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Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Logic
This book offers an original philosophical perspective on
exemplarity. Inspired by Wittgenstein's later work and Derrida's
theory of deconstruction, it argues that examples are not static
entities but rather oscillate between singular and universal
moments. There is a broad consensus that exemplary cases mediate
between singular instances and universal concepts or norms. In the
first part of the book, Macha contends that there is a kind of
differance between singular examples and general exemplars or
paradigms. Every example is, in part, also an exemplar, and vice
versa. Furthermore, he develops a paracomplete approach to the
logic of exemplarity, which allows us to say of an exemplar of X
neither that it is an X nor that it is not an X. This paradox is
structurally isomorphic to Russell's paradox and can be addressed
in similar ways. In the second part of the book, Macha presents
four historical studies that exemplify the ideas developed in the
first part. This part begins with Plato's Forms, understood as
standards/paradigms, before considering Kant's theory of reflective
judgment as a general epistemological account of exemplarity. This
is then followed by analyses of Hegel's conceptual moment of
particularity and Kuhn's concept of paradigm. The book concludes by
discussing the speculative hypothesis that all our knowledge is
based on paradigms, which, following the logic of exemplarity, are
neither true nor false. The Philosophy of Exemplarity will be of
interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of
language, logic, history of philosophy, and literary theory.
The central contention of this book is that second-order logic has
a central role to play in laying the foundations of mathematics. In
order to develop the argument fully, the author presents a detailed
development of higher-order logic, including a comprehensive
discussion of its semantics. Professor Shapiro demonstrates the
prevalence of second-order notions in mathematics is practised, and
also the extent to which mathematical concepts can be formulated in
second-order languages . He shows how first-order languages are
insufficient to codify many concepts in contemporary mathematics,
and thus that higher-order logic is needed to fully reflect current
mathematics. Throughout, the emphasis is on discussing the
philosophical and historical issues associated with this subject,
and the implications that they have for foundational studies. For
the most part, the author assumes little more than a familiarity
with logic as might be gained from a beginning graduate course
which includes the incompleteness of arithmetic and the
Lowenheim-Skolem theorems. All those concerned with the foundations
of mathematics will find this a thought-provoking discussion of
some of the central issues in this subject.
This book develops a new Wittgenstein interpretation called
Wittgenstein's Metametaphysics. The basic idea is that one major
strand in Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy can be
described as undermining the dichotomy between realism and
idealism. The aim of this book is to contribute to a better
understanding of the relation between language and reality and to
open up avenues of dialogue to overcome deep divides in the
research literature. In the course of developing a comprehensive
and in-depth interpretation, the author provides fresh and original
analyses of the latest issues in Wittgenstein scholarship and gives
new answers to both major exegetical and philosophical problems.
This makes the book an illuminating study for scholars and advanced
students alike.
The Routledge Companion to Pragmatism offers 44 cutting-edge
chapters-written specifically for this volume by an international
team of distinguished researchers-that assess the past, present,
and future of pragmatism. Going beyond the exposition of canonical
texts and figures, the collection presents pragmatism as a living
philosophical idiom that continues to devise promising theses in
contemporary debates. The chapters are organized into four major
parts: Pragmatism's history and figures Pragmatism and plural
traditions Pragmatism's reach Pragmatism's relevance Each chapter
provides up-to-date research tools for philosophers, students, and
others who wish to locate pragmatist options in their contemporary
research fields. As a whole, the volume demonstrates that the
vitality of pragmatism lies in its ability to build upon, and
transcend, the ideas and arguments of its founders. When seen in
its full diversity, pragmatism emerges as one of the most
successful and influential philosophical movements in Western
philosophy.
