The Diary of a U.S. Soldier in Germany by Cpl. John Tomikel is a historical document. It describes the life of a soldier in the occupation of West Germany and its relationship to East Europe controlled by the Soviet Union. The Korean War is in progress. The daily life of the soldier and the contacts with German civilians are noted. Halfway through his tour of duty, John is joined by his wife. They rent a room in the city of Wiesbaden and mingle with the natives. John is able to join his wife on most weekends and they enjoy the cultural offerings of the city as well as trips to different areas. This is an excellent documentary of the time and place as well as the life of a soldier. Two momentous events occurred during this time period, the death of Josef Stalin and the cease-fire in the Korean War. This is an interesting adventure as well as a historical document.

With North Korea rattling its saber again, Letters to Ann takes the reader back to the early years of the Korean War. Even in some of its darkest moments, Captain John Hughes finds and shares bits of humor about his daily military existence with his then four year-old daughter. It is a unique perspective of what so often is called "The Forgotten War."

Rarely is it a good idea for any field of human endeavor to be dominated by a single theory aimed at addressing a pressing problem. However, such dominance has recently occurred in the American approach to counterinsurgency warfare. In recent years, driven by the perceived failures in the American war in Iraq, the United States military, and in particular the United States Army, has determined that when it comes to counterinsurgency, the population-centric approach is the only way to go. The population-centric approach dominates the Army's capstone manual on Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, a document published in late 2006 in order to help redress shortcomings in fighting the war in Iraq.1 The driving force behind the manual, General David Petraeus, took the principles contained therein with him to Iraq, applied them during the famous surge of 2007-2008, and ultimately turned that war around. According to this popular account, the population-centric approach had been vindicated, and it became something of received truth about how to prosecute counterinsurgency.

Since Vietnam, we have come to realize that today's con icts involve more than victory in battle to succeed. We need to win the hearts and minds of the people as well as the re ghts in order to prevail. Ironically, Marines get this. Their legendary courage and tenacity on the battle eld is equally matched by their compassion and engagement with the traumatized civilian population. Marine General Jim Mattis summed it up best when he said, "We can be your worst enemy or your best friend."

Eyewitness to War Oral History Series: Eyewitness to War The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History is a unique publication for the Combat Studies Institute. It is our first publication to make exclusive use of oral history. This study is a derivative of the CSI Operational Leadership Experiences (OLE) project, a program that collects and archives first-person experiences from the Global War on Terror. It can also be considered a companion to the recently published CSI Occasional Paper #20: Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Interviews collected for the OLE project formed the basis for that occasional paper and were so compelling, we felt a need to publish those interviews in a book series. In November 2004, the second battle for Fallujah was a brutal and bloody fight so characteristic of urban terrain. Under the overall command of the 1st Marine Division, four Marine infantry and two US Army battalions (Task Forces 2-2 Infantry and 2-7 Cavalry) were committed to the streets of Fallujah. At this same time, the Army's 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division formed a cordon to hold and isolate the insurgents in the city. Using the fi repower and mobility of the Army's heavy armor and mechanized units to full effect, the Marine Regimental Combat Teams were successful in destroying the enemy and securing Fallujah in ten days. Eyewitness to War interviews span a wide spectrum of participants, from commanders and senior non-commissioned officers at all levels to the first-hand accounts of combat and combat service support personnel on the battlefield. We make no claim that this history is a comprehensive work, as these 37 people are but a fraction of the thousands who took part in the operation. This is primarily an Army oral history, though one of the Marine Regimental Commanders agreed to provide his story. The USMC bore the brunt of fighting in Fallujah and this study does not attempt to overlook their tremendous accomplishments. The individuals featured in this work volunteered to work with our staff over many months. Their stories are a tremendous testimony to the skill, flexibility, and bravery of the US Army today. This collection of personal experiences is the raw material history is made of. It is a riveting and useful way to study the past. And it is our hope that the insights derived from their roles in the second battle for Fallujah will better prepare the US Army for tomorrow's endeavors.

