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This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking
collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers
and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and
responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of
responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and
interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and
legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive
law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume
introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the
reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.
The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the
idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how
a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty
to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal
authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures
with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up
approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and
practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of
authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of
legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and
structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and
advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are
intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to
understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason
under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his
or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on
reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can
fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity.
Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of
Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study
explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention
in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure
of practical reason of the legal rules' addressees. The account is
comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and
normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from
'apparent' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal
systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a
'practical turn' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and
authority.
This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking
collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers
and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and
responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of
responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and
interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and
legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive
law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume
introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the
reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.
This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act
when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with
the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the
interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive
arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them,
and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link.
Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal
interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between
moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will
appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral
philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and
philosophy of action.
This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act
when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with
the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the
interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive
arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them,
and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link.
Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal
interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between
moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will
appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral
philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and
philosophy of action.
The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the
idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how
a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty
to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal
authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures
with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up
approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and
practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework of
authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of
legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and
structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and
advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are
intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to
understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason
under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his
or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on
reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can
fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity.
Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of
Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study
explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention
in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure
of practical reason of the legal rules' addressees. The account is
comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and
normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from
'apparent' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal
systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a
'practical turn' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and
authority.
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