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The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those
presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the
University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The
exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able
to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and
that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did
contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science
Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of
California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER
University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California
at Irvine Vll INTRODUCTION PART I: DECISIONS AND GAMES Causal
notions have recently corne to figure prominently in discussions
about rational decision making. Indeed, a relatively influential
new approach to theorizing about rational choice has come to be
called "causal decision theory." 1 Decision problems such as
Newcombe's Problem and some versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma
where an act counts as evidence for a desired state even though the
agent knows his choice of that act cannot causally influence
whether or not the state obtains have motivated causal decision
theorists.
The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those
presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the
University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The
exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able
to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and
that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did
contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science
Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of
California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER
University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California
at Irvine VII INTRODUCTION TO CAUSATION, CHANCE, AND CREDENCE The
search for causes is so central to science that it has sometimes
been taken as the defining attribute of the scientific enterprise.
Yet even after twenty-five centuries of philosophical analysis the
meaning of "cause" is still a matter of controversy, among
scientists as well as philosophers. Part of the problem is that the
servicable concepts of causation built out of Necessity,
Sufficiency, Locality, and Temporal Precedence were constructed for
a deterministic world-view which has been obsolete since the advent
of quantum theory. A physically credible theory of causation must
be, at basis, statistical. And statistical analyses of caus ation
may be of interest even when an underlying deterministic theory is
assumed, as in classical statistical mechanics."
The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those
presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the
University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The
exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able
to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and
that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did
contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science
Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of
California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER
University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California
at Irvine Vll INTRODUCTION PART I: DECISIONS AND GAMES Causal
notions have recently corne to figure prominently in discussions
about rational decision making. Indeed, a relatively influential
new approach to theorizing about rational choice has come to be
called "causal decision theory." 1 Decision problems such as
Newcombe's Problem and some versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma
where an act counts as evidence for a desired state even though the
agent knows his choice of that act cannot causally influence
whether or not the state obtains have motivated causal decision
theorists.
With publication of the present volume, The University of Western
Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science enters its second phase.
The first fourteen volumes in the Series were produced under the
managing editorship of Professor James J. Leach, with the
cooperation of a local editorial board. Many of these volumes
resulted from colloguia and workshops held in con nection with the
University of Western Ontario Graduate Programme in Philosophy of
Science. Throughout its seven year history, the Series has been
devoted to publication of high quality work in philosophy of
science con sidered in its widest extent, including work in
philosophy of the special sciences and history of the conceptual
development of science. In future, this general editorial emphasis
will be maintained, and hopefully, broadened to include important
works by scholars working outside the local context. Appointment of
a new managing editor, together with an expanded editorial board,
brings with it the hope of an enlarged international presence for
the Series. Serving the publication needs of those working in the
various subfields within philosophy of science is a many-faceted
operation. Thus in future the Series will continue to produce
edited proceedings of worthwhile scholarly meetings and edited
collections of seminal background papers. How ever, the publication
priorities will shift emphasis to favour production of monographs
in the various fields covered by the scope of the Series. THE
MANAGING EDITOR vii W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce
(eds.), lIs, vii."
With publication of the present volume, The University of Western
Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science enters its second phase.
The first fourteen volumes in the Series were produced under the
managing editorship of Professor James J. Leach, with the
cooperation of a local editorial board. Many of these volumes
resulted from colloguia and workshops held in con nection with the
University of Western Ontario Graduate Programme in Philosophy of
Science. Throughout its seven year history, the Series has been
devoted to publication of high quality work in philosophy of
science con sidered in its widest extent, including work in
philosophy of the special sciences and history of the conceptual
development of science. In future, this general editorial emphasis
will be maintained, and hopefully, broadened to include important
works by scholars working outside the local context. Appointment of
a new managing editor, together with an expanded editorial board,
brings with it the hope of an enlarged international presence for
the Series. Serving the publication needs of those working in the
various subfields within philosophy of science is a many-faceted
operation. Thus in future the Series will continue to produce
edited proceedings of worthwhile scholarly meetings and edited
collections of seminal background papers. How ever, the publication
priorities will shift emphasis to favour production of monographs
in the various fields covered by the scope of the Series. THE
MANAGING EDITOR vii W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce
(eds.), lIs, vii."
In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on
foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of
science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four
decades there have been striking formal advances in our
understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in
probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which
include the development of the relations between semantics and
metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the
algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories
(especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights
into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and
statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of
scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of
profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of
Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently
the emergence of Bayesian statistics as a radical alternative to
standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent
years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict
has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good
statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to
know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the
methods available. The search for principles which would explain
why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does
offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.
