Ninety miles from the US coast of Florida, dictators and zealots ruled the island of Cuba for hundreds of years. The last half of the 20th century saw dictator Fulgencio Batista deposed by rebel leader Fidel Castro and his followers. Proclaiming himself a supporter of Cubanism not Communism, Castro's nationalization of agriculture and businesses revealed a different side. Thousands of Cubans departed by air and sea en route to the US and Europe. The US government, alerted by the Central Intelligence Agency, became concerned when an alliance forged between Castro and Nikita Khrushchev brought arms and ammunition to the island so close to US shores. John F. Kennedy, sworn into office as the 35th president when critical actions required attention, did not immediately approve the plan without considerable evaluation. The Agency hierarchy enjoyed power and influence and at times withheld critical pieces of the plan. The CIA hatched a plan to have Castro removed and enlist the Cuban exiles to be trained by US agents and invade the island to establish a new government. The operation, an invasion at the Bay of Pigs, or Bahia de Cochinos, began during the administration of President Eisenhower with participation from all departments of government up to the Oval Office. Brigade 2506 - as the exile force called themselves - was trained in Guatemala and Nicaragua by Agency representatives. With patched up B-26s from the "boneyard" in Tucson, Arizona and commercial vessels leased from an exile in New York, the Brigade had an active military force. Former military pilots, students, farmers, lawyers and doctors comprised the group who opposed Castro and wanted to be part of his takedown. Three days after the invasion at the beach, all hell broke loose.

Eager to fully use its excessive arms manufacturing capacities and thus earn as much hard currency as possible, communist Czechoslovakia became one of the principal arms suppliers to the Middle East during the Cold War. After the end of the Second World War, Czechoslovakia became an integral part of the Soviet Bloc which was heralded by the communist coup d'etat in February 1948. Before that date, however, the communist-led government in Prague had already decided, with backing from Moscow, to provide the newly established State of Israel with armament, which subsequently led to violating the UN arms embargo. These arms - infantry weapons and fighter aircraft - played a crucial role in the subsequent 1948 Arab Israeli War. As well as armament, the Czechoslovak Army also trained the initial cadre of personnel for the Israeli Air Force and Israeli paratrooper forces. When it became clear that Israel would not become a communist country, solid relations between the two states were disrupted by the Czechoslovak government. From then onwards, the leadership in Prague concentrated on deliveries of military hardware to Israel's Arab opponents. Thus in 1955, thanks to Prague, Syria became the first Arab state which obtained weapons from any communist country. Damascus remained the most loyal client of Czechoslovak arms in the Middle East until the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in 1989. During more than 30 years, Syrians ordered large quantities of Czechoslovak-designed jet trainer aircraft and impressive numbers of armoured vehicles manufactured in Czechoslovakia under Soviet license. Moreover, Czechoslovak experts designed several Syrian facilities for the repairs of military hardware as well as a number of installations and structures on Syrian military airfields. Jordan also obtained Czechoslovak infantry weapons in 1956 and Amman expressed interest in arms supplies and military assistance from Czechoslovakia in the subsequent years. The publication also contains information related to deliveries of Czechoslovak weapons to other states in the Middle East such as Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and to different Palestinian factions. The first volume of this mini-series provides general information on the development of the Czechoslovak arms industry post-1945 as well as detailing the principles, organization and history of arms export from communist Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the training of foreign military personnel in Czechoslovakia is outlined. Using the declassified original documentation, this is the most comprehensive account of Cold War Czechoslovak military involvement in the Middle East ever published.

The 1998 yearbook continues SIPRI's annual analyses of developments in global and regional major armed conflicts; in conflict prevention, management and resolution; in world military expenditure, arms production, arms transfers, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and in arms control and disarmament. Special studies in this volume include: * major armed conflicts * armed conflict prevention, management and resolution * multilateral peace missions in 1997 * regional studies of the Middle East peace process, Russia and the conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes in its environment, and new security arrangements in Europe * world military expenditure and arms production * Russian military expenditure * the 100 largest arms-producing companies * military research and development * the trade in major conventional weapons * multilateral military-related export controls * nuclear, chemical and biological arms control * new nuclear weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa * implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention * conventional arms control * the ban on anti-personnel land-mines

Marshaling a great deal of new information in a highly readable manner, the author explains the reasons for the dramatic expansion of arms sales during the past decade and clearly traces such trends as the rise in sophistication of weapons being sold so as to include the most advanced technologies, and the shift in sales to unstable parts of the Third World.

