For three years, beginning in June 1950, air and ground crews of the United States Air Force (USAF) conducted bombing operations with Boeing B-29 Superfortresses in support of the United Nations (U.N.) forces engaged on the peninsula of Korea. Powered by four large radial piston engines, the propeller- driven Superfortress had been the most advanced very long-range heavy bomber developed during the Second World War. But such had been the pace of aeronautical development since the Second World War that it was now, at the time of Korea, considered but a medium bomber, and one outclassed by early jet aircraft at that. Manned principally by officers and men from the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the B-29 units carried out missions very different from the task for which SAC was trained. Instead of striking at the homeland of a major industrial power with ATOMIC weapons, the crews at- tacked targets of many types, showing the variety of functions that air power could perform. The bombers carried out battlefield support, interdiction, and air superiority (counter airfield) missions. They hit industrial targets of the type normally classified as strategic and also took part in an effort to utilize air power to pressure the enemy to agree to a cease-fire. This study traces the war fought by Far East Air Forces (FEAF) Bomber Command (Provisional), the B-29 force created to attack targets in Korea from bases in Okinawa and Japan. Consisting of units belonging to FEAF and others from SAC assigned on temporary duty, Bomber Command cooperated with other USAF organizations to support operations in the Korean peninsula. The B-29 crews earned credit in all ten of the recognized campaigns of the Korean War. Politically, the war had three phases. From June 25, 1950, when North Koreans attacked South Korea, until November 2, 1950, U.N. forces defended the south and defeated the invaders. From November 1950 until July 1951, the U.N. had to deal with the intervention of Communist China and the most desperate fighting of the war. Beginning on July 10, 1951, fighting continued even as negotiations for a cease-fire between the opposing military commands were under way. This third phase, and the war, ended when the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. As for actual combat operations, however, Bomber Command experienced the war in terms of the opposition it encountered. Following a brief but intensive air superiority war in the summer of 1950, North Korea posed negligible air opposition, but when the Chinese entered the war in November, assisted by Soviet fighter pilots flying MiG-15 jet fighters, the limitations of the obsolescent B-29s became apparent. Communist air resistance was so heavy that by the end of October 1951 the B-29s had switched to a remarkable night campaign that continued for more than a year and a half. By 1953, SAC was well on the way to removing the B-29s from its inventory. Thus, for one last time, the B-29, a workhorse of the air campaign in the Pacific in World War II, flew into combat. Often called a "police action," or the "Korean conflict," the fighting in Korea was undertaken under the leadership of the United States on the authority of the U.N., to defend the Republic of Korea against the Communist North Koreans and Chinese and their Soviet supporters. Thus, it differed significantly from previous conflicts, which had been typified by formal declarations of war by the Congress. This semantic uncertainty well reflects the unprecedented situation that American fighting men faced in the Far East. For Bomber Command, the contrast between what a strategic bomber like the B-29 had been designed for and what it actually did clearly illustrates the anomalies.

Before the Korean War, the primary mission of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer's Far East Air Forces was air defense of the Japanese homeland. Most of the aircraft constituting Stratemeyer's inventory were interceptors, not designed for the type of combat that would be required now that the United States was joining in the UN effort to end the war in Korea. The Joint Army/USAAF doctrine of 1946, known as Field Manual 31-35, Air Ground Operations, was also considered outdated in the present circumstance. A new approach to warfighting had to be developed in response to the strong influence of General Douglas MacArthur and other of his air officers in the Army-dominated General Headquarters Far East Command. Close air support of the ground forces as provided by Fifth Air Force came at some cost, and tempers flared in the process, but the air commanders in Korea never deprived the ground commanders of close air support if it was needed. Indeed, without the close air support provided to the airmen, the ground campaign would have been a much more bloody and difficult affair than it was.

Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) irregular warfare and "nation-building" mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan's history and culture, the region's contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in U.S. Government strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in U.S. Government structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. As a rationally ordered expression of the ways and means to be applied in the protection of vital national security interests, strategy is supposed to represent a careful analysis and prioritization of the particular interests at stake. In turn, these interests are linked to feasible methods and the resources that are available for their protection, all placed within the context of competing global security demands and a serious consideration of risk. In the case of Afghanistan, however, U.S. Government strategic guidance has been disjointed-- or inconsistent and lacking coherence--while interagency efforts have been "disunified," with agency outputs too often fragmented, inadequate, or internally at odds with one another. As a result, U.S. strategic supervision of the Afghan operation has been muddled and shifting at best, even as our government's interagency processes and available agency capabilities have fallen far short of what is needed to carry out the complex and broad requirements of irregular warfare and "nation-building." Given the breadth, length, and expense of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan, these strategic and operational shortfalls also carry with them potentially dire consequences for U.S. national security interests around the globe, considering potential first- and second-order effects and other associated risks. U.S. Government disjointed ways, coupled with a corresponding disunity of means, represent the proximate cause of our struggles in Afghanistan, and these deficiencies must be addressed if this mission and other similar future endeavors are to succeed.

The Combat Studies Institute provides a wide range of military, historical, and educational support to the Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command, and the United States Army. The Combat Studies Institute researches, writes, and publishes original interpretive works on issues of relevance to the US Army. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) publication collection contains reports and books pertaining to American history, military guidelines, foreign affairs, and more. Titles featured in this collection include: Art of War Papers: Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior, Law of War: Can 20th Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? and Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City. This title is one of many in the Combat Studies Institute collection.

This report discusses logistics in the Persian Gulf war as it applies to all military operations and in particular to air operations. Simply put, how did the United States equip its forces for Desert Shield and Desert Storm? Logistics also includes fictions for maintaining an air base and support services. These aspects of logistics will be covered in the two parts of this volume.

In the summer of 2010, a unit of Danish soldiers known as ISAF-10 deployed to Afghanistan under British command. In Helmand Province, they tried to secure a fragile peace while dealing with the challenges of training an often apparently indifferent Afghan police and army, ensuring a functioning collaboration with the British despite insufficient military intelligence and divergent military cultures, and fell under frequent attack by an increasingly sophisticated and deadly Taliban. In this remarkable book, Kjeld Hald Galster tells their story. He also looks at the wider picture, examining coalitions ranging from Ancient Greece to the Cold War. Exploring the millennia-long history of coalition warfare, he looks at what makes them work, the lessons they teach us, and how they reflect - and predict - the rise and downfall of the coalitions of the willing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and those yet to come.

This book contains the personal journey and incredible struggles of a combat tested Air Force Chief Master Sergeant. Reading this book is like taking a tour back in time to the peak of the war in Iraq. The reader will feel the stress of being under attack, know the agony of seeing brothers in arms being wounded and patched up, and most importantly, feel the pain a leader carries with them when troops are killed in action. During this journey, Chief Scott Dearduff and his commanding general lead thousands of Airmen stationed across the entire country of Iraq. During that 12 month tour of combat duty, 13 of their Airmen were killed in action. The chief details the struggles that a leader deals with during those most difficult of time. He also shares the internal battle that he felt by being at war again while his family waited for him at home, not really knowing if he would make it home again. This book is not about killing the enemy, but more about those who served and those who sacrificed to meet the demands of the mission. The reader will feel like they have been to Iraq when the book is done. It should be read by every mother, father, sister, brother, friend and family member of any US service member who served in Iraq. These stories, which are never told on the national news, will help you understand that there is passion and compassion in war time, even on the darkest of days.

Despite the vast research by Americans on General Matthew B. Ridgway's miraculous transformation of the Eighth Army during the Korean War, few studies have examined his operational approach, while contrasting it with General Douglas MacArthur's. The constructed reality that emerges from the literature is that General MacArthur's operational desires led to a strained relationship with President Truman and ultimately limited his ability to employ forces in the manner he believed necessary to defeat the Communist Chinese Forces. Similarly, the impression of General Ridgway painted by historical text is that sheer will stopped and turned around the frantic retreating army, which subsequently halted the CCF advance and pushed the communists beyond the 38th Parallel. Army Design Methodology provides a powerful tool for viewing these actions in a new perspective. This monograph examines the actions of General MacArthur and General Ridgway and their application of critical and creative thinking to the problem created by the entry of Communist Chinese Forces onto the Korean Peninsula in October and November of 1950. This study details the significant reframing that characterized the methods applied by General Ridgway during 1950 and 1951, providing future operational commanders a relevant historical example of Army Design Methodology in action.