There is a crossroads near Safwan in southeastern Iraq. Nearby, there is a small hill and an airstrip. After the Gulf War, Safwan became a gathering point for refugees fleeing the Iraqi Army as it reestablished control of Basrah. Prior to that, the airstrip was the site of the dictation of armistice terms to that army by the victorious coalition's military high command. Still earlier, at the end of the coalition attack, the absence of American forces on the airstrip and at the road junction was the source of the most serious command crisis of the U.S. expeditionary forces. Its resolution put at risk American soldiers and threatened the reputations of the very commanders who had just conducted the greatest offensive of concentrated armored forces in the history of the United States Army. In many ways, events at Safwan in late February and early March are emblematic of the Gulf War. It is to explain how U.S. forces arrived at Safwan, what they did and did not do there, and what this all meant, that this book is written. The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable sort-good against evil, a wrong to be righted-a crusade. It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February in 1991. The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's observations as the Third Army historian. This book's focus is on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt-General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." The book is titled "Lucky War" after the affectation of Third Army, whose telephone switch, as far back as General George Patton's World War II headquarters, has been named "Lucky." In the same fashion, the Third Army's tactical operations center in Desert Storm was referred to as "Lucky TOC." Its forward command post was "Lucky Wheels," and so on. "Lucky" is a talisman to Third Army as, incidentally, are "Jay Hawk" to VII Corps, and "Danger" to the 1st Infantry Division. It is for that reason alone that "Lucky" is incorporated in the title.

In 1991, at the start of the first Gulf War, I was as a 4th year medical student in Paris France on a general surgery rotation. Little did I know that fifteen years later, as I cared for Iraqi - civilians, military, terrorists who would have killed us given the chance, the words of Dr. Jean Louis Paille would echo in my mind - "Patient care trumps politics every time... Every time." Under fire and under pressure in Balad, Iraq, Lt. Col Jay T. Bishoff, a United States Air Force surgeon, gives a first-hand account of the war in Iraq through unique photographic images and his personal encounters in his new book, Boots of War. Dr. Bishoff recounts true stories from the 332 EMDG Hospital in Balad Iraq when it was the busiest trauma center in the world. While insurgents launched mortar and rocket attacks onto the Balad, Iraq Air base an average of seven times a day, medical personnel continually cared for critically injured U.S. and coalition soldiers, Iraqi nationals and even the rocket firing insurgents themselves. Full of laughter and tears, these modern-day war stories are unforgettable accounts of Operation Iraqi Freedom, its human cost, and its moral lessons.

The first comprehensive look at youth living in a country attempting to rebuild itself after three decades of civil conflict, Children of Afghanistan relies on the research and fieldwork of twenty-one experts to cover an incredible range of topics. Focusing on the full scope of childhood, from birth through young adulthood, this edited volume examines a myriad of issues: early childhood socialization in war and peace; education, literacy, vocational training, and apprenticeship; refugee life; mental and physical health, including disabilities and nutrition; children's songs, folktales, and art; sports and play; orphans; life on the streets; child labor and children as family breadwinners; child soldiers and militarization; sexual exploitation; growing up in prison; marriage; family violence; and other issues vital to understanding, empowerment, and transformation. Children of Afghanistan is the first volume that not only attempts to analyze the range of challenges facing Afghan children across class, gender, and region but also offers solutions to the problems they face. With nearly half of the population under the age of fifteen, the future of the country no doubt lies with its children. Those who seek peace for the region must find solutions to the host of crises that have led the United Nations to call Afghanistan "the worst place on earth to be born." The authors of Children of Afghanistan provide child-centered solutions to rebuilding the country's cultural, social, and economic institutions.

Complexity theory has attracted considerable interest from operational artists in recent times. However, because it is still an emerging field, there are few -if any - historical case studies that show how complexity applies to military operations. Using the comparison method, this review compares the similarities and differences between a historical case study and insights from complexity theory in order to evaluate the utility of complexity theory for military practice. The first three months of Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway's command of the Eighth Army during the Korean War is chosen for the historical case study, as an exemplar of successful operational command. Complexity theory is compared with how Ridgway understood, perceived, and approached the complexity of his operational environment. Complexity theory offers broad guidelines for action, such as: use simple rules to generate complex behavior; look at the system from multiple scales to gain better perspective; achieve a holistic picture of the situation by recognizing interdependence; and continually adapt to a changing environment. The comparative analysis shows good agreement between these recommendations of complexity theory and Ridgway's successful campaign. A significant implication of this research is that complexity theory and history can be complementary perspectives for appreciating operational art. Leaders who understand complexity theory as well as military history may be better prepared for the challenges they will face in an uncertain future.