Originally published in 1982.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

International Arms Trade has always been a powerful and multi-functional constituent of world politics and international diplomacy. Sending military advisors abroad and promoting arms sales, each legitimizing and supporting the other, became indispensable tools of alliance-making starting from the eve of the First World War until today. To the German Empire, as a relative latecomer to imperialistic rivalry in the struggle for colonies around the word in the late 19th century, arms exports performed a decisive service in stimulating and strengthening the German military-based expansionist economic foreign policy and provided effective tools to create new alliances around the globe. Therefore, from the outset, the German armament firms' marketing and sales operations to the global arms market but especially to the Ottoman Empire, under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II, were openly and strongly supported by Kaiser Wilhelm II, Bismarck and the other decision-makers in German Foreign Policy. Based on extensive multinational archival research in Germany, Turkey, Britain and the United States, Arming the Sultan explores the decisive impact of arms exports on the formation and stimulation of Germany's expansionist foreign economic policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Making an important contribution to current scholarship on the political economy of the international arms trade, Yorulmaz's innovative book Arming the Sultan reveals that arms exports, specifically under the shadow of personal diplomacy, proved to be an indispensable and integral part of Germany's foreign economic policy during the period leading up to WW1.

Although there is often opposition to individual wars, most people continue to believe that the arms industry is necessary in some form: to safeguard our security, provide jobs and stimulate the economy. Not only conservatives, but many progressives and liberals, support it for these reasons. Indefensible puts forward a devastating challenge to this conventional wisdom, which has normalised the existence of the most savage weapons of mass destruction ever known. It is the essential handbook for those who want to debunk the arguments of the industry and its supporters: deploying case studies, statistics and irrefutable evidence to demonstrate they are fundamentally flawed, both factually and logically. Far from protecting us, the book shows how the arms trade undermines our security by fanning the flames of war, terrorism and global instability. In countering these myths, the book points to ways in which we can combat the arms trade's malignant influence, reclaim our democracies and reshape our economies.

The Small Arms Survey 2015 examines the role of weapons and armed violence in humanity's appropriation of the earth's wildlife and mineral riches - in Africa, where the poaching of elephants and rhinos is becoming increasingly militarised, and near resource extraction sites around the world. In addition to presenting updates on the UN small arms process and the top arms importers and exporters, the volume assesses how recent technological developments affect weapons marking, record-keeping, and tracing; reviews small arms flows to Egypt, Libya, and Syria; and evaluates a stockpile management initiative in south-east Europe. The 'armed actors' section sheds light on the arms and ammunition used by insurgents in northern Mali, the decline of the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, and the use of floating armouries by private security companies in the Indian Ocean. This edition also analyses conditions that are driving young people to adopt high-risk coping strategies in Burundi.

The United Nations's groundbreaking Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which went into effect in 2014, sets legally binding standards to regulate global arms exports and reflects the growing concerns toward the significant role that small and major conventional arms play in perpetuating human rights violations, conflict, and societal instability worldwide. Many countries that once staunchly opposed shared export controls and their perceived threat to political and economic autonomy are now beginning to embrace numerous agreements, such as the ATT and the EU Code of Conduct. Jennifer L. Erickson explores the reasons top arms-exporting democracies have put aside past sovereignty, security, and economic worries in favor of humanitarian arms transfer controls, and she follows the early effects of this about-face on export practice. She begins with a brief history of failed arms export control initiatives and then tracks arms transfer trends over time. Pinpointing the normative shifts in the 1990s that put humanitarian arms control on the table, she reveals that these states committed to these policies out of concern for their international reputations. She also highlights how arms trade scandals threaten domestic reputations and thus help improve compliance. Using statistical data and interviews conducted in France, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Erickson challenges existing IR theories of state behavior while providing insight into the role of reputation as a social mechanism and the importance of government transparency and accountability in generating compliance with new norms and rules.

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8th, 2010. The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT. This might convince more nations to co-operate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons. This book examines the New START Treaty between the U.S. and Russia with a focus on the central limits and key provisions outlined in the monitoring and verification in arms control.

This book provides nineteen cases focusing on defence acquisition and logistics issues that will give excellent learning opportunities to a range of readers. These include defence manufacturing, procurement, inventory and change management, as well as operational logistic scenarios.