This book examines the philosophical conception of abductive
reasoning as developed by Charles S. Peirce, the founder of
American pragmatism. It explores the historical and systematic
connections of Peirce's original ideas and debates about their
interpretations. Abduction is understood in a broad sense which
covers the discovery and pursuit of hypotheses and inference to the
best explanation. The analysis presents fresh insights into this
notion of reasoning, which derives from effects to causes or from
surprising observations to explanatory theories. The author
outlines some logical and AI approaches to abduction as well as
studies various kinds of inverse problems in astronomy, physics,
medicine, biology, and human sciences to provide examples of
retroductions and abductions. The discussion covers also everyday
examples with the implication of this notion in detective stories,
one of Peirce's own favorite themes. The author uses Bayesian
probabilities to argue that explanatory abduction is a method of
confirmation. He uses his own account of truth approximation to
reformulate abduction as inference which leads to the truthlikeness
of its conclusion. This allows a powerful abductive defense of
scientific realism. This up-to-date survey and defense of the
Peircean view of abduction may very well help researchers,
students, and philosophers better understand the logic of
truth-seeking.
Computability and Logic has become a classic because of its
accessibility to students without a mathematical background and
because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate
logic course, such as Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also a
large number of optional topics, from Turing's theory of
computability to Ramsey's theorem. This 2007 fifth edition has been
thoroughly revised by John Burgess. Including a selection of
exercises, adjusted for this edition, at the end of each chapter,
it offers a simpler treatment of the representability of recursive
functions, a traditional stumbling block for students on the way to
the Godel incompleteness theorems. This updated edition is also
accompanied by a website as well as an instructor's manual.
This collection of essays is on the relation between probabilities,
especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides
negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be
related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas
and results which will open up areas of research. The collection is
intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely
responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as
describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work the contributions
extend his ideas in directions he may or may not have anticipated,
but that he certainly inspired. In addition to a wide range of
philosophers of science, the volume should interest computer
scientists and linguists.
This book gathers the proceedings of the conference "Cultures of
Mathematics and Logic," held in Guangzhou, China. The event was the
third in a series of interdisciplinary, international conferences
emphasizing the cultural components of philosophy of mathematics
and logic. It brought together researchers from many disciplines
whose work sheds new light on the diversity of mathematical and
logical cultures and practices. In this context, the cultural
diversity can be diachronical (different cultures in different
historical periods), geographical (different cultures in different
regions), or sociological in nature.
The operation of developing a concept is a common procedure in
mathematics and in natural science, but has traditionally seemed
much less possible to philosophers and, especially, logicians. Meir
Buzaglo's innovative study proposes a way of expanding logic to
include the stretching of concepts, while modifying the principles
which block this possibility. He offers stimulating discussions of
the idea of conceptual expansion as a normative process, and of the
relation of conceptual expansion to truth, meaning, reference,
ontology and paradox, and analyzes the views of Kant, Wittgenstein,
Godel, and others, paying especially close attention to Frege. His
book will be of interest to a wide range of readers, from
philosophers (of logic, mathematics, language, and science) to
logicians, mathematicians, linguists, and cognitive scientists.
We share the capacity for knowledge with animals, but it is the
nature and the scope of what we may rationally believe that makes
us human. Yet what kind of beliefs do qualify as 'rational'? This
challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain
fundamental questions concerning rational legitimacy of some widely
held beliefs and provides argument-based answers to such questions,
while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage
with the views put forward and form his/her own judgement. The book
is typically discursive rather than simply informative, and
introduces philosophy by doing it.
This accessible book provides a practical discussion of the main
elements of argumentation as illustrated by 30 public arguments
from a recent year on a wide variety of social, cultural, and
scientific topics. Arguing is an important form of communication in
any society and a principal way in which ideas are exposed,
discussed, and modified. The real-life examples examined in this
book reflect the different considerations that go into composing
arguments and the range of strategies that can be chosen as
vehicles for our positions. They demonstrate the roles that emotion
can play along with other modes of conveying evidence, from the use
of images to the use of gestures. They show the power of threats,
comparisons, and consequences. What emerges is an instructive
discussion that illustrates the way we argue and that shows
argument, invention, and evaluation in action. This book is a
stimulating read for anyone interested in argument and public
discourse and can be used as a supplemental text for courses in
argumentation, persuasive communication, critical thinking,
composition, and informal logic.
