The war on the Eastern Front during 1941-45 was an immense struggle, running from the Barents Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. The vast distances involved forced the Soviet political-military leadership to resort to new organizational expedients in order to control operations along the extended front. These were the high commands of the directions, which were responsible for two or more fronts (army groups) and, along maritime axes, one or more fleets. In all, five high commands were created along the northwestern, western, southwestern, and North Caucasus strategic directions during 1941-42. However, the highly unfavourable strategic situation during the first year of the war, as well as interference in day-to-day operations by Stalin, severely limited the high commands' effectiveness. As a consequence, the high commands were abolished in mid-1942 and replaced by the more flexible system of supreme command representatives at the front. A High Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East was established in 1945 and oversaw the Red Army's highly effective campaign against Japanese forces in Manchuria. The Far Eastern High Command was briefly resurrected in 1947 as a response to the tense situation along the Korean peninsula and the ongoing civil war in China, but was abolished in 1953, soon after Stalin's death. Growing tensions with China brought about the recreation of the Far Eastern High Command in 1979, followed a few years later by the appearance of new high commands in Europe and South Asia. However, these new high commands did not long survive the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and were abolished a year later. The book relies almost exclusively on Soviet and post-communist archival and other sources and is the first unclassified treatment of this subject in any country, East or West.

The Russian Civil War was one of the most fateful of the 20th century's military conflicts, a bloody three-year struggle whose outcome saw the establishment of a totalitarian communist regime within the former Russian Empire. As such, it commands the attention of the military specialist and layman alike as we mark the one hundredth anniversary of the war's end. This work is the third volume of the three-volume Soviet official history of the Russian Civil War, which appeared during 1928-1930, just before the imposition of Stalinist orthodoxy. While the preceding volumes focused on the minutiae of the Red Army's organizational development and military art, this volume provides an in-depth description and analysis of the of the civil war's major operations along the numerous fronts, from the North Caucasus, the Don and Volga rivers, the White Sea area, the Baltic States and Ukraine, as well as Siberia and Poland. It also offers a well-argued case for the political reasons behind the Bolsheviks' military strategy and eventual success against their White opponents. And while it is a certainly a partisan document with a definite political bias, it is at the same time a straightforward military history that manages to avoid many of the hoary myths that later came to dominate the subject. As such, it is easily the most objective account of the struggle to emerge from the Soviet Union before the collapse of the communist system in 1991.

The humanities in American higher education is in a state of crisis with declining student enrollment, fewer faculty positions, and diminishing public prestige. Instead of recycling old arguments that have lost their appeal, the humanities must discover and articulate new rationales for their value to students, faculty, administrators, and the public. Why the Humanities Matter Today: In Defense of Liberal Education is an attempt to do so by having philosophers, literature and foreign language professors, historians, and political theorists defend the value and explain the worth of their respective disciplines as well as illuminate the importance of liberal education. By setting forth new arguments about the significance of their disciplines, these scholars show how the humanities can reclaim its place of prominence in American higher education.

The humanities in American higher education is in a state of crisis with declining student enrollment, fewer faculty positions, and diminishing public prestige. Instead of recycling old arguments that have lost their appeal, the humanities must discover and articulate new rationales for their value to students, faculty, administrators, and the public. Why the Humanities Matter Today: In Defense of Liberal Education is an attempt to do so by having philosophers, literature and foreign language professors, historians, and political theorists defend the value and explain the worth of their respective disciplines as well as illuminate the importance of liberal education. By setting forth new arguments about the significance of their disciplines, these scholars show how the humanities can reclaim its place of prominence in American higher education.

The proposed book investigates brain asymmetry from the perspective of functional neural systems theory, a foundational approach for the topic. There is currently no such book available on the market and there is a need for a neuroscience book, with a focus on the functional asymmetry of these two integrated and dynamic brains using historical and modern clinical and experimental research findings with the field. The book provides evidence from multiple methodologies, including clinical lesion studies, brain stimulation, and modern imaging techniques. The author has successfully used the book in doctoral and advances undergraduate courses on neuroscience and neuropsychology.  It has also been used to teach a course on the biological basis of behavior and could be used in a variety of contexts and courses.                                                                                          

Georgii Samoilovich Isserson (1898-1976) was one of the most prescient and prolific authors on military science in the years preceding World War II. His theories greatly influenced the Red Army's operations and were instrumental in achieving victory over Germany. This book gathers together for the first time English translations of Isserson's most influential works, including some that are still classified. His writings on the preparation and conduct of ""deep operations""--the deployment of tanks, mechanized infantry, air power and airborne troops to penetrate echeloned defenses-also serve as a primer on how to construct a position to defeat such an attack. His well argued defense of deep operations based on an examination of later wars, and his reminiscences about the people and events that shaped Soviet military theory in the 1930s are included.

