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Throughout the past century, a debate has raged over the thesis of
realism and its alternatives. Realism the seemingly commonsensical
view that all or most of what we encounter in the world exists and
is what it is independently of human thought has been vigorously
denied by such prominent intellectuals as Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault, Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, Hilary Putnam, and Nelson
Goodman. The opponents of realism, among them historians and social
scientists who support social constructionism, hold that all or
most of reality depends on human conceptual schemes and beliefs. In
this volume of original essays, a group of philosophers explores
the ongoing controversy. The book opens with an introduction by
William P. Alston, whose writing on the subject has been widely
influential. Selected essays then compare and contrast aspects of
the arguments put forward by the realists with those of the
antirealists. Other chapters discuss the importance of the debate
for philosophical topics such as epistemology and for domains
ranging from religion, literature, and science to morality."
Why suppose that sense perception is an accurate source of
information about the physical environment? More generally, is it
possible to demonstrate that our basic ways of forming beliefs are
reliable? In this book, a leading analytic philosopher confronts
this classic problem through detailed investigation of sense
perception, the source of beliefs in which we place the most
confidence. Carefully assessing the available arguments, William P.
Alston concludes that it is not possible to show in any noncircular
way that sense perception is a reliable source of beliefs. Alston
thoroughly examines the main arguments that have been advanced for
the reliability of sense perception, including arguments from the
various kinds of success we achieve by relying on the sense
perception, arguments that some features of our sense experience
are best explained by supposing that it is an accurate guide, and
arguments that there is something conceptually incoherent about the
idea that sense perception is not reliable. He concludes that all
of these arguments that are not disqualified in other ways are
epistemically circular, for they use premises based upon the very
source in question. Alston then suggest that the most appropriate
response to the impossibility of showing that our basic sources of
beliefs are reliable is an appeal to the practical rationality of
engaging in certain socially established belief-forming practices.
The Reliability of Sense Perception will be welcome by
epistemologists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of science.
In Perceiving God, William P. Alston offers a clear and
provocative account of the epistemology of religious experience. He
argues that the "perception of God" his term for direct
experiential awareness of God makes a major contribution to the
grounds of religious belief. Surveying the variety of reported
direct experiences of God among laypersons and famous mystics,
Alston demonstrates that a person can be justified in holding
certain beliefs about God on the basis of mystical experience.
Through the perception that God is sustaining one in being, for
example, one can justifiably believe that God is indeed sustaining
one in being.
Alston offers a detailed discussion of our grounds for taking
sense perception and other sources of belief including
introspection, memory, and mystical experience to be reliable and
to confer justification. He then uses this epistemic framework to
explain how our perceptual beliefs about God can be justified.
Alston carefully addresses objections to his chief claims,
including problems posed by non-Christian religious traditions. He
also examines the way in which mystical perception fits into the
larger picture of grounds for religious belief.
Suggesting that religious experience, rather than being a purely
subjective phenomenon, has real cognitive value, Perceiving God
will spark intense debate and will be indispensable reading for
those interested in philosophy of religion, epistemology, and
philosophy of mind, as well as for theologians."
One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late
twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in
epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of
language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically
discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including
perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of
religious diversity, and truth. Together with Alston's vigorous
responses, these articles make significant new contributions to the
literature and will be of interest to a wide range of philosophers
and students. In addition, the volume contains a comprehensive
introduction and overview of Alston's work and a complete
bibliography of his publications
Much of the writing in Anglo-American epistemology in the twentieth
century focused on the conditions for beliefs being "justified." In
a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of
knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-long search for
a correct account of the nature and conditions of epistemic
justification misses the point. Alston calls for that search to be
suspended and for talk of epistemic justification to cease. He
proposes instead an approach to the epistemology of belief that
focuses on the evaluation of various "epistemic desiderata" that
may be satisfied by beliefs.Alston finds that features of belief
that are desirable for the goals of cognition include having an
adequate basis, being formed in a reliable way, and coherence
within bodies of belief. In Alston's view, a belief's being based
on an adequate ground and its being formed in a reliable way,
though often treated as competing accounts of justification, are
virtually identical. Beyond "Justification" also contains
discussions of fundamental questions about the epistemic status of
principles and beliefs and appropriate responses to various kinds
of skepticism.
Throughout the past century, a debate has raged over the thesis of
realism and its alternatives. Realism the seemingly commonsensical
view that all or most of what we encounter in the world exists and
is what it is independently of human thought has been vigorously
denied by such prominent intellectuals as Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault, Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, Hilary Putnam, and Nelson
Goodman. The opponents of realism, among them historians and social
scientists who support social constructionism, hold that all or
most of reality depends on human conceptual schemes and beliefs. In
this volume of original essays, a group of philosophers explores
the ongoing controversy. The book opens with an introduction by
William P. Alston, whose writing on the subject has been widely
influential. Selected essays then compare and contrast aspects of
the arguments put forward by the realists with those of the
antirealists. Other chapters discuss the importance of the debate
for philosophical topics such as epistemology and for domains
ranging from religion, literature, and science to morality."
