Through original speculations on the surprisingly complementary concepts of simultaneity and delay, and new interpretations of the great philosophers of time, this book proposes an innovative theory of staggered time. In the early 20th Century, Bergson and Husserl (following Einstein) made Simultaneity-what it means for events to occur at the same time-a central motif in philosophy.In the late 20th Century, Derrida and Deleuze instead emphasized Delay-events staggered over distant times.This struggle between convergent and staggered time also plays out in 20th Century aesthetics (especially music), politics, and the sciences. Despite their importance in the history of philosophy, this is the first book to comprehensively examine the concepts of simultaneity and delay.By putting simultaneity and delay into a dialectical relation, this book argues that time in general is organized by elastic rhythms. Lampert's concepts describe the time-structures of such diverse phenomena as atonal music, political decision-making, neuronal delays, leaps of memory and the boredom of waiting; and simultaneities and delays in everyday experience and behaviour.

This book tackles some of the deepest problems in Berkeley's philosophy by providing a fresh interpretation of Berkeley's core ontological doctrines and their relationship to his views about self-consciousness. Berkeley, the author argues, is led to adopt a new model of self-consciousness because he rejects the basic metaphysics of many of his predecessors. This new model of self-consciousness provides the foundation for Berkeley's own ontological framework. Bettcher's interpretation provides answers to long-standing questions about Berkeley's traditionally derided views about mind, offers an elegant treatment of Berkeley's core metaphysical views more generally, and illuminates Berkeley's innovative attempt to address the important philosophical and theological issues of his day. Moreover, Bettcher shows the importance of Berkeley's philosophy of spirit to the perplexing thesis that the subject of experience is somehow mysteriously elusive. She argues that Berkeley can be seen as a transitional figure with respect to the older philosophical concept of 'subject' (as a metaphysical supporter of properties) and the more modern philosophical concept of 'subject (as opposed to 'object'). She provides a re-reading of Hume's famous claim that when he turned reflection upon himself, he could perceive only perceptions and sheds new light on the notion of a 'subject of experience'. The book will be of substantial interest both to Berkeley scholars and to philosophers concerned with contemporary discussions of self-consciousness.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

This work, originally published in 1912, is an introduction to the theory of philosophical enquiry. It gives Russell's views on such subjects as the distinction between appearance and reality and the existence and nature of matter.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Cities are conspicuous among settlements because of their bulk and pace: Venice, Paris, or New York. Each is distinctive, but all share a social structure that mixes systems (families, businesses, and schools), their members, and a public regulator. Cities alter this structure in ways specific to themselves: orchestras play music too elaborate for a quartet; city densities promote collaborations unachievable in simpler towns. Cities, Real and Ideal avers with von Bertalanffy, Parsons, Simmel, and Wirth that a theory of social structure is empirically testable and confirmed. It proposes a version of social justice appropriate to this structure, thereby updating Marx's claim that justice is realizable without the intervention of factors additional to society's material conditions.

Horst Ruthrof revisits Husserl's phenomenology of language and highlights his late writings as essential to understanding the full range of his ideas. Focusing on the idea of language as imaginable as well as the role of a speech community in constituting it, Ruthrof provides a powerful re-assessment of his methodological phenomenology. From the Logical Investigations to untranslated portions of his Nachlass, Ruthrof charts all the developments and amendments in his theorizations. Ruthrof argues that it is the intersubjective character to linguistic meaning that is so emblematic of Husserl's position. Bringing his study up to the present day, Ruthrof discusses mental time travel, the evolution of language, and protosyntax in the context of Husserl's late writings, progressing a comprehensive new phenomenological ontology of language with wide-ranging implications for philosophy, linguistics, and cultural studies.

Logics of Worlds stands as one of the most important texts in contemporary thought. Conceived as the sequel to Alan Badiou's Being and Event, the book expands upon and elucidates the questions that were posed in the first book. As a complex theory of worlds, the text has, for the most part, been misunderstood, but in William Watkin's diligent and critical close reading of the book, he makes the case for Logics of Worlds being the essential Badiou book for anyone interested in existence, meaning and the potential for radical change. For Watkin, this recasting of ontology is followed by a transformation of logic, which is not only a theory of being, but of appearing and allows Badiou to give new meaning to the object, body and relation. To do this, he explores these concepts through architecture, astronomy and renowned thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard. For students of French Continental philosophy, ontology and Badiou himself, Watkin's commentary on the philosopher's text provides a brilliant and incisive new interpretation of this underrated work by the leading Continental philosopher of our time.

The philosopher Abu Nasr al-Farabi (c. 870-c. 950 CE) is a key Arabic intermediary figure. He knew Aristotle, and in particular Aristotle's logic, through Greek Neoplatonist interpretations translated into Arabic via Syriac and possibly Persian. For example, he revised a general description of Aristotle's logic by the 6th century Paul the Persian, and further influenced famous later philosophers and theologians writing in Arabic in the 11th to 12th centuries: Avicenna, Al-Ghazali, Avempace and Averroes. Averroes' reports on Farabi were subsequently transmitted to the West in Latin translation. This book is an abridgement of Aristotle's Prior Analytics, rather than a commentary on successive passages. In it Farabi discusses Aristotle's invention, the syllogism, and aims to codify the deductively valid arguments in all disciplines. He describes Aristotle's categorical syllogisms in detail; these are syllogisms with premises such as 'Every A is a B' and 'No A is a B'. He adds a discussion of how categorical syllogisms can codify arguments by induction from known examples or by analogy, and also some kinds of theological argument from perceived facts to conclusions lying beyond perception. He also describes post-Aristotelian hypothetical syllogisms, which draw conclusions from premises such as 'If P then Q' and 'Either P or Q'. His treatment of categorical syllogisms is one of the first to recognise logically productive pairs of premises by using 'conditions of productivity', a device that had appeared in the Greek Philoponus in 6th century Alexandria.