When the British Labour party announced the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in January 1968, the United States faced a potential power vacuum in the area. The incoming Nixon administration, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and China, and the war in Vietnam, had no intention of replacing the British in the Gulf. To avoid further military commitments, the US encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain area security. A critical policy decision, overlooked by most scholars, saw Nixon and Kissinger engineer the rise in oil prices between 1969 and 1972 to enable Saudi Arabia and Iran to purchase the necessary military hardware to serve as guardians of the Gulf. For all their bluster about reversing Labours withdrawal decision, after their surprise victory in the election of June 1970 the Conservatives adhered to Labours policy. But in contrast to Labours wish to cut the umbilical cord of empire, the Tories wanted to retain influence in the Persian Gulf, pursuing policies largely independent of the US by the creation of the United Arab Emirates, deposing the sultan of Oman, and trying to solve the dispute over the Buraimi oasis with Saudi Arabia. By trying to maintain its empire on the cheap, Britain turned into an arms supplier supreme. But offering and selling arms does not a foreign policy make, leaving Britain in the long run with less influence in regional affairs. This was true also for the US, whose arms sales were to prove no realistic an alternative to foreign policy. The US hid under the Iranian security blanket for almost a decade. Given the weakness of the regime and the Shahs nonsensical dreams of turning Iran into one of the top five industrial and military powers in the world, the policy was cavalierly irresponsible. Similarly, leaving Saudi Arabia wallowing in oil money and medieval stupor a seedbed for Islamic fundamentalists created major future problems for the United States, as evinced by 9/11.

This book provides the reader with unclassified quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries. Some general data are provided on world-wide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary purchasers in the sale of arms. During the years 1994-2001, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations compromised 68.3 per cent of all such agreements world-wide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 65.8 per cent of all such agreements globally from 1998-2001, and 60.5 per cent of these agreements in 2001. Contents: Introduction; Major Findings; Summary of Data Trends, 1994-2001; Selected Weapons Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1994-2001; World-wide Arms Transfer Agreements and Deliveries Values, 1994-2001; Description of Items Counted in Weapons Categories, 1994-2001; Regions Identified in Arms Transfer Tables and Charts; List of Tables; Index.

Eight prominent Russian experts contribute to this unique Russian-American analysis of the state of Russia's arms industry and national export controls, as well as the strategic implications of Russian arms sales to China and clients in the Middle East. Since the early 1990s, Russia's once colossal defense-industrial complex has been in upheaval. Parts of the arms industry have collapsed, and hopes for conversion from military to civilian production have proven largely illusory. An aggressive arms-sales policy--seen as a panacea--has also met with mixed results. At the same time, turmoil in domestic politics and in the reform process has limited and slowed much-needed changes in the industry's organization, operations, decisionmaking, and controls over the export of arms and sensitive technologies. The authors examine these and other issues posed by Russia's participation in the world arms trade, weigh the chances of Russian-American discord over arms exports to " rogue states" as well as the possibilities for arms cooperation; discuss the prospects for Russia's expanded participation in multilateral arms restraint and international norm-setting, and offer policy proposals. The book evolved from discussions of the Russian-American working group on conventional arms proliferation convened by the co-editors at the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center.

European Arms Trade

Focusing on conventional weapons, rather than nuclear, biological and chemical ones, this book draws attention to important differences, within the EU, between the trade in finished weapons and the technology used to make them. It examines West European efforts since 1945 to manage both sides of conventional defence-related trade, and the political, industrial, technological and conceptual obstacles to effective mulitlateral co-ordination and regulation. The book argues that, in current European and international circumstances, recent EU initiatives have limited prospects and may prove to be counterproductive.>

This book examines the nature of the international arms trade and the adjustment of the defense industries in the United States and Russia to the post-cold war world. O'Prey highlights the substantial reduction in demand for armaments both on the world market and by the two countries. Although this decrease in demand results partly from the decline of the superpower rivalry, it also represents the culmination of technological and industrial trends that have been under way for over a decade. O'Prey argues that many observers have not recognized the long-term nature of these changes. As a consequence, industry representatives and some government officials in both countries often unwisely emphasize arms exports as a means to preserve their cold war defense industries. Given the high expectations of export success and low levels of demand, competition among arms suppliers has become intense. In the process, proliferation of armaments, technologies, and production processes to outlaw states has become more likely. In addition, false expectations of arms export success may lead officials to forgo necessary restructuring and conversion of their defense industries. This problem is especially pronounced in Russia. O'Prey offers a number of suggestions for resolving the problems posed by arms export competition and defense industry adjustment. He argues that in virtually all cases, cooperation or partnership between the U.S. and Russia will be essential. Potential measures range from mutual restraint in arms exports to private industry partnerships for defense conversion and ultimately to multilateral initiatives for defense industry and export cooperation.

Arms, Trade & the Future of the Russian Defense Industry

Americans spend more than $100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Today's weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nation's military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition--the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nations defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion--less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.

