Intelligence operations face the challenging task of predicting the shape of future wars. This task is hindered by their limited ability to warn of peacetime foreign military innovation. Using formerly classified sources in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.

The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.

Uncovering Ways of War substantially revises the perception of how American intelligence performed prior to World War II. Mahnken challenges the assumption that intelligence regarding foreign militaries had little influence on the development of U.S. weapons and doctrine. Finally, he explains the obstacles these agencies must still negotiate as they seek to understand foreign efforts to exploit the information revolution."

An unprecedented high-level master narrative of America's intelligence wars, demonstrating in a time of new threats that espionage and the search for facts are essential to our democracy For General Michael Hayden, playing to the edge means playing so close to the line that you get chalk dust on your cleats. Otherwise, by playing back, you may protect yourself, but you will be less successful in protecting America. "Play to the edge" was Hayden's guiding principle when he ran the National Security Agency, and it remained so when he ran CIA. In his view, many shortsighted and uninformed people are quick to criticize, and this book will give them much to chew on but little easy comfort; it is an unapologetic insider's look told from the perspective of the people who faced awesome responsibilities head on, in the moment. How did American intelligence respond to terrorism, a major war and the most sweeping technological revolution in the last 500 years? What was NSA before 9/11 and how did it change in its aftermath? Why did NSA begin the controversial terrorist surveillance program that included the acquisition of domestic phone records? What else was set in motion during this period that formed the backdrop for the infamous Snowden revelations in 2013? As Director of CIA in the last three years of the Bush administration, Hayden had to deal with the rendition, detention and interrogation program as bequeathed to him by his predecessors. He also had to ramp up the agency to support its role in the targeted killing program that began to dramatically increase in July 2008. This was a time of great crisis at CIA, and some agency veterans have credited Hayden with actually saving the agency. He himself won't go that far, but he freely acknowledges that CIA helped turn the American security establishment into the most effective killing machine in the history of armed conflict. For 10 years, then, General Michael Hayden was a participant in some of the most telling events in the annals of American national security. General Hayden's goals are in writing this book are simple and unwavering: No apologies. No excuses. Just what happened. And why. As he writes, "There is a story here that deserves to be told, without varnish and without spin. My view is my view, and others will certainly have different perspectives, but this view deserves to be told to create as complete a history as possible of these turbulent times. I bear no grudges, or at least not many, but I do want this to be a straightforward and readable history for that slice of the American population who depend on and appreciate intelligence, but who do not have the time to master its many obscure characteristics."

While other books have speculated on the history and nature of Britain's intelligence services, this is the first to tell the story through the documents themselves. Only ten years ago access to these original sources would have been impossible, but now experts Twigge, Hampshire and Macklin draw on the spies' and spymasters' own words from the National Archives' unique intelligence files - including the very latest remarkable releases from MI5. Historical narrative is interwoven with colourful tales from the past that highlight some of the greatest successes - and failures - along the way, as well as the motives and machinations of those responsible for them. And readers who want to explore sources for themselves are given all the guidance they need. As the Iraq War and its aftermath bring the intelligence profession back into the spotlight, "British Intelligence" is compelling reading for anyone interested in the shadowy world of 20th-century espionage.

This study explodes prevailing myths about the Phoenix Program, the CIA's top-secret effort to destroy the Viet Cong by neutralizing its "civilian" leaders. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with American, South Vietnamese, and North Vietnamese sources, Mark Moyar examines the attempts to eradicate the Viet Cong infrastructure and analyzes their effectiveness. He addresses misconceptions about these efforts and provides an accurate, complete picture of the allies' decapitation of the Viet Cong shadow government. Combining social and political history with a study of military operations, Moyar offers a fresh interpretation of the crucial role the shadow government played in the Viet Cong's ascent. Detailed accounts of intelligence operations provide an insider's view of their development and reveal what really happened in the safe havens of the Viet Cong. Filled with new information, Moyar's study sets the record straight about one of the last secrets of the Vietnam War and offers poignant lessons for dealing with future Third World insurgencies. This Bison Books edition includes a new preface and chapter by the author.

