Life on the frontier in the decades before the Revolution was extremely difficult and uncertain. It was a world populated by Native Americans, merchants, fur traders, land speculators, soldiers and settlers—including women, slaves, and indentured servants. Each of these groups depended on the others in some way, and collectively they formed the patchwork that was life on the frontier. Using a wealth of material culled from primary sources, Dunn paints a vivid picture of a world caught up in the winds of change, a world poised on the edge of revolution. Life on the frontier in the decades before the Revolution was extremely difficult and uncertain. It was a world populated by Indians, merchants, fur traders, land speculators, soldiers and settlers—including women, slaves, and indentured servants. Each of these groups depended on the others in some way, and collectively they formed the patchwork that was life on the frontier. Using a wealth of material culled from primary sources, Dunn paints a vivid picture of a world caught up in the winds of change, a world poised on the edge of revolution. In the 15 years preceding the American Revolution, the existence of the frontier exerted a dominant influence on the colonial economy. The possibility of new territory in the West and the removal of the French army offered an enormous opportunity for economic expansion but such prospects were not without risk. Farmers worked endlessly to clear a few scant acres for production. Traders struggled to reach remote areas to bargain with local tribes. Merchants weighted the possibilities for enormous profit with huge risk. Native Americans faced increasing encroachment upon their traditional lands. Women and slaves played a greater role in opening the frontier than many sources have indicated.

This book describes the creation of a new economy in the Soviet Union from 1930 to 1945. The Red Army defeated the Germans in World War II with equipment produced by that economy and not with masses of untrained men as has been often argued. The Soviet weapons were produced in factories designed and built under the direction of American engineers in the 1930s. Also, the Weimar Republic played a part in the creation of the Red Army by providing aviation and tank training schools and technical assistance to the developing armaments industry. Dunn argues that if France had been invaded by the Allies in 1943 rather than in 1944, the post-war world would have been less advantageous to the Soviet Union.

This book traces the development of the Russian Army in reaction to the rise of Hitler. Caught by surprise in 1941, the Red Army had achieved superiority over the Germans by 1943, and had no real need for Western military assistance. The Russians, as this book establishes, won because they had better organization and equipment--i.e., a better and more effective army. By delaying the second front, the Allies gave Stalin the opportunity to enslave Eastern Europe.

During the Seven Years War the British economy had expanded rapidly to meet the demands of equipping the army and navy as well as subsidizing Britain's European allies. After the war, the economy was left without sufficient markets to absorb the extra production. This situation led to a persistent drive to open new markets, especially in the American colonies. When the British decided to maintain an army in America after 1764, these troops became a major market for the colonists who provided them with beef, pork, flour, and rum. Colonists also sold manufactured goods to French settlers in Illinois and fur traders west of the Mississippi.

Organization of this trade to provide the most cost-effective means of supplying goods to the frontier was achieved through refinements in financial, transportation, and production techniques. By the end of 1768, competition between American merchants increased, and prices dropped dramatically. Meanwhile, British troops began moving back toward the East Coast, further depriving the colonial merchants of a major market. This period marked a severe setback for colonial merchants on the frontier and added fuel to the fires of discontent with British policies.

Most military historians have difficulty comprehending the miracle that took place in late 1941 and early 1942 in the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1941, the German Army routed the Red Army as it had routed the Polish, British, French and other armies in 1939, 1940, and early 1941. None had been able to withstand German might more than a few weeks. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, his legions quickly overcame the Soviet divisions they met, and it appeared to most that Hitler would succeed as he had before. A major portion of the prewar Red Army had been completely annihilated, millions of prisoners taken, and the most populous and developed provinces of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans and their allies. In September, the Germans surrounded and captured a huge bag of divisions east of Kiev, only to encounter a flood of new Red Army divisions when they redirected their intentions on Moscow. In short order the Wehrmacht broke through this line, and approached within sight of the outskirts of the capital. There, they were surprised by a massive offensive mounted by even more new divisions. Other countries had surrendered after losing one army, let alone two. The Soviets came back with a third--which sent the Germans reeling to the rear. How was this possible? Dunn's detailed examination shows that, far from carelessly throwing thousands of disorganized, untrained men into battle, the Soviets wisely used the resources at hand to resist and drive back the invaders once the initial shock had been absorbed. He reveals how the Soviets systematically trained men as replacements for casualties in existing units, often renaming the unit (a move that confused Germanintelligence then and continues to confound historians today). Unit integrity was as significant in the Red Army as in other armies. Men were not robotic clones, and each had strengths and weaknesses. Knowing this led to unit integrity and success on the battlefield. Tracing the formation and commitment to battle of Soviet units, regardless of the changes of designation, is crucial to understanding the success and failure of Soviet operations--and Stalin's "keys to victory."

