In Chapter 1, I explain why temporal syntheses, although distinguished from associative syntheses, count among the most fundamental phenomena of the passive sphere. I draw on Husserl s account of absolute consciousness, which sublates pairs of opposites such as form/content and constituting/constituted, to show that activity and passivity mutually determine one another.

In Chapter 2, I further expand on pre-egoic components of sense-giving acts encompassed by original passivity. I explain the function of primordial association (Urassoziation) in passive genesis with special reference to the problem of syntheses of similarity and contrast. Then, I turn to the difficult issue of the relation between affection and prominence (Abgehobenheit) in the perceptual field.

In Chapter 3, I explore the sphere of secondary passivity a generic name for the modifications undergone by constituted meanings once the process of constitution is accomplished. I give particular consideration to the passive components involved in the phenomena of memory fulfillment and forgetfulness.

Chapter 4 continues the previous chapter by expanding the discussion of secondary passivity from the subjective to the intersubjective level of sedimentation. I focus on Husserl s account of habitus and language as passive factors responsible for cultural crises. I use the example of translation to show, against Husserl, that passivity, understood as alienation, can also provide the palliative for cultural crises.

In Chapter 5, I question the relation between the three meanings of passivity: receptivity, inactuality and alienation. I present the distinction between the lived body and the physical body as a form of self-alienation. Then I discuss the intersubjective significance of the concept of pairing association. Finally, I turn to the problem of Fremderfahrung in the broad sense, that is, the problem of the interaction between home worlds and alien worlds. I defend the harshly criticized idea of analogical transfer by reversing it and by showing that homecultures, one s own body and also one s self manifest themselves in similar modes of accessible inaccessibility.

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In Chapter 1, I explain why temporal syntheses, although distinguished from associative syntheses, count among the most fundamental phenomena of the passive sphere. I draw on Husserl s account of absolute consciousness, which sublates pairs of opposites such as form/content and constituting/constituted, to show that activity and passivity mutually determine one another.

In Chapter 2, I further expand on pre-egoic components of sense-giving acts encompassed by original passivity. I explain the function of primordial association (Urassoziation) in passive genesis with special reference to the problem of syntheses of similarity and contrast. Then, I turn to the difficult issue of the relation between affection and prominence (Abgehobenheit) in the perceptual field.

In Chapter 3, I explore the sphere of secondary passivity a generic name for the modifications undergone by constituted meanings once the process of constitution is accomplished. I give particular consideration to the passive components involved in the phenomena of memory fulfillment and forgetfulness.

Chapter 4 continues the previous chapter by expanding the discussion of secondary passivity from the subjective to the intersubjective level of sedimentation. I focus on Husserl s account of habitus and language as passive factors responsible for cultural crises. I use the example of translation to show, against Husserl, that passivity, understood as alienation, can also provide the palliative for cultural crises.

In Chapter 5, I question the relation between the three meanings of passivity: receptivity, inactuality and alienation. I present the distinction between the lived body and the physical body as a form of self-alienation. Then I discuss the intersubjective significance of the concept of pairing association. Finally, I turn to the problem of Fremderfahrung in the broad sense, that is, the problem of the interaction between home worlds and alien worlds. I defend the harshly criticized idea of analogical transfer by reversing it and by showing that homecultures, one s own body and also one s self manifest themselves in similar modes of accessible inaccessibility.

"