In this revised and extended edition of Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon's battlefield success and ultimate failure. Napoleon's development and mastery of the operational art of warfare is revealed as each chapter analyzes one Napoleonic war or major campaign of a war. To achieve this, the essays conform to the common themes of Napoleon's planning, his command and control, his execution of plans, and the response of his adversaries. Napoleon's sea power and the British response to the French challenge at sea is also investigated. Overall, this volume reflects the finest scholarship and cutting-edge research to be found in Napoleonic military history. Contributors include Jonathan Abel, Robert M. Citino, Phillip R. Cuccia, Huw J. Davies, Mark T. Gerges; John H. Gill; Jordan R. Hayworth, Kenneth G. Johnson, Michael V. Leggiere, Kevin D. McCranie, Alexander Mikaberidze, Frederick C. Schneid, John Severn, Dennis Showalter, Geoffrey Wawro, and John F. Weinzierl. See inside the book.

Intelligence is often the critical factor in a successful military campaign. This was certainly the case for Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsular War. In this book, author Huw J. Davies offers the first full account of the scope, complexity, and importance of Wellington's intelligence department, describing a highly organized, multifaceted series of networks of agents and spies throughout Spain and Portugal - an organization that was at once a microcosm of British intelligence at the time and a sophisticated forebear to intelligence developments in the twentieth century. Spying for Wellington shows us an organization that was, in effect, two parallel networks: one made up of Foreign Office agents 'run' by British ambassadors in Spain and Portugal, the other comprising military spies controlled by Wellington himself. The network of agents supplied strategic intelligence, giving the British army advance warning of the arrival, destinations, and likely intentions of French reinforcements. The military network supplied operational intelligence, which confirmed the accuracy of the strategic intelligence and provided greater detail on the strengths, arms, and morale of the French forces. Davies reveals how, by integrating these two forms of intelligence, Wellington was able to develop an extremely accurate and reliable estimate of French movements and intentions not only in his own theater of operations but also in other theaters across the Iberian Peninsula. The reliability and accuracy of this intelligence, as Davies demonstrates, was central to Wellington's decision-making and, ultimately, to his overall success against the French. Correcting past, incomplete accounts, this is the definitive book on Wellington's use of intelligence. As such, it contributes to a clearer, more comprehensive understanding of Wellington at war and of his place in the history of British military intelligence.

In the maelstrom of Napoleonic Europe, Britain remained defiant, resisting French imperial ambitions. This Anglo-French rivalry was a politico-economic conflict for preeminence fought on a global scale and it reached a zenith in 1806-1808 with France's apparent dominance of Continental Europe. Britain reacted swiftly and decisively to implement maritime-based strategies to limit French military and commercial gains in Europe, while protecting British overseas interests. The policy is particularly evident in relations with Britain's 'Ancient Ally': Portugal and, by association, her South American empire, which became the front line in the battle between Napoleon's ambitions and British maritime security. Shedding new light on British war aims and maritime strategy, this is an essential work for scholars of the Napoleonic Wars and British political, diplomatic, economic and maritime/military history.