Propositions are routinely invoked by philosophers, linguists,
logicians, and other theorists engaged in the study of meaning,
communication, and the mind. To investigate the nature of
propositions is to investigate the very nature of our connection to
each other, and to the world around us. As one of the only volumes
of its kind, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions provides a
comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both
historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original
chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses
both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of
propositions, and our capacity to engage with them in thought and
in communication. The chapters are clearly organized into the
following three sections: I. Foundational Issues in the Theory of
Propositions II. Historical Theories of Propositions III.
Contemporary Theories of Propositions Essential reading for
philosophers of language and mind, and for those working in
neighboring areas, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions is
suitable for upper-level undergraduate study, as well as graduate
and professional research.
Godel's modal ontological argument is the centerpiece of an
extensive examination of intensional logic. First, classical type
theory is presented semantically, tableau rules for it are
introduced, and the Prawitz/Takahashi completeness proof is given.
Then modal machinery is added to produce a modified version of
Montague/Gallin intensional logic. Finally, various ontological
proofs for the existence of God are discussed informally, and the
Godel argument is fully formalized. Parts of the book are
mathematical, parts philosophical. "
Part I of this book presents a theory of modal metaphysics in the
possible-worlds tradition. `Worlds' themselves are understood as
structured sets of properties; this `Ersatzist' view is defended
against its most vigorous competitors, Meinongianism and David
Lewis' theory of existent concrete worlds. Related issues of
essentialism and linguistic reference are explored. Part II takes
up the question of lexical meaning in the context of possible-world
semantics. There are skeptical analyses of analyticity and the
notion of a logical constant; and an `infinite polysemy' thesis is
defended. The book will be of particular interest to
metaphysicians, possible-world semanticists, philosophers of
language, and linguists concerned with lexical semantics.
This open access book is the first ever collection of Karl Popper's
writings on deductive logic. Karl R. Popper (1902-1994) was one of
the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. His
philosophy of science ("falsificationism") and his social and
political philosophy ("open society") have been widely discussed
way beyond academic philosophy. What is not so well known is that
Popper also produced a considerable work on the foundations of
deductive logic, most of it published at the end of the 1940s as
articles at scattered places. This little-known work deserves to be
known better, as it is highly significant for modern
proof-theoretic semantics. This collection assembles Popper's
published writings on deductive logic in a single volume, together
with all reviews of these papers. It also contains a large amount
of unpublished material from the Popper Archives, including
Popper's correspondence related to deductive logic and manuscripts
that were (almost) finished, but did not reach the publication
stage. All of these items are critically edited with additional
comments by the editors. A general introduction puts Popper's work
into the context of current discussions on the foundations of
logic. This book should be of interest to logicians, philosophers,
and anybody concerned with Popper's work.
Russell's first book on philosophy and a fascinating insight into
his early thinking A classic in the history and philosophy of
mathematics and logic by one of the greatest philosophers of the
20th century This Routledge Classics edition includes a new
foreword by Michael Potter, a renowned expert on analytic
philosophy
Brilliant introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, from the
question 'what is a number?' up to the concept of infinity,
descriptions, classes and axioms Russell deploys all his skills and
brilliant prose to write an introductory book - a real gem by one
of the 20th century's most celebrated philosophers New foreword by
Michael Potter to the Routledge Classics edition places the book in
helpful context and explains why it's a classic
Superb insight into the development of Russell's thinking by the
master himself Clearly and engaging written, charting his
intellectual development from young idealist to celebrated sceptic
This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Nicholas
Griffin Ideal companion to Russell's own Autobiography, which is
concerned with his incredibly colourful life rather than philosophy
"The old logic put thought in fetters, while the new logic gives it
wings." For the past century, philosophers working in the tradition
of Bertrand Russell - who promised to revolutionise philosophy by
introducing the 'new logic' of Frege and Peano - have employed
predicate logic as their formal language of choice. In this book,
Dr David Corfield presents a comparable revolution with a newly
emerging logic - modal homotopy type theory. Homotopy type theory
has recently been developed as a new foundational language for
mathematics, with a strong philosophical pedigree. Modal Homotopy
Type Theory: The Prospect of a New Logic for Philosophy offers an
introduction to this new language and its modal extension,
illustrated through innovative applications of the calculus to
language, metaphysics, and mathematics. The chapters build up to
the full language in stages, right up to the application of modal
homotopy type theory to current geometry. From a discussion of the
distinction between objects and events, the intrinsic treatment of
structure, the conception of modality as a form of general
variation to the representation of constructions in modern
geometry, we see how varied the applications of this powerful new
language can be.
