The Independent Companies of Foreigners are widely regarded as the worst examples of foreign units in the British Army during the Napoleonic Wars. They were formed, in the last years of these wars, to receive French deserters who had come over to the British in Spain. Each company was intended to serve separately in the garrisons of the West Indies. Instead two of them were used in an active role on the East Coast of America a " this did not turn out well. Drawing of British, French and American sources, this book provides a fuller picture of the men, why the units were formed, why they were used as they were and what actually happened. Judgement can then be made whether the bad reputation of the units, and the soldiers in them, is justified.

Why do people wage war? How can wars be won? How has warfare been an engine of change for human civilization-for better and for worse? In this book Paul Schuurman shows how some of the best Western minds between 1650 and 1900 tried to answer these questions in an epoch when European developments became a matter of global concern. In eight wide-ranging chapters he discusses the key concepts that philosophers and generals of this era developed to grasp and influence the dramatic and horrific phenomenon of war. Their concepts remain fresh and relevant down to the present day.

At a time when Napoleon needed all his forces to reassert French dominance in Central Europe, why did he fixate on the Prussian capital of Berlin? Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive showdown with the enemy, he repeatedly detached large numbers of troops, under ineffective commanders, toward the capture of Berlin. In "Napoleon and Berlin, " Michael V. Leggiere explores Napoleon's almost obsessive desire to capture Berlin and how this strategy ultimately lost him all of Germany.

Napoleon's motives have remained a subject of controversy from his own day until ours. He may have hoped to deliver a tremendous blow to Prussia's war-making capacity and morale. Ironically, the heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French left Napoleon's Grande Armee vulnerable to an Allied coalition that eventually drove Napoleon from Central Europe forever.

In February 1793, in the wake of the War of American Independence and one year after British prime minister William Pitt the Younger had predicted fifteen years of peace, the National Convention of Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands. France thus initiated nearly a quarter century of armed conflict with Britain. During this fraught and still-contested period, historian Nathaniel Jarrett suggests, Pitt and his ministers forged a diplomatic policy and military strategy that envisioned an international system anticipating the Vienna settlement of 1815. Examining Pitt's foreign policy from 1783 to 1797-the years before and during the War of the First Coalition against Revolutionary France-Jarrett considers a question that has long vexed historians: Did Pitt adhere to the "blue water" school, imagining a globe-trotting navy, or did he favor engagement nearer to shore and on the European Continent? And was this approach grounded in precedent, or was it something new? While acknowledging the complexities within this dichotomy, The Lion at Dawn argues that the prime minister consistently subordinated colonial to continental concerns and pursued a new vision rather than merely honoring past glories. Deliberately, not simply in reaction to the French Revolution, Pitt developed and pursued a grand strategy that sought British security through a novel collective European system-one ultimately realized by his successors in 1815. The Lion at Dawn opens a critical new perspective on the emergence of modern Britain and its empire and on its early effort to create a stable and peaceful international system, an ideal debated to this day.