Of all the Army Air Forces' many operations in the Second World War, none was more demanding or important than those supporting the activity of resistance groups fighting the Axis powers. The special operations supporting the Yugoslavian partisans fighting the forces of Nazism in the Balkans required particular dedication and expertise. Balkan flying conditions demanded the best of flying skills, and the tenacious German defenses in that troubled region complicated this challenge even further. In this study, Professor William Leary examines what might fairly be considered one of the most important early experiences in the history of Air Force special operations. It is ironic that, fifty years after these activities, the Air Force today is heavily involved in Balkan operations, including night air drops of supplies. But this time, the supplies are for humanitarian relief, not war. The airlifters committed to relieving misery in that part of the world follow in the wake of their predecessors who, fifty years ago, flew the night skies with courage and skill to help bring an end to Nazi tyranny.

The formation of ice on wings and other control surfaces of airplanes is one of the oldest and most vexing problems that aircraft engineers and scientists continue to face. While no easy, comprehensive answers exist, the staff at NASA's Icing Research Tunnel at the Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has done pioneering work to make flight safer for experimental, commercial, and military consumers.

The formation of ice on wings and other control surfaces of airplanes is one of the oldest and most vexing problems that aircraft engineers and scientists continue to face. While no easy, comprehensive answers exist, the staff at NASAs Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) at the Glenn Research Center in Cleveland has done pioneering work to make flight safer for experimental, commercial, and military customers. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) initiated government research on aircraft icing in the 1930s at its Langley facility in Virginia. Icing research shifted to the NACA's Cleveland facility in the 1940s. Initially there was little focus on icing at either location, as these facilities were more concerned with aerodynamics and engine development. With several high-profile fatal crashes of air mail carriers, however, the NACA soon realized the need for a leading research facility devoted to icing prevention and removal. The IRT began operation in 1944 and, despite renovations and periodic attempts to shut it down, has continued to function productively for almost 60 years. In part because icing has proved so problematic over time, IRT researchers have been unusually open-minded in experimenting with a wide variety of substances, devices, and techniques. Early icing prevention experiments involved grease, pumping hot engine exhaust onto the wings, glycerin soap, mechanical and inflatable "boots," and even corn syrup. The IRT staff also looked abroad for ideas and later tried a German and Soviet technique of electromagnetism, to no avail. More recently, European polymer fluids have been more promising. The IRT even periodically had "amateur nights" in which a dentist's coating for children's teeth proved unequal to the demands of super-cooled water droplets blown at 100 miles per hour. Despite many research dead-ends, IRT researchers have achieved great success over the years. They have developed important computer models, such as the LEWICE software, and made significant contributions to prevent ice buildup on turbine-powered commercial aircraft, helicopters, and military planes.

Icing research has received only limited attention from historians. Yet the problem of icing has challenged aviators and aircraft manufacturers since the earliest days of powered flight-and continues to do so. At various times in the past, victory has been declared over the menace of icing, but these claims have always proved premature. Despite more than seven decades of research into the phenomena, much remains to be learned about the nature of icing and how to respond to it.

Chronicles the role of the Combat Cargo Command during the Korean War under the command of Major General William H. Tunner. The lessons of the Korean War reinforced what Tunner had learned during World War II and the Berlin airlift.

William M. Leary Jr.'s study combines history with personal drama to reconstruct an important chapter in the early years of aviation. He has conducted intensive research in American governmental archives, the Hoover Institution, and numerous libraries throughout the United States, in addition to obtaining access to the records of Pan American Airways (who bought out CNAC in 1933). His history of CNAC offers insights into the history of modern China and sheds light on several key aspects of Sino-American diplomatic and business relations.

They were the forgotten commanders of World War II. While the names of Bradley and Patton became household words for Americans, few could identify Krueger or Eichelberger. They served under General Douglas MacArthur, a military genius with an enormous ego who dominated publicity from the Southwest Pacific during the American advance from Australia, through New Guinea, to the Philippines. While people at home read about the great victories that were won by "MacArthur's navy" and "MacArthur's air force," his subordinates labored in obscurity, fearful lest attention from the press lead to their replacement.

Historians too have paid little attention to the men who fought so well in the far reaches of the Pacific, and not a single biography has appeared in the decades since V-J Day. Yet General Blamey played a key role in the early battles of New Guinea. Generals Krueger and Eichelberger led American armies to major victories over the Japanese. General Kenney was one of the foremost air strategists of the war, while few airmen could match General Whitehead's tactical brilliance. Admiral Kinkaid took a crucial part in one of the greatest naval engagements in history. Admiral Barbey was an acknowledged master of amphibious warfare.

We Shall Return addresses a serious shortcoming in the literature of World War II. Revealed for the first time is the full extent of the contributions made by MacArthur's commanders to the defeat of the Japanese. As the authors of these essays so ably demonstrate, many of MacArthur's bold decisions and innovative tactics were urged upon him by his subordinates. Clearly, these men deserve more credit for his successes than they have received.

In Under Ice, William Leary examines the evolution of Arctic submarine operations in the U.S. Navy, a little-known but significant area of national security concern. Through the career of Waldo Lyon, he chronicles the problems of under-ice navigation and the development of Cold War naval strategy. In World War II, the Arctic became an active theater of operations for German and Soviet subs, which occasionally ducked under the ice to escape detection. The U.S. Navy responded with its own advances in underwater navigation and location, under Lyon's direction. After the war, Lyon's interest in cold-water acoustics led him to work on sonar and navigation instruments that could be applied to Arctic submarines. His specialization led to the establishment of the Arctic Submarine Laboratory (ASL) and the development of under-ice capability for nearly all U.S. subs, which became even more important with the growth of the Cold War and the corresponding growth of naval concern about the possibilities of nuclear warfare in Arctic regions. Lyon led the way in U.S. under-ice submarine development. In 1958, with the launching of the nuclear submarine Nautilus, the Arctic Ocean beneath the pack ice could finally be fully explored. Today, under-ice operations are standard for submarines of the United States and other nations. Leary provides informative treatments of the early problems with under-ice navigation; the Boarfish experimental dives; the Skate's torpedo firing into ice; making contact with Drifting Station Alpha; and the drama-packed patrol of Seadragon, the first submarine to pass under an iceberg. He ably delineates the roles of such other actors in the drama as Robert McWethy, commanding officer of the Burton Sound; the "fabulous patrol" of the Sargo; CDR Joseph Skoog, who played poker while his crew transited the dangerous Arctic waters at high speed; and war hero Lawson Ramage, who incorrectly forecast that the Soviets would never develop under-ice capability. Under Ice tells a lively and carefully researched story that will be important for naval and Cold War historians and for students of science and technology, especially those interested in post-1945 DOD-funded science.