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War, the official history offices of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and their respective historical associations collaborated to sponsor as comprehensive a symposium as possible, including as participants some of the coalition partners who contributed forces and weapons to the war. The intent of this symposium, titled Coalition Air Warfare during the Korean War, 1950 -1953, was to focus not only on the contributions made by the armed forces of the United States, but also on those of America's allies. The diverse group of panelists and speakers included not only scholars with subject matter expertise, but also veteran soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had served in that conflict. It was hoped that the melding of these diverse perspectives would provide interesting, if sometimes conflicting, views about the Korean War. The symposium organizers designated an agenda of six specific panels for investigation, including Planning and Operations; Air Superiority, Air Support of Ground Forces; Air Interdiction and Bombardment, Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence, and Logistical Support of Air Operations. Each session began with commentary by the panel chairman, which was followed by formal papers, and in some instances included a lively question and answer session. The papers and most of the proceedings found their way into print and are recorded here in an effort to permanently capture the activities, challenges, contributions, and heroics of the coalition air forces and the airmen who fought during the Korean conflict.

Early on the morning of January 17, 1991, the Persian Gulf War began. It consisted of massive allied air strikes on Iraq and Iraqi targets in Kuwait. The United States Air Force spearheaded the offensive and furnished the bulk of the attacking aircraft. During 43 days of fighting, the U.S. Air Force simultaneously conducted two closely coordinated air campaigns. This study develops background information to place the Persian Gulf War in its proper historical and cultural contexts, unfamiliar to and not easily understood by Americans.

Following the fight out of the Chosin Reservoir, the 1st Marine Division embarked aboard ships bound for Pusan. Once offloaded in mid-December, the division moved inland some 40 miles west to Masan, an area previously occupied by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade that summer. As 1950 drew to a close, the military situation in Korea appeared bleak. American policymakers were even contemplating evacuating U.S. forces. This U.S. Marine Corps history provides unique information about important aspects of the Korean War, with material on the 1st Marine Division, Lt. General Matthew Bunker Ridgway, Truman fires MacArthur, medical helicopter evacuation, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 1951.

"Train Wreckers and Ghost Killers" discusses the contributions the British Marines and the Korean Marines made to the Allied Forces in the Korean War. In praise of the British Royal Marines that had been attached to his command since mid-November 1950, Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, wrote that their services in the recently concluded Chosin Reservoir campaign made "a significant contribution to the holding of Hagaru, which was vital to the 1st Marine] Division." General Smith's comments reflected the view held by many Marines, both officers and enlisted, of the fighting abilities of both their British cousins and their Republic of Korea Marine Corps allies. During the three years they fought together on the Korean peninsula, the British, Korean, and U.S. Marines forged bonds that still exist today.

The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 capped an era of USAF modernization and enhanced readiness begun in the late 1970s and that continued through the 1980s. The long lead-time weapons acquisition and training programs, begun a decade or more earlier, came to fruition against a far different opponent and in an unforeseen locale than that envisioned by their creators. The force designed to counter the superpower foe of the Cold War, the USSR, never fought a direct battle against that enemy during the existence of the Soviet Union. Instead, the USAF fought the first war of the so-called New World Order, a war that had as much in common with the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century as it had with the high-technology wars of the late twentieth century. The USAF shouldered the bulk of the fighting for the first thirty-nine of the conflict's forty-two days. This volume covers the air offensive against strategic military and economic targets within the pre-August 1990 borders of Iraq. The offensive air plan once again displayed the ability of the U.S. military to turn the necessity of improvisation into a virtue when, in mid-August 1990, an element of the Air Staff in the Pentagon wrote the basis of the offensive plan in ten days. The plan was founded upon the precepts of Col. John A. Warden III's air power theories-centers of gravity, shock effect, and the importance of leadership-related targets. Once the outline plan reached the arena of operations, the U.S. Central Air Forces (CENTAF), under the able leadership of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, adopted the targeting philosophy of the plan and, after many modifications owing to new targets and an increased force structure, employed it with devastating effect. The author describes not only the outstanding performance of USAF men and machines but also the difficulties and complexities of coordinating the many elements of air and staff operations. Among these were the complex coordination of the fighters with their tankers, the speedy transmission of data from the allseeing eyes of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, the multiple bomb runs over chemical and biological warfare bunkers, and the shortcomings of certain types of intelligence. All these factors impacted on mission effectiveness. The author also diagrams how outside influences-political pressure from neutrals, such as the Israelis, and from public news media-can affect the direction of the bombing effort. Although this account of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf concentrates on the operational history of a six-week war, it also places that war into its larger political and military context, especially in its tale of the interplay between the U.S. military and civilian leadership. It illustrates, with reference to actual missions, the operational advantages of stealth fighter bombers as well as their vulnerabilities. Davis presents the reader with a detailed account of one of the USAF's most important air operations in the last half of the twentieth century. In the decade after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the pattern of strategic air operations against Iraq became the template for USAF operations over Bosnia and during the air war over Serbia and, most recently, in Afghanistan as well. In planning for air operations in the Balkans, USAF officers were strongly influenced by John A. Warden's methodology and ideology with its emphasis on centers of gravity and strikes on leadership targets. Stealth air combat operations, inaugurated en masse in the Gulf War, became even more prevalent with the introduction of the B-2 bomber. Likewise, the use of precision weapons grew. The aversion of western democracies to both military and civilian casualties and their effect on targeting, tactics, and strategy first encountered over Iraq became more pronounced in subsequent conflicts-as did the continuing challenge in matching accurate intelligence to precision weapons.

