Founded in 1927, the Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation- Chemical Construction, or "Osoaviakhim," became the largest mass voluntary association in the Soviet Union before World War II. Conceived in Bolshevik rhetoric about the creativity of the toiling masses, this novel organizational scheme gradually acquired bureaucratic substance and played a significant role in making the civilian masses administratively accessible for elementary programs in military training and chemical and aviation technology. William E. Odom's study of Osoaviakhim in its first decade seeks not only to recount the history of its development, but, more importantly, to demonstrate that the Soviet experience can be analyzed using the language and concepts of Western social science. In particular, the author argues that concepts from organization theory offer promising opportunities to relate Soviet area studies to the broader concerns of comparative politics, and that middle range generalizations about politics within bureaucracies may prove very helpful in explaining "who gets what, when, and how" in the Soviet polity. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Founded in 1927, the Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation- Chemical Construction, or "Osoaviakhim," became the largest mass voluntary association in the Soviet Union before World War II. Conceived in Bolshevik rhetoric about the creativity of the toiling masses, this novel organizational scheme gradually acquired bureaucratic substance and played a significant role in making the civilian masses administratively accessible for elementary programs in military training and chemical and aviation technology. William E. Odom's study of Osoaviakhim in its first decade seeks not only to recount the history of its development, but, more importantly, to demonstrate that the Soviet experience can be analyzed using the language and concepts of Western social science. In particular, the author argues that concepts from organization theory offer promising opportunities to relate Soviet area studies to the broader concerns of comparative politics, and that middle range generalizations about politics within bureaucracies may prove very helpful in explaining "who gets what, when, and how" in the Soviet polity. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Security depends on intelligence. A leading authority discusses basic problems in American intelligence and how to fix them William E. Odom is the highest-ranking member of the United States Intelligence community ever to write a book outlining fundamental restructuring of this vast network of agencies, technology, and human agents. In the wake of 9/11, Odom has revised and updated a powerful critique he wrote several years ago for staffs of the U.S. congressional committee overseeing the vast American intelligence bureaucracy. His recommendations for revamping this essential component of American security are now available for general readers as well as for policymakers. While giving an unmatched overview of the world of U.S. intelligence, Odom persuasively shows that the failure of American intelligence on 9/11 had much to do with the complex bureaucratic relationships existing among the various components of the Intelligence Community. The sustained fragmentation within the Intelligence Community since World War II is part of the story; the blurring of security and intelligence duties is another. Odom describes the various components of American intelligence in order to give readers an understanding of how complex they are and what can be done to make them more effective in providing timely intelligence and more efficient in using their large budgets. He shows definitively that they cannot be remedied with quick fixes but require deep study of the entire bureaucracy and the commitment of the U.S. government to implement the necessary reforms.

One of the great surprises in modern military history is the collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1991-along with the party-state with which it was inextricably intertwined. In this important book, a distinguished United States Army officer and scholar traces the rise and fall of the Soviet military, arguing that it had a far greater impact on Soviet politics and economic development than was perceived in the West. General William E. Odom asserts that Gorbachev saw that dramatically shrinking the military and the military-industrial sector of the economy was essential for fully implementing perestroika and that his efforts to do this led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Odom enhances his account with interviews with key actors in the Soviet Union before, during, and after the collapse. He describes the condition of the Soviet military during the mid-1980s and explains how it became what it was-its organizational structures, manpower policies, and military-industrial arrangements. He then moves to the dramatic events that led to its destruction, taking us to the most secret circles of Soviet policy making, as well as describing the public debates, factional struggles in the new parliament, and street combat as army units tried to repress the political forces unleashed by glasnost. Odom shows that just as the military was the ultimate source of stability for the multinational Soviet state, the communist ideology justified the military's priority claim on the economy. When Gorbachev tried to shift resources from the military to the civilian sector to overcome economic stagnation, he had to revise the official ideology in order to justify removing the military from its central place. Paralyzed by corruption, mistrust, and public disillusionment, the military was unable and unwilling to intervene against either Gorbachev's perestroika or Yeltsin's dissolution of the Soviet Union.