New threats require new thinking. State attacks involving long-range missiles or conventional military forces are not the only threat to the U.S. homeland. Covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals-and even by residents of the United States-are significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman offers a range of recommendations, from reevaluating what constitutes a threat and bolstering homeland defense measures, to improving resource allocation and sharpening intelligence. There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis. No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.

Khe Sanh remains to this day, an extremely controversial and emotional aspect of the war in Vietnam. The U.S. Armed Forces fought to defend Khe Sanh in early 1968 and then abandoned the base after a 77-day siege by the North Vietnamese. This book contains fromerly Top Secret messages to President Lyndon Johnson from National Security Advisor W.W. "Walt" Rostow, Gen. William Westmoreland and many others. The siege and loss of Khe Sanh is the tragedy of the war in Vietnam in microcosm.

This book-length poem by one of the major poets of our era is structured as a series of messages transmitted by a master spy to the director of spy operations and to a number of his fellow spies. The spy speaks of his own alienation and sense of purposelessness as a secret agent-a metaphor for a human existence committed to ordering, deciphering, and making sense of a world of random signs. First published in 1974, the book is now reprinted with a substantial introduction by the author that elaborates on the genesis of the poem, the literary figures who inspired some of the characters, the poem's reception, and other matters. Reviews of the earlier edition: "These poems can be read and admired for their fluidity, their wonderful diversity of significance. . . . Many delights."-Richard Poirier, Los Angeles Times "Hollander's arch and subtle long poem allegorizes the mirror closeness between raveller and unraveller."-George Steiner, New Yorker "Hollander explores with wit and virtuosity the pleasures of poetry (encipherment) and the trials of the workaday world (one's 'cover.') . . . A rich, intelligent poem . . . a special pleasure for those with an ear for allusions, parodies, and puns."-Library Journal

How has the end of the Cold War affected America's intelligence agencies? When are aggressive clandestine operations justifiable, and who should be responsible for deciding to proceed with them? Should the United States engage in more aggressive economic espionage? These are just a few of the issues Loch Johnson examines in this thoughtful assessment of strategic intelligence and its vital role in modern governments. Johnson draws on historical data, more than five hundred interviews, and his own experience working for Congressional committees on intelligence. He begins by defining the functions of intelligence: espionage, counterintelligence, and covert action. He then provides an overview of America's secret operations abroad, assesses the moral implications of clandestine operations, and offers guidelines for a more ethical approach to the use of secret power. Johnson explores the question of intelligence accountability, looking closely at how well intelligence agencies have been monitored through the forum of Congressional hearings. He compares America's approach to intelligence with that of other nations, discusses the degree to which intelligence agencies should provide information about foreign businesses, and evaluates how well the U.S. intelligence agencies fared during the Cold War against the USSR. Secret agencies have the capacity not only to safeguard democracy but also to subvert it, says Johnson. As such, they deserve both our support and our scrutiny.

This highly acclaimed book-hailed as the definitive account of the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg case-now includes a new introduction that discusses the most recent evidence. It provides information from the Khrushchev and Molotov memoirs, the Venona papers, and material contained in a Discovery Channel documentary that was first aired in March 1997.

For forty years the Central Intelligence Agency has published an in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, for CIA eyes only. Now the agency has declassified much of this material. This engrossing book, which presents the most interesting articles from the journal, provides revealing insights into CIA strategies and into events in which the organization was involved. The articles were selected by H. Bradford Westerfield, an independent authority who teaches courses on intelligence operations but has never been affiliated with the CIA. Westerfield's comprehensive introduction sketches the history and basic structure of the CIA, sets the articles in context, and explains his process of selection. The articles span a wide range of intelligence activities, including intelligence data gathering inside the United States; analysis of data; interaction between analysts and policymakers; the development of economic intelligence targeted at friendly countries as well as at foes; use of double agents (the personal memoir of a CIA officer who pretended to the Russians to be their agent); evaluation of defectors (the Nosenko case); and coercive interrogation techniques and how to resist them.