In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on
foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of
science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four
decades there have been striking formal advances in our
understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in
probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which
include the development of the relations between semantics and
metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the
algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories
(especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights
into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and
statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of
scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of
profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of
Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently
the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to
standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent
years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict
has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good
statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to
know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the
methods available. The search for principles which would explain
why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does
offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.
In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on
foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of
science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four
decades there have been striking formal advances in our
understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in
probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which
include the development of the relations between semantics and
metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the
algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories
(especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights
into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and
statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of
scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of
profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of
Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently
the emergence of Baysian statistics as a radical alternative to
standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent
years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict
has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good
statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to
know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the
methods available. The search for principles which would explain
why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does
offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.
In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on
foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of
science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four
decades there have been striking formal advances in our
understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in
probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which
include the development of the relations between semantics and
metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the
algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories
(especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights
into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and
statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of
scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of
profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of
Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently
the emergence of Bayesian statistics as a radical alternative to
standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent
years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict
has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good
statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to
know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the
methods available. The search for principles which would explain
why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does
offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.
In 1973 a workshop was held at The University of Western Ontario on
topics of common interest to philosophers and linguists. This
volume con tains most of the papers presented at the workshop. Also
included are previously unpublished essays by R. Dougherty and H.
Lasnik as well as a comment on G. Lakoff's paper by B. van
Fraassen. K. Donnellan's paper was presented at the workshop and
subsequently appeared in The Philosophical Review. We thank the
editors of this journal for permission to publish the paper here.
The papers by D. Lewis, R. Stalnaker, G. Lakoff, B. Partee and H.
Herzberger appeared earlier in Journal of Philosophical Logic by
arrangement of the editors with B. van Fraassen and D. Reidel
Publishing Company. The editors thank the officers of The
University of Western Ontario for making the workshop possible and
Pauline Campbell for making the workshop work. THE EDITORS DAVID
LEWIS COUNTERFACTUALS AND COMPARATIVE POSSIBILITY* In the last
dozen years or so, our understanding of modality has been much
improved by means of possible-world semantics: the project of
analyzing modal language by systematically specifying the
conditions under which a modal sentence is true at a possible
world. I hope to do the same for counterfactual conditionals. I
write A 0-C for the counter factual conditional with antecedent A
and consequent C. It may be read as 'H it were the case that A,
then it would be the case that C' or some more idiomatic paraphrase
thereof."
In 1973 a workshop was held at The University of Western Ontario on
topics of common interest to philosophers and linguists. This
volume con tains most of the papers presented at the workshop. Also
included are previously unpublished essays by R. Dougherty and H.
Lasnik as well as a comment on G. Lakoff's paper by B. van
Fraassen. K. Donnellan's paper was presented at the workshop and
subsequently appeared in The Philosophical Review. We thank the
editors of this journal for permission to publish the paper here.
The papers by D. Lewis, R. Stalnaker, G. Lakoff, B. Partee and H.
Herzberger appeared earlier in Journal of Philosophical Logic by
arrangement of the editors with B. van Fraassen and D. Reidel
Publishing Company. The editors thank the officers of The
University of Western Ontario for making the workshop possible and
Pauline Campbell for making the workshop work. THE EDITORS DAVID
LEWIS COUNTERFACTUALS AND COMPARATIVE POSSIBILITY* In the last
dozen years or so, our understanding of modality has been much
improved by means of possible-world semantics: the project of
analyzing modal language by systematically specifying the
conditions under which a modal sentence is true at a possible
world. I hope to do the same for counterfactual conditionals. I
write A 0-C for the counter factual conditional with antecedent A
and consequent C. It may be read as 'H it were the case that A,
then it would be the case that C' or some more idiomatic paraphrase
thereof."
The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those
presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the
University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The
exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able
to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and
that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did
contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science
Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of
California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER
University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California
at Irvine VII INTRODUCTION TO CAUSATION, CHANCE, AND CREDENCE The
search for causes is so central to science that it has sometimes
been taken as the defining attribute of the scientific enterprise.
Yet even after twenty-five centuries of philosophical analysis the
meaning of "cause" is still a matter of controversy, among
scientists as well as philosophers. Part of the problem is that the
servicable concepts of causation built out of Necessity,
Sufficiency, Locality, and Temporal Precedence were constructed for
a deterministic world-view which has been obsolete since the advent
of quantum theory. A physically credible theory of causation must
be, at basis, statistical. And statistical analyses of caus ation
may be of interest even when an underlying deterministic theory is
assumed, as in classical statistical mechanics."
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