The Occupy movement in Hong Kong was sustained for about 80 days because of government tolerance, the presence of determined participants, and a weak leadership. The government tolerated the occupation because its initial use of force, in particular teargas, was counterproductive and provoked large-scale participation. Unlike other social movements, such as the 1989 Tiananmen movement, the Occupy movement reached its peak of participation at the very beginning, making it difficult to sustain the momentum. The presence of determined participants who chose to stay until the government responded was crucial to the sustaining of the movement. These self-selected participants were caught in a dilemma between fruitless occupation and reluctance to retreat without a success. The movement lasted also because the weak leadership was unable to force the government to concede or devise approaches for making a "graceful exit." Consequently, site clearance became the common choice of both the government and the protestors. This book develops a new framework to explain the sustaining of decentralized protest in the absence of strong movement organizations and leadership. Sustained protests are worth research because they not only reveal the broad social context in which the protests arise and persist but also point out the dynamics of the escalation or the decline of the protests. In addition, sustained protest may not only lead to more dramatic action, but they also result in the diffusion of protests or lead to significant policy changes.

The Occupy movement in Hong Kong was sustained for about 80 days because of government tolerance, the presence of determined participants, and a weak leadership. The government tolerated the occupation because its initial use of force, in particular teargas, was counterproductive and provoked large-scale participation. Unlike other social movements, such as the 1989 Tiananmen movement, the Occupy movement reached its peak of participation at the very beginning, making it difficult to sustain the momentum. The presence of determined participants who chose to stay until the government responded was crucial to the sustaining of the movement. These self-selected participants were caught in a dilemma between fruitless occupation and reluctance to retreat without a success. The movement lasted also because the weak leadership was unable to force the government to concede or devise approaches for making a "graceful exit." Consequently, site clearance became the common choice of both the government and the protestors. This book develops a new framework to explain the sustaining of decentralized protest in the absence of strong movement organizations and leadership. Sustained protests are worth research because they not only reveal the broad social context in which the protests arise and persist but also point out the dynamics of the escalation or the decline of the protests. In addition, sustained protest may not only lead to more dramatic action, but they also result in the diffusion of protests or lead to significant policy changes.

In the 1990s, the Chinese government launched an unprecedented reform of state enterprises, putting tens of millions of people out of work. This empirically rich study calls on comprehensive surveys and interviews, combining quantitative data with qualitative in its examination of the variation in workers' collective action. Cai investigates the difference in interests of and options available to workers that reduce their solidarity, as well as the obstacles that prevent their coordination. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, this book explores the Chinese Government's policies and how their feedback shaped workers' incentives and capacity of action.

China has witnessed numerous incidents of social protests over the past three decades. Protests create uncertainty for authoritarian governments, and the Chinese government has created, strengthened, and coordinated multiple dispute-resolution institutions to manage social conflicts and protests. Accommodating the aggrieved prevents the accumulation of grievances in society, but concessions require resources. As the frequency and scale of collective action are closely tied to the political opportunity for action, the Chinese government has also contained protest by shaping the political opportunity available to the aggrieved. Cai and Chen show that when the Chinese central government prioritizes social control, as it has under Xi Jinping's leadership, it signals that it will tolerate local governments' use of coercion. The result is an environment that is not conducive to the mobilization of collective action, large-scale occurrences of which have been uncommon in China in recent years.

In the 1990s, the Chinese government launched an unprecedented reform of state enterprises, putting tens of millions of people out of work. This empirically rich study calls on comprehensive surveys and interviews, combining quantitative data with qualitative in its examination of the variation in workers' collective action. Cai investigates the difference in interests of and options available to workers that reduce their solidarity, as well as the obstacles that prevent their coordination. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, this book explores the Chinese Government 's policies and how their feedback shaped workers incentives and capacity of action.

Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's economic development, but they are also responsible for severe problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens' rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese Party-state respond when a government official commits a duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds? "State and Agents in China" explores how the party-state addresses this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective disciplining of government officials and its implications for governance in China.
By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and how such reform measures have significant implications for the regime's resilience.

Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's economic development, but they are also responsible for severe problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens' rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese Party-state respond when a government official commits a duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds? "State and Agents in China" explores how the party-state addresses this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective disciplining of government officials and its implications for governance in China.
By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and how such reform measures have significant implications for the regime's resilience.

Although academics have paid much attention to contentious politics in China and elsewhere, research on the outcomes of social protests, both direct and indirect, in non-democracies is still limited. In this new work, Yongshun Cai combines original fieldwork with secondary sources to examine how social protest has become a viable method of resistance in China and, more importantly, why some collective actions succeed while others fail.
Cai looks at the collective resistance of a range of social groups--peasants to workers to homeowners--and explores the outcomes of social protests in China by adopting an analytical framework that operationalizes the forcefulness of protestor action and the cost-benefit calculations of the government. He shows that a protesting group's ability to create and exploit the divide within the state, mobilize participants, or gain extra support directly affects the outcome of its collective action. Moreover, by exploring the government's response to social protests, the book addresses the resilience of the Chinese political system and its implications for social and political developments in China.

Do our ideas about social movements travel successfully beyond the democratic West? Unrest in China, from the dramatic events of 1989 to more recent stirrings, offers a rare opportunity to explore this question and to consider how popular contention unfolds in places where speech and assembly are tightly controlled. The contributors to this volume, all prominent scholars of Chinese politics and society, argue that ideas inspired by social movements elsewhere can help explain popular protest in China.

Drawing on fieldwork in China, the authors consider topics as varied as student movements, protests by angry workers and taxi drivers, recruitment to Protestant house churches, cyberprotests, and anti-dam campaigns. Their work relies on familiar concepts such as political opportunity, framing, and mobilizing structures while interrogating the usefulness of these concepts in a country with a vastly different history of class and state formation than the capitalist West. The volume also speaks to silences in the study of contentious politics (for example, protest leadership, the role of grievances, and unconventional forms of organization), and shows that well-known concepts must at times be modified to square with the reality of an authoritarian, non-western state.

Although academics have paid much attention to contentious politics in China and elsewhere, research on the outcomes of social protests, both direct and indirect, in non-democracies is still limited. In this new work, Yongshun Cai combines original fieldwork with secondary sources to examine how social protest has become a viable method of resistance in China and, more importantly, why some collective actions succeed while others fail.
Cai looks at the collective resistance of a range of social groups--peasants to workers to homeowners--and explores the outcomes of social protests in China by adopting an analytical framework that operationalizes the forcefulness of protestor action and the cost-benefit calculations of the government. He shows that a protesting group's ability to create and exploit the divide within the state, mobilize participants, or gain extra support directly affects the outcome of its collective action. Moreover, by exploring the government's response to social protests, the book addresses the resilience of the Chinese political system and its implications for social and political developments in China.