Eyewitness to War Oral History Series: US Army Advisors in Afghanistan is the third publication by the Combat Studies Institute that makes exclusive use of oral history. This volume is a product of interviews obtained by the CSI Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) project and our Contemporary Operations Study Team (COST). The interviews used in this volume range from a senior officer who conceptualized the idea for Task Force Phoenix, the Coalition Joint Task Force that execute a broad-based training, mentoring, and assistance program aimed at improving the Afghan National Army's (ANA) ability to field mission-ready operational commands, to embedded transition team members assigned to coach, teach and mentor their ANA counterparts. The interviews are in their own words; they provide frank commentary to a range of topics including pre-deployment training, logistics support, poppy eradication (and some of the corruption they encountered associated with that task) and integration of Special Forces with conventional infantry on operations.

The lightning campaign that toppled the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003 seemed to herald the arrival of a new way of war, as Germany's blitzkrieg had done at the beginning of World War II. But the initial victory soon devolved into a persistent counterinsurgency conflict reminiscent of the long U.S. effort to pacify the Philippines after the rapid defeat of Spain in 1898. In Iraq, American soldiers and their Coalition partners had merely traded one fairly weak and generally conventional opponent for a more deadly, diverse, and determined foe relying on the tactics of the guerrilla and the terrorist. This volume focuses on that second and longer campaign. But rather than a narrative of the overall course of the conflict, it provides a soldier's-eye view of the war by focusing on detailed accounts of selected engagements. Each illustrates the everyday challenges that America's soldiers faced in a difficult struggle against an inventive and often elusive enemy. Weapons, doctrine, and procedures developed to fight a conventional campaign against a similar opposing force had to be adapted to fit a different type of conflict. The U.S. Army's combat and support forces brought both resourcefulness and resilience to this task while continuing to demonstrate the same courage shown by previous generations fighting the nation's battles. These stories not only symbolize the tip of the spear formed by units in contact, but they also represent the contributions of all American men and women who have served their country in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Taken together, these accounts will provide our deploying leaders and soldiers a better understanding of the environment that they will encounter and prepare them for the work that must be done.

The book is part of the Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series. It depicts the Marine involvement in the events from the Nevada Battles to the Armistice.

This monograph is a preliminary accounting of the role of the U.S. Marine Corps' senior command in the Persian Gulf conflict from 8 August 1990 to 16 April 1991. It is one of a series covering the operations of the 1st Marine Division; the 2d Marine Division; the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Combat Service Support Element, comprised of 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups units; Marines afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq and Turkey.

Since reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan began in 2001, the U.S. government, the international community, and the Afghan government have made improving Afghanistan's justice system a priority. Key documents have noted the importance of the justice sector, including the U.S. government's Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the Afghan Government's National Priority Programs focus on strengthening Afghan rule of law and Afghan citizens' access to justice. The Department of State (State) has invested in a variety of rule of law programs since 2005, including programs managed by its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to train Afghan justice sector personnel. State also serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. justice sector development efforts in Afghanistan, responsible for coordinating the activities of several U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice. INL has spent approximately $205.5 million on its Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) to provide training to Afghan justice sector officials, to develop a case management system to track cases throughout Afghanistan's justice system, and to build the capacity and administrative skills of officials within Afghan ministries

On Sunday, 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea unexpectedly invaded its southern neighbor, the American-backed Republic of Korea (ROK). The poorly equipped ROK Army was no match for the well prepared North Korean People's Army (NKPA) whose armored spearheads quickly thrust across the 38th Parallel. The stunned world helplessly looked on as the out-numbered and outgunned South Koreans were quickly routed. With the fall of the capital city of Seoul imminent, President Harry S. Truman ordered General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, in Tokyo, to immediately pull all American nationals in South Korea out of harm's way. During the course of the resultant noncombatant evacuation operations an unmanned American transport plane was destroyed on the ground and a flight of U.S. Air Force aircraft were buzzed by a North Korean Air Force plane over the Yellow Sea without any shots being fired. On 27 July, an American combat air patrol protecting Kimpo Airfield near the South Korean capital actively engaged menacing North Korean planes and promptly downed three of the five Soviet-built Yak fighters. Soon thereafter American military forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC) were committed to thwart a Communist takeover of South Korea. Thus, only four years and nine months after V-J Day marked the end of World War II, the United States was once again involved in a shooting war in Asia.

"Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951" is a concise narrative of the major events surrounding not only the call-up of reserve units and individ uals but also the policies affecting service.