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The philosophy of perception investigates the nature of our sensory
experiences and their relation to reality. In the second edition of
this popular book, William Fish introduces the subject
thematically, setting out the major theories of perception together
with their motivations and attendant problems. While providing
historical background to debates in the field, this comprehensive
overview focuses on recent presentations and defenses of the
different theories, and looks beyond visual perception to take into
account the role of other senses. The second edition organizes the
contents into two main parts: the first deals with philosophical
theories of perception, and the second covers key topics and issues
in perception as they are discussed in philosophy, cognitive
science, and psychology. Two completely new chapters have been
added - one on color and color vision; and a second on the
interaction between sense modalities - and other chapters have been
significantly updated to include discussion of topics such as
pre-twentieth-century philosophy of perception, phenomenal
intentionality, color adverbialism, predictive processing
approaches to perception, ecological approaches to perception, and
in-depth discussions of the non-visual senses. Additional updates
include fuller and easier-to-understand explanations of some
important views that were glossed over in the first edition and
greater coverage of research from the last 25 years. All chapter
summaries, references, and Suggested Reading lists at the end of
each chapter have been brought up to date and the volume now
includes a more extensive index at the back of the book. Key
Features and Benefits: The only single-authored textbook on
philosophy of perception currently available Devoted to
contemporary theories and topics, but with appropriate historical
coverage for fuller understanding of contemporary work Each chapter
includes a chapter overview, questions for further consideration,
and an annotated list of Suggested Readings Includes coverage of
topics like: - the phenomenal principle - perception and
hallucination - perception and content - naive realism and
disjunctivism - intentionalism and representationalism - the nature
of content - qualia theories and phenomenal intentionality -
perception and empirical science - color and color science -
theories of non-visual perception - Molyneux's problem -
cross-modal illusions - multimodality Key Changes to the Second
Edition The division of the book into two major parts: Part I on
philosophical theories of perception, Part II on key
interdisciplinary topics in perception The addition of two new
chapters on color and color vision, and interaction between
different sense modalities More topics from the last 25 years of
philosophy of perception Combined chapters on belief acquisition
theories and intentional theories into one larger chapter More
material on the growing intersection of the philosophy and
psychology of perception Includes coverage of Molyneux's problem
and of cross-modal illusions Updated chapter summaries, references,
and Suggested Reading lists at the end of each chapter A summary
table and a more extensive index
The philosophy of perception investigates the nature of our sensory
experiences and their relation to reality. In the second edition of
this popular book, William Fish introduces the subject
thematically, setting out the major theories of perception together
with their motivations and attendant problems. While providing
historical background to debates in the field, this comprehensive
overview focuses on recent presentations and defenses of the
different theories, and looks beyond visual perception to take into
account the role of other senses. The second edition organizes the
contents into two main parts: the first deals with philosophical
theories of perception, and the second covers key topics and issues
in perception as they are discussed in philosophy, cognitive
science, and psychology. Two completely new chapters have been
added - one on color and color vision; and a second on the
interaction between sense modalities - and other chapters have been
significantly updated to include discussion of topics such as
pre-twentieth-century philosophy of perception, phenomenal
intentionality, color adverbialism, predictive processing
approaches to perception, ecological approaches to perception, and
in-depth discussions of the non-visual senses. Additional updates
include fuller and easier-to-understand explanations of some
important views that were glossed over in the first edition and
greater coverage of research from the last 25 years. All chapter
summaries, references, and Suggested Reading lists at the end of
each chapter have been brought up to date and the volume now
includes a more extensive index at the back of the book. Key
Features and Benefits: The only single-authored textbook on
philosophy of perception currently available Devoted to
contemporary theories and topics, but with appropriate historical
coverage for fuller understanding of contemporary work Each chapter
includes a chapter overview, questions for further consideration,
and an annotated list of Suggested Readings Includes coverage of
topics like: - the phenomenal principle - perception and
hallucination - perception and content - naive realism and
disjunctivism - intentionalism and representationalism - the nature
of content - qualia theories and phenomenal intentionality -
perception and empirical science - color and color science -
theories of non-visual perception - Molyneux's problem -
cross-modal illusions - multimodality Key Changes to the Second
Edition The division of the book into two major parts: Part I on
philosophical theories of perception, Part II on key
interdisciplinary topics in perception The addition of two new
chapters on color and color vision, and interaction between
different sense modalities More topics from the last 25 years of
philosophy of perception Combined chapters on belief acquisition
theories and intentional theories into one larger chapter More
material on the growing intersection of the philosophy and
psychology of perception Includes coverage of Molyneux's problem
and of cross-modal illusions Updated chapter summaries, references,
and Suggested Reading lists at the end of each chapter A summary
table and a more extensive index
Conscious perceptual experiences are not only one of the most
pervasive and familiar mental states that we enjoy in our lives as
minded creatures, but they are also the most fundamental source of
our knowledge of the world in which we live. An understanding of
perception is therefore essential to both understanding who we are
and how we engage with the world in which we live. Although
philosophical thinking about perception is as old as philosophy
itself, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen a
resurgence of interest in this core philosophical topic which has
seen it become one of the hottest topics in contemporary
philosophy. The proposed collection will therefore provide the
reader with the historical background needed to understand the key
concerns of contemporary philosophy of perception (Volume I) as
well as a detailed understanding of the different theories that
attempt to address those concerns (Volume II). In addition to this,
the collection will also provide the reader with an appreciation
for the many ways in which philosophical and empirical, scientific
approaches to perception interact with one another (Volume III) and
will introduce the reader to both historical and contemporary
attempts to move our thinking about perception beyond the central
case of vision (Volume IV). Each volume will contain a
newly-written introduction by the editor that will both overview
the contents of that particular volume and connect that volume to
the general themes of the collection.
Being able to describe, evaluate and generate reasoning and
arguments effectively, appropriately and sympathetically is a key
life, professional and academic skill. But there are hidden
complexities inherent in this approach, and it has limits when
employed as a form of persuasion. This eloquent and profound book,
which draws on key philosophers, explores the issues, deepens
understanding and supplies the tools.
The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found
expression in J.M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. In
the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish
develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed
accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience-perception,
hallucination, and illusion-and an explanation of how perception
and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without
having anything in common. In the veridical case, Fish contends
that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the
subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it
is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes
the experience possess a phenomenal character. Fish argues that
when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while
lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject
to possess it. Fish then shows how this approach to visual
experience is compatible with empirical research into the workings
of the brain and concludes by extending this treatment to cover the
many different types of illusion that we can be subject to.
The idea of a disjunctive theory of visual experiences first found
expression in J.M. Hinton's pioneering 1973 book Experiences. In
the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish
develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed
accounts of the three core kinds of visual experience--perception,
hallucination, and illusion--and an explanation of how perception
and hallucination could be indiscriminable from one another without
having anything in common. In the veridical case, Fish contends
that the perception of a particular state of affairs involves the
subject's being acquainted with that state of affairs, and that it
is the subject's standing in this acquaintance relation that makes
the experience possess a phenomenal character. Fish argues that
when we hallucinate, we are having an experience that, while
lacking phenomenal character, is mistakenly supposed by the subject
to possess it. Fish then shows how this approach to visual
experience is compatible with empirical research into the workings
of the brain and concludes by extending this treatment to cover the
many different types of illusion that we can be subject to.
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