Contrary to common understanding, in the backcountry at least, the American Revolution was fought over land rather than democratic ideals. In this book, historian Walter Dunn reveals the true nature of the conflicting interests on the frontier, demonstrating that the primary issues there, land and the fur trade, were, in fact, the basis of the conflict between the local colonists and Britain. Diverse Indian groups, wealthy land speculators, humbler settlers, fur traders, and the British government all had conflicting designs on the rich lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. The conflict on the frontier during the Revolution has been described as one of heroic settlers defending their farms against attacks by the British army, the Tories, and the Indians. In truth, the situation was far more complex. For many on the frontier, the primary motive for fighting was not defending farms, but acquiring vast tracts of land for later resale at enormous profit. Native Americans, in contrast, were motivated by the desire to retain control of their homeland, for without their hunting grounds and cornfields, they would starve. Going beyond accepted theory, Dunn explores why those on the frontier reacted to the conflict as they did. He demonstrates how the various economic groups were forced to decide whether they should side with Britain or the colonists or if possible remain neutral, and the forces that governed those choices. Finally, he reveals how the decisions made on the frontier during the Revolution had a lasting impact on the post-war situation in the West, delaying western expansion by nearly two decades.

After the conclusion of Pontiac's Uprising, frontier trade reopened in 1765. Unfortunately, for the colonists, the renewed activity favored the French in Canada and Illinois and the British traders in Quebec and Montreal. Only three British regiments were assigned to frontier duty, an inadequate number of troops to enforce trade regulations against the French. To keep the peace with local tribes, the British army allowed the French to trade anywhere, while colonial merchants were restricted to army trading posts. Had the army been more astute in protecting colonial interests, colonial merchants might have been more favorable toward paying taxes in support of military efforts.

Frontier commerce was a major component of the colonial economy, ranking third in export behind tobacco and rice. The European demand for fashionable broad-brimmed beaver hats was the driving force that created turmoil on the frontier from 1765 to 1768. After the cession of Canada to Britain in 1763, the French obtained half the beaver pelt exports by forcibly diverting them from Quebec to New Orleans and then on to France. This competition hurt wealthy colonial merchants in New York City and Philadelphia, who blamed the British army and set the tone for the coming conflict.

The battle of Kursk was the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front. The battle began well for the Germans, but the Russians delayed them long enough for reserves to come forward. Soon the defenders outnumbered the attackers, and Hitler called off the attack. The Russian victory at Kursk resulted from a massive rebuilding of the Red Army in 1943, which included new unit organizations and weapons designed to counter the German Tiger and Panther tanks. The German defeat signalled the transfer of the initiative to the Russians and demonstrated to the Western Allies that the Soviet Union could defeat the Germans without a second front. Based on recently declassified Russian information and an analysis of captured German records, this book gives a detailed description of both the German and Soviet forces involved and evaluates the quality of the units on both sides.

When a German victory became impossible in WWII, the July 1944 conspirators plotted to bring a quick end to the war, hoping to negotiate a peace with the Western allies and possibly to join them in a war against Russia. Because the Allies would not negotiate with Hitler, the plotters planned to assassinate him and seize control of the government, using the Replacement Army to overcome the S.S. and the Nazi Party. more than half-a-million trained men. The conspirators convinced key Replacement Army officers to withhold men from the Field Army in the spring of 1944 in preparation for taking over the country. The result was a German army that lacked enough reserve divisions to counter the invasion of France and the Red Army attack in Russia. Although the plotters failed to kill Hitler, they hastened the war's end by weakening the German army. Dunn examines the 1944 July Plot from a manpower and logistics perspective to demonstrate that the conspirators did, in fact, achieve their goal of hastening the war's end. 1944, and the methods they used to keep half a million men from the battlefields of France and Russia. Without the efforts of these high ranking German officers, the war against Hitler might have had a completely different outcome.

By 1760, with the alleviation of the French threat to the western frontier, colonial fur traders headed west to reap the bounty of trade with the local tribes. However, when dissatisfied French interests conspired to instigate a revolt, the resulting Pontiac Uprising would force the British to rethink colonial trade policy. The fur traders, who had considered the British government their ally in exploiting the west, now saw the British allying themselves with the French and local tribes to keep the colonists out of the region. The prominent merchants who suffered financially and received no compensation would soon come to oppose British rule.

The fur trade and land speculation were two driving forces in the westward spread of merchant interests, but the promise of such riches would remain unfulfilled. Regulation of the trade would prove an enormous expense for the British; thus, to avoid the financial burden as well as to remove ill-treatment of the Native Americans as a cause for conflict, the Proclamation of 1763 prohibited settlement west of the mountains. The resulting dissatisfaction among the traders and speculators cost the British the support of colonial merchants. This book is an informative account of the interaction of economic, political, and social concerns on the western frontier.