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This book presents a distinctive version of a contractarian
approach to law and justice. The work argues that law and justice
are social norms that arise from a process of social evolution, and
are binding only if and to the extent that they are mutually
beneficial. It explicitly rejects accounts of law and justice that
are based on morality, on the basis that morality itself is only
legitimately founded on mutual advantage. But it also rejects most
existing versions of contractarianism, which are based on ideas of
hypothetical agreements by rational contractors, in favour of an
approach that is based on actually existing social norms, but
advocates critically examining these norms and discarding those
that are not truly mutually beneficial. The first half of the book
develops the approach, while the second half explores some of its
implications for law. It argues for a left-libertarian approach to
property, an approach largely based on the common law of tort,
contract and criminal law, and a rejection of most statutory law,
which is based not on mutual advantage but rather on benefiting
some at the expense of others. However, it ultimately recognises
that there are those who want a more extensive state than this
approach allows, and advocates a strong form of federalism to allow
this, provided robust exit rights are provided. The book combines
political philosophy, economics and law into an approach that is
broadly libertarian but distinctive in many respects. It will be of
interest to scholars in all three of those disciplines.
This book presents a distinctive version of a contractarian
approach to law and justice. The work argues that law and justice
are social norms that arise from a process of social evolution, and
are binding only if and to the extent that they are mutually
beneficial. It explicitly rejects accounts of law and justice that
are based on morality, on the basis that morality itself is only
legitimately founded on mutual advantage. But it also rejects most
existing versions of contractarianism, which are based on ideas of
hypothetical agreements by rational contractors, in favour of an
approach that is based on actually existing social norms, but
advocates critically examining these norms and discarding those
that are not truly mutually beneficial. The first half of the book
develops the approach, while the second half explores some of its
implications for law. It argues for a left-libertarian approach to
property, an approach largely based on the common law of tort,
contract and criminal law, and a rejection of most statutory law,
which is based not on mutual advantage but rather on benefiting
some at the expense of others. However, it ultimately recognises
that there are those who want a more extensive state than this
approach allows, and advocates a strong form of federalism to allow
this, provided robust exit rights are provided. The book combines
political philosophy, economics and law into an approach that is
broadly libertarian but distinctive in many respects. It will be of
interest to scholars in all three of those disciplines.
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