This volume consists of papers delivered at the conference 'The
Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy', organised in
celebration of the hun- dredth anniversary ofKazimierz Twardowski's
first lecture as Professor of Phi- losophy at Lvov University. This
lecture can be regarded as the starting point of the development of
analytic philosophy in Poland, which culminated in the Warsaw
School of Logic. The conference was held in Lvov (15-17 November)
and Warsaw (19-21 November 1995). It was organised jointly by the
Ukrainian Academy of Sci- ences and the Polish Academy of Sciences.
The general organisation was un- dertaken by Professor Andrzej
Grzegorczyk (polish Academy of Sciences) and Professor Marat
Vernikov (Ukrainian Academy of Sciences). Professors Jaroslaw
Isaievich (Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) and Jan Wolenski (Jagiel-
Ionian University) were responsible for the scientific programme.
Over 100 philosophers participated in the conference. Papers
published in this volume are organised according to the sections of
the conference and rep- of the papers delivered. resent a selection
The editors would like to express their gratitude to Professor
Andrzej Grze- gorczyk, spiritus movens of the conference, who, by
including the present vol- ume in a programme of publications
connected with the hundredth anniversary of the Lvov-Warsaw School,
provided financial support for its preparation. Fi- nally, we
express our gratitude to Dr Timothy Childers of the Academy of
Sciences of the Czech Republic for correcting the English of the
papers.
A Theory of Argument is an advanced textbook intended for students
in philosophy, communications studies and linguistics who have
completed at least one course in argumentation theory, information
logic, critical thinking or formal logic. Containing nearly 400
exercises, Mark Vorobej develops a novel approach to argument
interpretation and evaluation. One of the key themes of the book is
that we cannot succeed in distinguishing good argument from bad
arguments until we learn to listen carefully to others. Part I
develops a relativistic account of argument cogency that allows for
rational disagreement. Part II offers a comprehensive and rigorous
account of argument diagramming. Hybrid arguments are contrasted
with linked and convergent arguments, and a novel technique is
introduced for graphically recording disagreements with authorial
claims.
This book argues that there is a common cognitive mechanism
underlying all indexical thoughts, in spite of their seeming
diversity. Indexical thoughts are mental representations, such as
beliefs and desires. They represent items from a thinker's point of
view or her cognitive perspective. We typically express them by
means of sentences containing linguistic expressions such as 'this
(F)' or 'that (F)', adverbs like 'here', 'now', and 'today', and
the personal pronoun 'I'. While generally agreeing that
representing the world from a thinker's cognitive perspective is a
key feature of indexical thoughts, philosophers disagree as to
whether a thinker's cognitive perspective can be captured and
rationalized by semantic content and, if so, what kind of content
this is. This book surveys competing views and then advances its
own positive account. Ultimately, it argues that a thinker's
cognitive perspective - or her indexical point of view - is to be
explained in terms of the content that is believed and asserted as
the only kind of content that there is which thereby serves as the
bearer of cognitive significance. The Indexical Point of View will
be of interest to philosophers of mind and language, linguists, and
cognitive scientists.
This Handbook offers students and more advanced readers a valuable
resource for understanding linguistic reference; the relation
between an expression (word, phrase, sentence) and what that
expression is about. The volume's forty-one original chapters,
written by many of today's leading philosophers of language, are
organized into ten parts: I Early Descriptive Theories II Causal
Theories of Reference III Causal Theories and Cognitive
Significance IV Alternate Theories V Two-Dimensional Semantics VI
Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity VII The Empty Case VIII Singular
(De Re) Thoughts IX Indexicals X Epistemology of Reference
Contributions consider what kinds of expressions actually refer
(names, general terms, indexicals, empty terms, sentences), what
referring expressions refer to, what makes an expression refer to
whatever it does, connections between meaning and reference, and
how we know facts about reference. Many contributions also develop
connections between linguistic reference and issues in metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.
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