The CIA and its World War II predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), were for many years largely populated by members of Ivy League colleges, particularly Yale. In this highly acclaimed book, Robin Winks explores the underlying bonds between the university and the intelligence communities, introducing a fascinating cast of characters that include safe-crackers and experts in Azerbaijani as well as such social luminaries as Paul Mellon, David Bruce, John P. Marquand, Jr., and William Vanderbilt. This edition of the book includes a new preface by Winks. Reviews of the first edition: "One of the best studies of intelligence in recent years."-Edward Jay Epstein, Los Angeles Times Book Review "The most original book yet written on the interpenetration of counter-intelligence and campus."-Andrew Sinclair, Sunday Times (London) "Winks writes a lively compound of analysis and anecdote to illuminate the bonds between academe and the intelligence community. His book is a towering achievement."-Robert W. Smith, Chicago Sun-Times "Among the more important contributions to the history of Anglo-American espionage to appear this or any other year. . . . Moves with an unfolding pace that any thriller writer might envy."-Tom Dowling, San Francisco Examiner "A brilliant book."-Sallie Pisani, Journal of American History

For three years during World War II, future Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commanded the OSS mission in Bern, Switzerland. From Hitler's Doorstep provides an annotated selection of his reports to Washington from 1942 to 1945.

Dulles was a leading source of Allied intelligence on Nazi Germany and the occupied nations. The messages presented in this volume were based on information received through agents and networks operating in France, Italy, Austria, Eastern Europe, and Germany itself. They deal with subjects ranging from enemy troop strength and military plans to political developments, support of resistance movements, secret weapons, psychological warfare, and peace feelers. The Dulles reports reveal his own vision of grand strategy and presage the postwar turmoil in Europe.

One of the largest collections of OSS records ever published, these telegrams and radiotelephone transmissions from the National Archives provide an exciting account of the course of the European war, offer insight on the development of American intelligence, and illuminate the origins of the Cold War. They will interest diplomatic and military historians as well as specialists on modern Europe. This volume is almost unique as document-based intelligence history and serves as a badly needed bridge between diplomatic history and intelligence studies.

The names, we sometimes say, have been changed "to protect the innocent". As regards those agents in KGB networks in the U.S. during and following World War II, their presence and their deeds (or misdeeds) were known, but their names were not. The FBI-KGB War is the exciting, true (which often really is stranger than fiction), and authentic story of how those names became known and how the not-so-innocent persons to whom those names belonged were finally called to account. Following World War II, FBI Special Agent Robert J. Lamphere set out to uncover the extensive American networks of the KGB. Lamphere used a large file of secret Russian messages intercepted during the war. The FBI-KGB War is the detailed (but never boring) story of how those messages were finally decoded and made to reveal their secrets, secrets that led to persons with such now-infamous names as Judith Coplon, Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

Cracking the enemy's radio code is a task so urgent and so difficult that it demands the military's best minds and most sophisticated technology. But when the coded messages are in a language as complex as Japanese, decoding problems multiply dramatically.

It took the U.S. Army a full two years after the attack on Pearl Harbor to break the codes of the Japanese Imperial Army. But by 1944 the U.S. was decoding more than 20,000 messages a month filled with information about enemy movements, strategy, fortifications, troop strengths, and supply convoys.

In "MacArthur's ULTRA," historian Edward Drea recounts the story behind the Army's painstaking decryption operation and its dramatic breakthrough. He demonstrates how ULTRA (intelligence from decrypted Japanese radio communications) shaped MacArthur's operations in New Guinea and the Philippines and its effect on the outcome of World War II.