In a time of great need for Britain, a small coterie of influential businessmen gained access to secret information on industrial mobilisation as advisers to the Principal Supply Officers Committee. They provided the state with priceless advice, but, as “insiders” utilised their access to information to build a business empire at a fraction of the normal costs. Outsiders, in contrast, lacked influence and were forced together into a defensive “ring” – or cartel – which effectively fixed prices for British warships. By the 1930s, the cartel grew into one of the most sophisticated profiteering groups of its day. This book examines the relationship between the private naval armaments industry, businessmen, and the British government defence planners between the wars. It reassesses the concept of the military-industrial complex through the impact of disarmament upon private industry, the role of leading industrialists in supply and procurement policy, and the successes and failings of government organisation. It blends together political, naval, and business history in new ways, and, by situating the business activities of industrialists alongside their work as government advisors, sheds new light on the operation of the British state. This is the story of how these men profited while effectively saving the National Government from itself.

This book explores the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world, where most of the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts currently exists, and where the greatest proportion of the conventional arms trade is conducted. For decades, during the height of the Cold War, providing conventional weapons to friendly states was an instrument of foreign policy utilized by the United States and its allies. Following the Cold War's end, U.S. arms transfer policy has been based on assisting friendly and allied nations in maintaining their ability to deal with regional security threats and concerns.

When the British Labour party announced the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in January 1968, the United States faced a potential power vacuum in the area. The incoming Nixon administration, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and China, and the war in Vietnam, had no intention of replacing the British in the Gulf. To avoid further military commitments, the US encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain area security. A critical policy decision, overlooked by most scholars, saw Nixon and Kissinger engineer the rise in oil prices between 1969 and 1972 to enable Saudi Arabia and Iran to purchase the necessary military hardware to serve as guardians of the Gulf. For all their bluster about reversing Labour's withdrawal decision, after their surprise victory in the election of June 1970 the Conservatives adhered to Labour's policy. But in contrast to Labour's wish to cut the umbilical cord of empire, the Tories wanted to retain influence in the Persian Gulf, pursuing policies largely independent of the US by the creation of the United Arab Emirates, deposing the sultan of Oman, and trying to solve the dispute over the Buraimi oasis with Saudi Arabia. By trying to maintain its empire on the cheap, Britain turned into an arms supplier supreme. But offering and selling arms does not a foreign policy make, leaving Britain in the long run with less influence in regional affairs. This was true also for the US, whose arms sales were to prove no realistic an alternative to foreign policy. The US hid under the Iranian security blanket for almost a decade. Given the weakness of the regime and the Shah's nonsensical dreams of turning Iran into one of the top five industrial and military powers in the world, the policy was cavalierly irresponsible. Similarly, leaving Saudi Arabia wallowing in oil money and medieval stupor -- a seedbed for Islamic fundamentalists -- created major future problems for the United States, as evinced by 9/11.

Deception in High Places reveals the corruption endemic in Britain's biggest arms deals over the last fifty years. Based on painstaking research in government archives, collections of private and court papers and documents won by the author in a landmark Freedom of Information Tribunal against the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the book illuminates a shadow world of bribery and elite enrichment. Deception in High Places charts British government involvement in arms trade corruption and presents the fullest history yet of bribery in Britain's arms deals with Saudi Arabia. It includes the backstory of the controversial termination of a Serious Fraud Office corruption investigation following pressure by the Saudi Royal Family and the British establishment.

A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology, described by a former CIA Director as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." A hero in Pakistan and revered as the Father of the Bomb, Khan built a global clandestine network that sold the most closely guarded nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Here for the first time is the riveting inside story of the rise and fall of A.Q. Khan and his role in the devastating spread of nuclear technology over the last thirty years. Drawing on exclusive interviews with key players in Islamabad, London, and Washington, as well as with members of Khan's own network, BBC journalist Gordon Corera paints a truly unsettling picture of the ultimate arms bazaar. Corera reveals how Khan operated within a world of shadowy deals among rogue states and how his privileged position in Pakistan provided him with the protection to build his unique and deadly business empire. It explains why and how he was able to operate so freely for so many years. Brimming with revelations, the book provides new insight into Iran's nuclear ambitions and how close Tehran may be to the bomb.
In addition, the book contains startling new information on how the CIA and MI6 penetrated Khan's network, how the U.S. and UK ultimately broke Khan's ring, and how they persuaded Pakistan's President Musharraf to arrest a national hero. The book also provides the first detailed account of the high-wire dealings with Muammar Gadaffi, which led to Libya's renunciation of nuclear weapons and which played a key role in Khan's downfall.
The spread of nuclear weapons technology around the globe presents the greatest security challenge of our time. Shopping for Bombs presents a unique window into the challenges of stopping a new nuclear arms race, a race that A.Q. Khan himself did more than any other individual to promote.