The proposed book investigates brain asymmetry from the perspective of functional neural systems theory, a foundational approach for the topic. There is currently no such book available on the market and there is a need for a neuroscience book, with a focus on the functional asymmetry of these two integrated and dynamic brains using historical and modern clinical and experimental research findings with the field. The book provides evidence from multiple methodologies, including clinical lesion studies, brain stimulation, and modern imaging techniques. The author has successfully used the book in doctoral and advances undergraduate courses on neuroscience and neuropsychology. It has also been used to teach a course on the biological basis of behavior and could be used in a variety of contexts and courses.

The Red Army's leading operational theorist in the 1930s, Georgii Samoilovich Isserson is perhaps best known as the mastermind behind the "deep operation," which became the cornerstone of Soviet offensive operations in World War II. Drawing from an in-depth analysis of Isserson's numerous published and unpublished works, his arrest file in the former KGB archives, and interviews with his family, this book provides the first full-length biography of a man usually overlooked by contemporary historians. Two chapters are devoted to the first 30 years of Isserson's life, but the bulk of the narrative deals with the flowering of his intellectual talents from 1929 through 1941. Additional chapters deal with Isserson's arrest and his remaining 35 years, 14 of which were spent in labor camps and internal exile.

Cumulative Prospect Theory is a popular model of risk preferences in behavioral economics and generally proposed as a better descriptive model than alternatives, and as an inferior normative model to guide risky decisions. Models of Risk Preferences collects studies that critically review these claims from the perspective of experimental economics. The Research in Experimental Economics series focuses on experimental and empirical investigations into both the economic effects of the law and how economic theories can explain the behavior of individuals within a legal system.

The Battle of Kursk: The Red Army's Defensive Operations and Counter- Offensive, July-August 1943, offers a peculiarly Soviet view of one of the Second World War's most critical events. While the Germans defeats at Moscow and Stalingrad showed that Hitler could not win the war in the East, the outcome of Kursk demonstrated beyond a doubt that he would lose it. This study was compiled by the Red Army General Staff's military-historical directorate, which was charged with collecting and analyzing the war's experience, and issued as an internal document in 1946-47. The study languished for more than a half-century, before being published in Russia in 2006, although heavily supplemented by commentary and other information not contained in the original. The present work omits these additions, while supplying its own commentary in places deemed necessary. The book is divided into two parts, dealing with the defensive and offensive phases of the battle, respectively. The first begins with a strategic overview of the situation along the Eastern Front by the spring and summer of 1943 and the Soviet decision to stand on the defensive. This is followed by a detailed examination of the Central Front's efforts to counter the expected German attack out of the Orel salient, and the Voronezh Front's attempts to do the same against the German concentrations in the Belgorod-Khar'kov area. The rest of this section is devoted to an exceedingly detailed day-by-day, tactical-operational account of the struggle, particularly along the southern face of the salient, where the Germans came closest to succeeding. The second part will be more of a revelation to the Western reader, who is likely to be more familiar with the defensive phase of the battle. Here the authors once again, in great detail, lay out the Red Army's preparations for and conduct of a massive counteroffensive to clear the Orel salient, which soon degenerated to a grinding struggle, which while ultimately successful, cost the Soviets dearly. Likewise, the authors detail the Voronezh Front's preparations to reduce the Belgorod salient and seize the industrial center of Khar'kov. This offensive, in conjunction with a simultaneous offensive in the Donets industrial region, pushed the German lines to the breaking point and set the stage for the follow-on advance to the Dnepr River and the eventual liberation of Ukraine.

In the first half of the twentieth century, both czarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, were confronted with the problem of conducting military operations involving mass armies along the broad fronts, a characteristic of modern war. Despite the ideological and technological differences between the two regimes, both strove toward a theory which became known as operational art-that level of warfare that links strategic goals to actual combat engagements.

From the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, through World War I, the civil war, and to the eve of World War II, modern operational art grew from theoretical speculations by a small group of officers to become a critical component of the Soviet art of war. In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become--despite radically different political settings and levels of technology--essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.

Tracking both continuity and divergence between the imperial and Red armies, Harrison analyzes, on the basis of theoretical writings and battlefield performance, the development of such operationally significant phenomena as the "front" (group of armies), consecutive operations, and the deep operation, which relied upon aircraft and mechanized formations to penetrate the kind of intractable defense systems that characterized so much of World War I.

Drawing upon a wide range of sources, including memoirs, theoretical works, and materials from the Russian military archives (many presented here for the first time), Harrison traces the debates within the Russian and Soviet armies that engaged such theorists as Neznamov, Svechin, Triandafillov, and Isserson. The end result is an exemplary military intellectual history that helps illuminate a critical element in the "Russian way of war."