The first major surprise of the post World War II years came into play when in late June 1950, the United States found itself responding in crisis fashion to the North Korean invasion of the new republic of South Korea, just four years and nine months after VJ-Day. The nation became involved in Korea as a result of the Cairo and Yalta conferences in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the concept of a free and independent post-war Korea.

Since reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan began in 2001, the U.S. government, the international community, and the Afghan government have made improving Afghanistan's justice system a priority. Key documents have noted the importance of the justice sector, including the U.S. government's Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the Afghan Government's National Priority Programs focus on strengthening Afghan rule of law and Afghan citizens' access to justice. The Department of State (State) has invested in a variety of rule of law programs since 2005, including programs managed by its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to train Afghan justice sector personnel. State also serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. justice sector development efforts in Afghanistan, responsible for coordinating the activities of several U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice. INL has spent approximately $205.5 million on its Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) to provide training to Afghan justice sector officials, to develop a case management system to track cases throughout Afghanistan's justice system, and to build the capacity and administrative skills of officials within Afghan ministries

Tracing the story of the Korean War from 1950 and the North Korean army's summer invasion across the 38th Parallel, So They Will Know brings to life the global conflict that remains misunderstood, underappreciated, and inadequately documented. In fact, a typical college American History textbook will have little more than a single page devoted to the Korean War, and rarely are there mentions of the specific battles where thousands of men were killed or injured during the final months before the close of the armed conflict.

Merriam Press Military Monograph 152. First Edition (2013). Shortly after 9/11, in November 2001, the seventeen members of the 710th left San Diego for Afghanistan to help in the search of the perpetrators of the worst terrorist attack on American soil. They answered the call during one of the most frightening times in our nation's history. Three would not come home again. The members of the 710th were some of the first boots on the ground in Afghanistan during the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom. Tragically, on April 15, 2002, the 710th lost three of their soldiers in an explosion of a booby-trapped weapons cache while supporting the 19th Special Forces group north of Kandahar. Killed in Action: SFC Daniel A. Romero, SSG Justin J. Galewski, SSG Brian T. Craig, and SGT Jamie O. Maugans. Only one soldier, SSG Jeffrey Pugmire, escaped death. The names of the three fallen Soldiers of the 710th were added to the EOD Memorial Wall at Eglin AFB in May 2003. The members of the 710th Ord Co (EOD) made history once again by their service and presence in Iraq on December 15, 2005 during that nation's first democratic elections. Other past deployments include operations in Bosnia and Kuwait as well. The former CO Major Keith Nelson, and SSG Jeff Pugmire (Ret) have worked at the Joint IED Task Force in Washington, DC. This interservice task force is developing new methods to defeat IEDs and their threat to our troops overseas. A Monument honoring the four killed in Afghanistan as well as Fort Rosecrans Soldiers, past and present, now stands at 1895 Tattnal Way. Open to the public, the Memorial is located along Harbor Drive in San Diego, within Lincoln Military Housing at Liberty Station. It was dedicated in April 2007 on the Fifth Year Anniversary weekend of the loss of the men from the 710th Ord Co (EOD) in Afghanistan. 103 B&W and color photos and documents.