Thailand's politics has been contentious in recent years. With a military coup in 2006 and another in 2014, the country has moved from being a promising electoral democracy to a military dictatorship. Electoral politics was embraced enthusiastically by some groups, including those in rural areas of the north and northeast, but came to be feared by groups variously identified as the old elite, royalists and the establishment. The transition to authoritarianism saw large and lengthy street protests and considerable violence. This book examines the background to and the sources of conflict and the turn to authoritarianism. It addresses: the return of the military to political centre stage; the monarchy's pivotal role in opposing electoral democracy; the manner in which sections of civil society have rejected electoral politics; and the rise of powerful non-elected bodies such as the Constitutional Court. In examining Thailand's authoritarianism, attention is also given to how income and wealth inequality may motivate political outcomes and also to the ways in which the military and the old elite have attempted to establish a "Thai-style democracy" that disenfranchises the majority. This book was previously published as a special issue of Journal of Contemporary Asia.

This open access book modifies and revitalizes the concept of the 'developmental state' to understand the politics of emerging economy through nuanced analysis on the roles of human agency in the context of structural transformation. In other words, there is a revived interest in the 'developmental state' concept. The nature of the 'emerging state' is characterized by its attitude toward economic development and industrialization. Emerging states have engaged in the promotion of agriculture, trade, and industry and played a transformative role to pursue a certain path of economic development. Their success has cast doubt about the principle of laissez faire among the people in the developing world. This doubt, together with the progress of democratization, has prompted policymakers to discover when and how economic policies should deviate from laissez faire, what prevents political leaders and state institutions from being captured by vested interests, and what induce them to drive economic development. This book offers both historical and contemporary case studies from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda. They illustrate how institutions are designed to be developmental, how political coalitions are formed to be growth-oriented, and how technocratic agencies are embedded in a network of business organizations as a part of their efforts for state building.