Who presupposes Kelsen's basic norm? Is it possible to defend the presupposition in a way that is convincing? And what difference does the presupposition make? Endeavouring to highlight the role of basic assumptions in the law, the author argues that the verb "to presuppose', with Kelsen, has not only a conceptual but also a normative dimension; and that the expression 'presupposing the basic norm'is adequate in so far as it marks the descriptive-normative nature of utterances made in specifically legal speech-situations.
Addressed to legal theorists in general, the treatise purports to show that Kelsen's doctrine lends itself to an interpretation according to which the very act of "presupposing" the Grundnorm can be understood as a Grund, i.e. normative source of all positive law; and, what is more, that this interpretation admits of addressing the issue of the (formal) legitimacy of supra-national and directly applicable rules and other norms.

Who presupposes Kelsen's basic norm? Is it possible to defend the presupposition in a way that is convincing? And what difference does the presupposition make? Endeavouring to highlight the role of basic assumptions in the law, the author argues that the verb "to presuppose', with Kelsen, has not only a conceptual but also a normative dimension; and that the expression 'presupposing the basic norm'is adequate in so far as it marks the descriptive-normative nature of utterances made in specifically legal speech-situations.
Addressed to legal theorists in general, the treatise purports to show that Kelsen's doctrine lends itself to an interpretation according to which the very act of "presupposing" the Grundnorm can be understood as a Grund, i.e. normative source of all positive law; and, what is more, that this interpretation admits of addressing the issue of the (formal) legitimacy of supra-national and directly applicable rules and other norms.

On Law and Justice by Alf Ross (1899-1979) is a classic work of twentieth-century legal philosophy. The first translation into English was notably poor and abridged, and it misrepresented Ross's views. Translated from scratch and in full length from the original Danish, this new critical edition casts light on Ross's work and resituates it firmly in the context of current debates in the field. Ross was, in H.L.A. Hart's words, 'the most acute and best-equipped philosopher' of Scandinavian legal realism. On Law and Justice provides a comprehensive outline of his legal realist position, offering a consistently empirical research programme that simultaneously recognizes the distinctly normative character of law. Ross's legal realism avoids the standard critiques against behaviourist reductionism while still remaining categorically distinct from legal positivism and natural law. This new edition features an introduction by Jakob v. H. Holtermann, clarifying Ross's general philosophical project and detailing the sophisticated dual distinction between internal and external aspects of law that provides a counterpoint to Hart's celebrated analysis. This new translation will allow readers to appreciate Ross's insights into the ongoing empirical turn in legal scholarship and related attempts to associate legal realism with broader philosophical trends.