From sources on both sides of the Pacific and national security agency declassified records, Drea has compiled a detailed listing of the ULTRA intelligence available to MacArthur. By correlating the existing intelligence with MacArthur's operational decisions, Drea shows how MacArthur usedand misusedintelligence information. He tells for the first time the story behind MacArthur's bold leap to Hollandia in 1944 and shows how ULTRA revealed the massive Japanese mobilization for what might have been (had it occurred) the bloodiest and most protracted engagement of the entire war the Allied invasion of Japan. Drea also clarifies the role of ULTRA in Truman's decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, and concludes that ULTRA shortened the war by six to ten months.

The exposure of two senior republicans as informers for British intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had 'lost' the intelligence war and was pressurised into peace. In this first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain's intelligence activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to special-forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence operate against paramilitaries? Is it effective? When should governments 'talk to terrorists'? And does regional variation explain the outcome of intelligence conflicts? This is a major contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace emerged in Northern Ireland.

Why Spy? is the result of Brian Stewart's seventy years of working in, and studying the uses and abuses of, intelligence in the real world. Few books currently available to those involved either as professionals or students in this area have been written by someone like the present author, who has practical experience both of field work and of the intelligence bureaucracy at home and abroad. It relates successes and failures via case studies, and draws conclusions that should be pondered by all those concerned with the limitations and usefulness of the intelligence product, as well as with how to avoid the tendency to abuse or ignore it when its conclusions do not fit with preconceived ideas. It reminds the reader of the multiplicity of methods and organisations and the wide range of talents making up the intelligence world.The co-author, scholar Samantha Newbery, examines such current issues as the growth of intelligence studies in universities, and the general emphasis throughout the volume is on the necessity of embracing a range of sources, including police, political, military and overt, to ensure that secret intelligence is placed in as wide a context as possible when decisions are made.

The intelligence community (IC) uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could inappropriately influence the government's decision making. This book examines the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel; the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use; and whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the eight civilian IC elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a sample of 287 contract records.

Recently, there have been multiple high-profile incidents involving the release of classified government information. Perhaps most prominent was Wikileaks.org's unauthorised publication of more than 600,000 classified Department of Defense documents. Such incidents have further heightened congressional, media and public interest in classified information policy. This book provides information on classified information policy, also known as security classification policy and national security classification information policy. It discusses the history, costs and agencies assigned roles in classified information policy and focuses on Executive Order 13526, which establishes much of the current policy and possible oversight issues for Congress.

This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them--with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S. intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups.

While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.

Spy-masters, moles, and double-agents. Ciphers, saboteurs, and atomic secrets. The shady world of real-life espionage is as alarming and mysterious as any John Le Carré novel or James Bond movie.

This outstanding book chronicles the international history of intelligence in the 20th century, exploring the impact of spies on world events during both war and peacetime. The work highlights the key events and breakthroughs in the history of intelligence and espionage - from the codebreaking and sabotage operations in the World Wars to the U2 incident and the CIA's secret war in Nicaragua. It also offers fascinating details of the colourful individuals who have made a mark as spies, defectors, and counterspies.

Cyberspace is one of the major bases of the economic development of industrialized societies and developing. The dependence of modern society in this technological area is also one of its vulnerabilities. Cyberspace allows new power policy and strategy, broadens the scope of the actors of the conflict by offering to both state and non-state new weapons, new ways of offensive and defensive operations. This book deals with the concept of "information war", covering its development over the last two decades and seeks to answer the following questions: is the control of the information space really possible remains or she a utopia? What power would confer such control, what are the benefits?

For almost sixty years after their deaths, three men, whose brave actions shortened the Second World War by as much as two years, remained virtually unknown and uncelebrated. Two lost their lives retrieving vital German codebooks from a sinking U-boat. The third survived the war, only to die in a house fire soon afterwards. But it was the precious documents they seized in October 1942 that enabled Bletchley Park's code-breakers to crack Enigma and so win the Battle of the Atlantic. Now recognised as a pivotal moment in world history, three British servicemen made it possible to finally beat the U-boats, but at the time not even their families could be told of the importance of their deeds. Shrouded in secrecy for decades, then recast as fictional Americans by the Hollywood film U-571, this book sets the record straight. It is written in celebration of Colin Grazier GC, Tony Fasson GC, and Tommy Brown GM - the REAL Enigma heroes.

