This book examines what we can reliably know about Plato and the historical Socrates. It shows how pervasively the sources of information were biased by Pythagoreanism, Platonism, and Neoplatonism. It gives a source-critical account of how the climate of opinion in fourth-century Athens was captured by the Pythagoreans and how Speusippos's Academy also came to be pythagorized--adding definitional idealism to Pythagorean number idealism, and elevating Plato to a divine level that makes him into a coequal of Pythagoras, thus capturing Plato for Pythagoreanism. By showing how Plato's dialogues were dedramatized, dedialogized, and read or understood as if they were works expounding pythagorizing doctrine, Tejera has created a provocative reappraisal for scholars of ancient Greek philosophy.

Two Metaphysical Naturalisms: Aristotle and Justus Buchler provides an American naturalist reading of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" with extensive literary-philological considerations of the original Greek text. Victorino Tejera defines and evaluates the underpinnings of the systematic metaphysics of Justus Buchler through the American tradition of reading Aristotle. The book expands on classical Greek thought and develops a matured stance on Aristotle's modes of knowing and Justus Buchler's systematic metaphysics. Tejera extracts from the Aristotelian-Peripatetic metaphysics the core of Aristotle's discussion of existence as existence by keeping track of the Peripatetic and Platonist interpolations of the editors who brought the text into being. The book also summarizes Buchler's Metaphysics of Natural Complexes in less technical terms to make it more accessible. With the help of Justus Buchler, Tejera reintroduces the concept of metaphysics as coordinative analysis. Finally bridging the classical with the modern, Tejera reveals a cohesive revitalization of metaphysical naturalism for contemporary scholars and students of both ancient and modern philosophy.

History and Anti-History in Philosophy demonstrates the viability of the idea of the unity of philosophic thinking and the reflective practice of the history of philosophy. It is a concise in-depth history of the deconstructive turn in philosophy, and of the styles of historical and interpretive contextualization afforded by diverse schools of thought. Thematic unity arises from the focus of contributors on the historical dimension of reflection in philosophy. History of philosophy and intellectual history come together when they are forced to practice foundational analysis, namely, when they feel the need to uncover "indubitables" of society. Indubitables are deeply held, usually unnoticed premises upon which a society or group acts, builds, and speaks. By foundational analysis, the editors do not mean the search for acceptable starting points of intellectual exploration, but the ongoing criticism of all such postulates of faith. For those interested in contextual analysis of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey, Mannheim, Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, this is an invaluable guide. The editors make plain their belief that not using history, as have past philosophies, is unphilosophic ideas in personal construction to a text that cannot supply reasons for being taken seriously in history. This volume illuminates the achievements of present-day social science insights. It merits a close reading by those for whom the history of ideas is a living entity.

History and Anti-History in Philosophy demonstrates the viability of the idea of the unity of philosophic thinking and the reflective practice of the history of philosophy. It is a concise in-depth history of the deconstructive turn in philosophy, and of the styles of historical and interpretive contextualization afforded by diverse schools of thought. Thematic unity arises from the focus of contributors on the historical dimension of reflection in philosophy.

History of philosophy and intellectual history come together when they are forced to practice foundational analysis, namely, when they feel the need to uncover "indubitables" of society. Indubitables are deeply held, usually unnoticed premises upon which a society or group acts, builds, and speaks. By foundational analysis, the editors do not mean the search for acceptable starting points of intellectual exploration, but the ongoing criticism of all such postulates of faith.

For those interested in contextual analysis of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey, Mannheim, Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, this is an invaluable guide. The editors make plain their belief that not using history, as have past philosophies, is unphilosophic--ideas in personal construction to a text that cannot supply reasons for being taken seriously in history. This volume illuminates the achievements of present-day social science insights. It merits a close reading by those for whom the history of ideas is a living entity.