The philosophy of perception investigates the nature of our sensory experiences and their relation to reality. In the second edition of this popular book, William Fish introduces the subject thematically, setting out the major theories of perception together with their motivations and attendant problems. While providing historical background to debates in the field, this comprehensive overview focuses on recent presentations and defenses of the different theories, and looks beyond visual perception to take into account the role of other senses. The second edition organizes the contents into two main parts: the first deals with philosophical theories of perception, and the second covers key topics and issues in perception as they are discussed in philosophy, cognitive science, and psychology. Two completely new chapters have been added - one on color and color vision; and a second on the interaction between sense modalities - and other chapters have been significantly updated to include discussion of topics such as pre-twentieth-century philosophy of perception, phenomenal intentionality, color adverbialism, predictive processing approaches to perception, ecological approaches to perception, and in-depth discussions of the non-visual senses. Additional updates include fuller and easier-to-understand explanations of some important views that were glossed over in the first edition and greater coverage of research from the last 25 years. All chapter summaries, references, and Suggested Reading lists at the end of each chapter have been brought up to date and the volume now includes a more extensive index at the back of the book. Key Features and Benefits: The only single-authored textbook on philosophy of perception currently available Devoted to contemporary theories and topics, but with appropriate historical coverage for fuller understanding of contemporary work Each chapter includes a chapter overview, questions for further consideration, and an annotated list of Suggested Readings Includes coverage of topics like: - the phenomenal principle - perception and hallucination - perception and content - naive realism and disjunctivism - intentionalism and representationalism - the nature of content - qualia theories and phenomenal intentionality - perception and empirical science - color and color science - theories of non-visual perception - Molyneux's problem - cross-modal illusions - multimodality Key Changes to the Second Edition The division of the book into two major parts: Part I on philosophical theories of perception, Part II on key interdisciplinary topics in perception The addition of two new chapters on color and color vision, and interaction between different sense modalities More topics from the last 25 years of philosophy of perception Combined chapters on belief acquisition theories and intentional theories into one larger chapter More material on the growing intersection of the philosophy and psychology of perception Includes coverage of Molyneux's problem and of cross-modal illusions Updated chapter summaries, references, and Suggested Reading lists at the end of each chapter A summary table and a more extensive index

The philosophy of perception investigates the nature of our sensory experiences and their relation to reality. In the second edition of this popular book, William Fish introduces the subject thematically, setting out the major theories of perception together with their motivations and attendant problems. While providing historical background to debates in the field, this comprehensive overview focuses on recent presentations and defenses of the different theories, and looks beyond visual perception to take into account the role of other senses. The second edition organizes the contents into two main parts: the first deals with philosophical theories of perception, and the second covers key topics and issues in perception as they are discussed in philosophy, cognitive science, and psychology. Two completely new chapters have been added - one on color and color vision; and a second on the interaction between sense modalities - and other chapters have been significantly updated to include discussion of topics such as pre-twentieth-century philosophy of perception, phenomenal intentionality, color adverbialism, predictive processing approaches to perception, ecological approaches to perception, and in-depth discussions of the non-visual senses. Additional updates include fuller and easier-to-understand explanations of some important views that were glossed over in the first edition and greater coverage of research from the last 25 years. All chapter summaries, references, and Suggested Reading lists at the end of each chapter have been brought up to date and the volume now includes a more extensive index at the back of the book. Key Features and Benefits: The only single-authored textbook on philosophy of perception currently available Devoted to contemporary theories and topics, but with appropriate historical coverage for fuller understanding of contemporary work Each chapter includes a chapter overview, questions for further consideration, and an annotated list of Suggested Readings Includes coverage of topics like: - the phenomenal principle - perception and hallucination - perception and content - naive realism and disjunctivism - intentionalism and representationalism - the nature of content - qualia theories and phenomenal intentionality - perception and empirical science - color and color science - theories of non-visual perception - Molyneux's problem - cross-modal illusions - multimodality Key Changes to the Second Edition The division of the book into two major parts: Part I on philosophical theories of perception, Part II on key interdisciplinary topics in perception The addition of two new chapters on color and color vision, and interaction between different sense modalities More topics from the last 25 years of philosophy of perception Combined chapters on belief acquisition theories and intentional theories into one larger chapter More material on the growing intersection of the philosophy and psychology of perception Includes coverage of Molyneux's problem and of cross-modal illusions Updated chapter summaries, references, and Suggested Reading lists at the end of each chapter A summary table and a more extensive index

Conscious perceptual experiences are not only one of the most pervasive and familiar mental states that we enjoy in our lives as minded creatures, but they are also the most fundamental source of our knowledge of the world in which we live. An understanding of perception is therefore essential to both understanding who we are and how we engage with the world in which we live. Although philosophical thinking about perception is as old as philosophy itself, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen a resurgence of interest in this core philosophical topic which has seen it become one of the hottest topics in contemporary philosophy. The proposed collection will therefore provide the reader with the historical background needed to understand the key concerns of contemporary philosophy of perception (Volume I) as well as a detailed understanding of the different theories that attempt to address those concerns (Volume II). In addition to this, the collection will also provide the reader with an appreciation for the many ways in which philosophical and empirical, scientific approaches to perception interact with one another (Volume III) and will introduce the reader to both historical and contemporary attempts to move our thinking about perception beyond the central case of vision (Volume IV). Each volume will contain a newly-written introduction by the editor that will both overview the contents of that particular volume and connect that volume to the general themes of the collection.

Being able to describe, evaluate and generate reasoning and arguments effectively, appropriately and sympathetically is a key life, professional and academic skill. But there are hidden complexities inherent in this approach, and it has limits when employed as a form of persuasion. This eloquent and profound book, which draws on key philosophers, explores the issues, deepens understanding and supplies the tools.

The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J.M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience-perception, hallucination, and illusion-and an explanation of how perception and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without having anything in common. In the veridical case, Fish contends that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes the experience possess a phenomenal character. Fish argues that when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject to possess it. Fish then shows how this approach to visual experience is compatible with empirical research into the workings of the brain and concludes by extending this treatment to cover the many different types of illusion that we can be subject to.

The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found expression in J.M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience--perception, hallucination, and illusion--and an explanation of how perception and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without having anything in common. In the veridical case, Fish contends that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes the experience possess a phenomenal character. Fish argues that when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject to possess it. Fish then shows how this approach to visual experience is compatible with empirical research into the workings of the brain and concludes by extending this treatment to cover the many different types of illusion that we can be subject to.