The history of scientific intelligence - its birth, its importance during the Second World War and its unique wartime qualities - has relied almost entirely on the memories of its pioneer, R.V. Jones. Through scrutiny of Jones' post-war literature (especially his war memoirs, entitled Most Secret War; his archival papers - as well as those of his colleagues and contemporaries - and other mediums he used to promote his account of scientific intelligence), this ground-breaking book constitutes a critique of the genesis of scientific and technical intelligence. Examining chronologically all of the key events Jones became famous for - the Battle of the Beams, the Bruneval Raid, the Radio War, the Battle of the V-Weapons - and comparing Jones' account of these (and many other) events with contemporary documentation, this book provides a rich understanding of the internal machinations within the British wartime air scientific intelligence organisation defined as ADI (Science) and their relationships with the many other political, military and intelligence sections that pursued similar and often closely-linked quests. This book importantly connects science and technology with the collection and collation of intelligence; is an analysis of wartime intelligence of a scientific and technical nature; argues that scientific intelligence was much more than one man's accomplishments, which involved many more individuals and organisations than has been perceived; and was much more crucial to the development of 20th century history than has been portrayed.

In this new edition of his classic 1970 memoir about the notorious U-2 incident, pilot Francis Gary Powers reveals the full story of what actually happened in the most sensational espionage case in Cold War history. After surviving the shoot-down of his reconnaissance plane and his capture on May 1, 1960, Powers endured sixty-one days of rigorous interrogation by the KGB, a public trial, a conviction for espionage, and the start of a ten-year sentence. After nearly two years, the U.S. government obtained his release from prison in a dramatic exchange for convicted Soviet spy Rudolph Abel. The narrative is a tremendously exciting suspense story about a man who was labeled a traitor by many of his countrymen but who emerged a Cold War hero.

___________ 'This excellent book demands the attention of anyone concerned about civil liberties in the United Kingdom' Guardian 1969 was a year of rising tension, violence and change for the people of Northern Ireland. Rioting in Derry's Bogside led to the deployment of British troops and a shortlived, uneasy truce. The British army soon found itself engaged in an undercover war against the Provisional IRA, which was to last for more than twenty years. In this enthralling and controversial book, Martin Dillon, author of the bestselling The Shankill Butchers, examines the roles played by the Provisional IRA, the State forces, the Irish Government and the British Army during this troubled period. He unravels the mystery of war in which informers, agents and double agents operate, revealing disturbing facts about the way in which the terrorists and the Intelligence Agencies target, undermine and penetrate each other's ranks. The Dirty War is investigative reporting at its very best, containing startling disclosures and throwing new light on previously inexplicable events.

Master of Deception is a biography of Peter Fleming, elder brother of Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond. Peter Fleming worked as a travel writer and journalist, serving with distinction throughout World War II and played a crucial role in British intelligence operations in the Far East. This biography ranges from the personal life of Fleming such as his marriage to Celia Johnson, a famous actor of the time, to his extensive military intelligence career which took him from Norway and Greece to the Far East. Framed through the life of Peter Fleming this book offers an in-depth study of British intelligence operations in the Far East during World War II.

An analysis of the insider information and insights that over eighty Soviet intelligence officer defectors revealed during the first half of the Soviet period Identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officer defectors for the period 1917 to 1954, representing a variety of specializations; the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date. Shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system. Shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government. Compiles for the first time corroborative primary sources in English, Russian, French, German, Finnish, Japanese, Latvian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state. This book identifies a group of those defectors from the Soviet elite - intelligence officers - and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Stalin's strategic priorities and concerns, thus to open a window into Stalin's impenetrable national security decision making. This book uses their information to define Soviet threat perceptions and national security anxieties during Stalin's time as Soviet leader.