One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time
here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of
truth with a work likely to claim a place at the very center of the
contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. William P.
Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which
he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia", Greek for "truth"). This
idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or
proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as
the statement says it is. Although this concept may seem quite
obvious, Alston says, many thinkers hold views incompatible with it
- and much of his book is devoted to a powerful critique of those
views. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent
and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist
ideas he attacks. Alston discusses different realist accounts of
truth, examining what they do and do not imply. He distinguishes
his version, which he characterizes as "minimalist", from various
"deflationary" accounts, all of which deny that asserting the truth
of a proposition attributes a property of truth to it. He also
examines alethic realism in relation to a variety of metaphysical
realisms. Finally, Alston argues for the importance - theoretical
and practical - of assessing the truth value of statements,
beliefs, and propositions.
Much of the writing in Anglo-American epistemology in the twentieth
century focused on the conditions for beliefs being "justified." In
a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of
knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-long search for
a correct account of the nature and conditions of epistemic
justification misses the point. Alston calls for that search to be
suspended and for talk of epistemic justification to cease. He
proposes instead an approach to the epistemology of belief that
focuses on the evaluation of various "epistemic desiderata" that
may be satisfied by beliefs.Alston finds that features of belief
that are desirable for the goals of cognition include having an
adequate basis, being formed in a reliable way, and coherence
within bodies of belief. In Alston's view, a belief's being based
on an adequate ground and its being formed in a reliable way,
though often treated as competing accounts of justification, are
virtually identical. Beyond "Justification" also contains
discussions of fundamental questions about the epistemic status of
principles and beliefs and appropriate responses to various kinds
of skepticism.
What is it for a sentence to have a certain meaning? This is the
question that William P. Alston, one of America's most
distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers, addresses in this
major contribution to the philosophy of language. His answer
focuses on the given sentence's potential to play the role that its
speaker had in mind -- what he terms the usability of the sentence
to perform the illocutionary act intended by its speaker.
Alston defines an illocutionary act as an act of saying
something with a certain "content". He develops his account of what
it is to perform such acts in terms of taking responsibility, in
uttering a sentence, for the existence of certain conditions. In
requesting someone to open a window, for example, the speaker takes
responsibility for its being the case that the window is closed and
that the speaker has an interest in its being opened.
In Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Alston expands upon
this concept, creating a framework of five categories of
illocutionary act and going on to argue that sentence meaning is
fundamentally a matter of illocutionary act potential; that is, for
a sentence to have a particular meaning is for it to be usable to
perform illocutionary acts of a certain type.
In providing detailed and explicit patterns of analysis for the
whole range of illocutionary acts, Alston makes a unique
contribution to the field of philosophy of language -- one that is
likely to generate debate for years to come.
Epistemic Justification collects twelve distinguished and
influential essays in epistemology by William P. Alston taken from
a body of work spanning almost two decades. They represent the
gradual development of Alston's thought in epistemology.He
concentrates on topics that are central to contemporary
epistemology and provides a much-needed and useful map to these
issues be explicitly distinguishing and interrelating concepts of
justification used in epistemology. More important, he develops and
defends his own distinctive epistemic view throughout the volume.
Notably, he argues for an account of justification that combines
both internalist and externalist features. In addition, he
discusses various forms of foundationalism and supports a moderate
form. Finally, Alston demonstrates that the epistemic circularity
that often plagues our attempts to validate our basic sources of
belief does not prevent our showing that they are reliable sources
of knowledge.
Mit diesem klaren und provokativen erkenntnistheoretischen Ansatz
im Bereich der Religionsphilosophie argumentiert William P. Alston,
dass die Wahrnehmung Gottes eines der wichtigsten Beitrage zu den
Grunden des religiosen Glaubens liefert. Dabei spielt sein Begriff
des direkten erfahrungsmassigen Bewusstsein eine entscheidende
Rolle. Nach einem Uberblick uber verschiedene berichtete direkte
Gotteserfahrungen zeigt Alston, dass eine Person auf der Grundlage
der mystischen Erfahrung berechtigt ist, an Gott zu glauben.
"Dieses grossartige Buch ist die Frucht von Jahrzehnten des Reifens
und der durchdringenden Reflexion. Wie zu erwarten war, nimmt es
die Diskussion des umgebenden Themas der Gotteserfahrung auf und
fuhrt es zu einer neuen Ebene der Einsicht und der Durchdringung."
Alvin Plantinga, Universitat von Notre Dame, USA "Die
Erkenntnistheorie des religiosen Glaubens war vor einiger Zeit das
heisseste Thema der Religionsphilosophie. Alstons Arbeit ist der
beste und interessanteste Beitrag zu diesem Gebiet. Alston ist
nicht nur mit der Verteidigung des religiosen Glaubens beschaftigt,
sondern er eroffnet einen plausiblen Vorschlag zum verbesserten
Verstandnisses der Frage nach der Entstehung des religiosen
Glaubens. Gott wahrnehmen ist sicher der wichtigste Beitrag zur
Religionsphilosophie in diesem Jahr." Robert Merrihew Adams,
Universitat von Califonien, Los Angeles"
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