Risk in Extreme Environments presents a wide-ranging discussion of approaches for assessing and managing extreme risks. Extreme events are not only severe, but also outside the normal range of experience of the system in question, and can include environmental catastrophe; engineering failure; financial or business meltdown; and nuclear or other extreme terrorism. The book focuses on synthesizing research results in a way that provides insights useful to decision makers, and enables them to ask probing questions about the risks faced by their organizations, identify creative solutions, and minimize the neglect of extreme risks that can come from a focus on mundane or ordinary management challenges. The book details case studies on nuclear power, infectious diseases, and global catastrophic risks, in addition to sections on risk assessment, risk management, and risk perceptions. Since effective management benefits from an interdisciplinary perspective, the chapter authors include experts in economics, engineering, geography, law, political science, psychology, sociology, and science in addition to risk analysis. Risk in Extreme Environments is an accessible and valuable resource for risk managers and other decision makers responsible for large complex business and government decisions, while also providing enough detail and references to be informative for risk analysts interested in learning more about technical aspects of the various methods.

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity.

In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). A comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected; and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat). The book provides a set of tools for applying game theory TO reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These tools will help to address problems of global security and also facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.

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