This Is A New Release Of The Original 1885 Edition.

With Brief Explanatory Notes Of The Gestures Taught Deaf-Mutes In Our Institutions For Their Instruction And A Description Of Some Of The Peculiar Laws, Customs, Myths, Superstitions, Ways Of Living, Code Of Peace And War Signals Of Our Aborigines.

With Brief Explanatory Notes Of The Gestures Taught Deaf-Mutes In Our Institutions For Their Instruction And A Description Of Some Of The Peculiar Laws, Customs, Myths, Superstitions, Ways Of Living, Code Of Peace And War Signals Of Our Aborigines.

With Brief Explanatory Notes Of The Gestures Taught Deaf-Mutes In Our Institutions For Their Instruction And A Description Of Some Of The Peculiar Laws, Customs, Myths, Superstitions, Ways Of Living, Code Of Peace And War Signals Of Our Aborigines.

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.