industrial and essential civilian needs for
materials.
This AY2010 U.S. Army War College student author analyzes two cases
of purported cyberattacks by Russia in 2007 and 2008. Although
subsequent investigations were inconclusive, the cyberattacks were
widely believed at the time to have been instigated by the Russian
government. Based on his analysis of the two case studies, the
author concludes that Russia has made cyberspaceattack a major
factor in its military strategy, useful to coerce "near abroad"
nations to align with Russian national interests. Accordingly, he
recommends a foundational strategy United States strategy to
counter this Russian strategy for using cyberspace.
Beginning in 2001, the National Defense Strategy changed as DOD
began implementing capabilities-based planning and strategy and by
moving to an expeditionary force primarily based in the continental
United States. This and each subsequent change in national defense
strategy increasingly required a strategically responsive joint
force to support U.S national strategy. Research shows the
strategic responsiveness of the joint force has not evolved
simultaneously with strategy to meet requirements for the
military's two fundamental tasks to deter and wage war in support
of US national policy and national strategy.
The President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff routinely publish strategic guidance in the form of the
National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, National
Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This AY-10
student research paper analyzes correlations between the guidance
contained in these documents on the Army's annual budget
submissions. Following this analysis, the author discusses how the
Army could better utilize the Planning Programming Budgeting System
process to more effectively implement change.
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