The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic silently started in early 2020, and no one was prepared for it. Unlike the outbreak of SARS in 2002-2003, a similar coronavirus, it was less contagious than COVID-19, but tended to be more deadly. The COVID-19 virus is much more contagious with a relatively lower chance of causing death. Nevertheless, it is still one of the most dangerous viruses in human history. Studies of COVID-19 have attracted tremendous attention from academia and governments. However, they tend to focus on the fields of biology, virology, public health, and psychology instead of the politics, policies, and political attitudes related to the pandemic. Of course, it is critical to understand the nature of this virus and seek proper policy remedies to stop the pandemic and help citizens to regain their everyday lives, but how the pandemic has affected the public and their views toward politics is equally important as it will determine political outcomes in the near future. We compare the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on public opinion, the dynamics of party politics in Taiwan, and some of its strategic neighbors.

This book tackles the perennial debate about whether presidentialism is associated with democratic breakdown. We integrate both institutional and behavioral arguments to discuss how institutional rigidity in changing executive power would stimulate citizens to adopt relatively violent means to address their grievances. Evidence from cross-national surveys is collected, and the results show that our central premises are indeed supported. We then employ a cross-national time-series data from 1946 to 2008 to examine the conditions in which a democracy enters into a crisis, and the conditions in which a crisis escalates into a democratic breakdown. Although the book finds evidence that presidentialism could contribute instabilities to a democratic system, it does not directly follow that those instabilities will trigger a democratic breakdown. In other words, presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not trigger a higher likelihood of a breakdown. The conventional wisdom is thus only half correct.