Most researchers would be amazed to discover that opinions they have about cherished themes in biology and medicine are biased. Van der Steen and Ho contend that logic and methodology are not well applied in biology and medicine, arguing that the impact of social and moral factors on claims within these two disciplines is underestimated. In response to this situation, Van der Steen and Ho present tools from logic and ethics for assessing existing literature. These tools will help to create sound articles and materials in the life sciences.

After reviewing logic and methodological approaches, broad guidelines are used to place science in a social context. Examples from life sciences illustrate the implementation of logic, methodology, and guidelines in forty-five brief case studies. Each study includes comments on quoted and paraphrased passages from a single article or book. Cross-references facilitate the assimilation of lessons from the text. Students, researchers, and scholars in biology, biomedicine, philosophy, and ethics as applied to the life sciences will find this guide useful in improving their research and writing skills.

Legal and moral reasoning share much methodology and address similar problems. This volume charts two shared problems: the relation between theory, principles and particular judgments; and the role of facts and factual assertions in normative settings. The relation between theory and practice and between principle and particular judgment has become the subject of much debate in moral philosopy. In the ongoing debate, some moral philosophers refer to leal philosophy for a support of their views on the primacy of practice over theory. According to them, legal philosophy should have a more balanced view in that relation. In the contributions to part one of the book, this claim is critically analyzed. The role of the facts is underestimated in discussions on legal reasoning and legal theory, as well as moral reasoning and ethical theory. Factual statements enter into moral and legal discussions not only because they link the conclusion with a rule. They also play a role as background assumptions in supporting a theory. The book's focus on the role of facts in normative reasoning should make it of particular interest to scholars of legal and moral argumentation.

Wim van der Steen charts conceptual foundations of evolutionary biology and, on the basis of this, he evaluates applications of evolutionary theory outside biology. Philosophical analysis shows that key notions of the theory such as fitness, adaptation, selection, and optimality are empty place-holder concepts that call for context-dependent specifications of meaning. For example, as he points out, the notion of optimality is empty without a specification of constraints. Hence, the controversial thesis that animals perform optimal behaviors as a result of natural selection is meaningless rather than true or false. Analysis shows that many other controversies in evolutionary biology are spurious. Thus, the thesis of genic selectionism, which puts genes at center stage in evolutionary theory, is best reconstructed as an arbitrary conceptualization without substance. Disagreements over the thesis are futile. They reflect preferences for different conceptualizations which are ultimately equivalent.

As concepts are properly specified, van der Steen asserts evolutionary theory turns out to be a body of interesting natural history at a low level of generality. General laws of evolution do not exist. Hence, evolutionary approaches do not allow sweeping claims about human nature. Unfortunately, in disciplines outside biology such claims are often defended with evolutionary approaches. Evolutionary theory also cannot serve as a foundation for normative views in ethics or epistemology. This is an important and controversial work for scholars and advanced researchers in biology and the philosophy of biology.