Reports the results of a workshop on ensuring the security of information against malevolent actions by insiders in the intelligence community with access to sensitive information and information systems. Reports the results of a workshop on the problems of ensuring the security of information against malevolent actions by insiders in the intelligence community (IC) with access to sensitive information and information systems. Attendees discussed community system models, vulnerabilities and exploits, attacker models, and event characterization, and discussed databases that would aid them in their work.

The authors develop a mathematical framework for assessing how information is processed in a human world. Assessing how technology contributes to information superiority and decision dominance a major challenge, in part because it demands quantitative measures for what are usually considered qualitative concepts. The authors have developed a mathematical framework to aid these efforts. Additional work, such as data fitting, experimentation, linking decisions and actions, historical analysis, and gaming will further advance knowledge in this area.

The modern means of communication have turned the world into an information fishbowl and, in terms of foreign policy and national security in post-Cold War power politics, helped transform international power politics. Information operations (IO), in which time zones are as important as national boundaries, is the use of modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior. Contemporary IO differs from traditional psychological operations practiced by nation-states, because the availability of low-cost high technology permits nongovernmental organizations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own as well as facilitates damaging cyber-attacks ("hactivism") on computer networks and infrastructure. As current vice president Dick Cheney once said, such technology has turned third-class powers into first-class threats. Conceived as a textbook by instructors at the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School of the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College and involving IO experts from several countries, this book fills an important gap in the literature by analyzing under one cover the military, technological, and psychological aspects of information operations. The general reader will appreciate the examples taken from recent history that reflect the impact of IO on U.S. foreign policy, military operations, and government organization.

In 1939, several hundred people - students, professors, international chess players, junior military officers, actresses and debutantes - reported to a Victorian mansion in Buckinghamshire: Bletchley Park. This was to be 'Station X', the Allies' top-secret centre for deciphering enemy codes. Their task was to break the ingenious Enigma code used for German high-level communications. The settings for the Enigma machine changed continually and each day the German operators had 159 million million million different possibilities. Yet against all the odds this gifted group achieved the impossible, coping with even greater difficulties to break Shark, the U-Boat Enigma, and Fish, the cypher system used by Hitler to talk to his guards.

This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them--with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S. intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups.

While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.

Peter Wilkinson's vivid insider account of the undercover campaigns of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War looks at the foundation and structure of the SOE, as well as his personal experience as an intelligence officer during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Polish Campaign of 1939. The book is a valuable contribution to the secret history of the Second World War. It concludes with an account of the SOE's hazardous attempt under the author's command to infiltrate the Third Reich from 1943-1945.

Most histories of the Civil War explain victory and defeat in terms of the skill of commanders and their troops. Intelligence records disappeared after the war, and thus a critically important element has largely been ignored. Fishel has unearthed substantial collections of such records, and his "intelligence explanation" radically alters history's understanding of the campaigns. The Secret War for the Union is one of the most important Civil War works ever published.

For forty years the Central Intelligence Agency has published an in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, for CIA eyes only. Now the agency has declassified much of this material. This engrossing book, which presents the most interesting articles from the journal, provides revealing insights into CIA strategies and into events in which the organization was involved. The articles were selected by H. Bradford Westerfield, an independent authority who teaches courses on intelligence operations but has never been affiliated with the CIA. Westerfield's comprehensive introduction sketches the history and basic structure of the CIA, sets the articles in context, and explains his process of selection. The articles span a wide range of intelligence activities, including intelligence data gathering inside the United States; analysis of data; interaction between analysts and policymakers; the development of economic intelligence targeted at friendly countries as well as at foes; use of double agents (the personal memoir of a CIA officer who pretended to the Russians to be their agent); evaluation of defectors (the Nosenko case); and coercive interrogation techniques and how to resist them.

"Changing Enemies is one of the last accounts we shall have by a witness to some of the high-level decision making during the war and its immediate aftermath. . . . Lord Annan's book valuably points to the contribution to German democracy that was distinctively British." Michael R. Beschloss, New York Times Book Review"In this crackling tale, former British intelligence officer Annan offers an insider's view of the military espionage that helped the Allies win the war against Hitler. . . . He vividly describes power struggles among the Allied forces occupying Germany, his work in guiding post-Nazi Germany toward multi-party democracy, and] his friendship with Konrad Adenauer." Publishers Weekly"A graceful and crystal style like Noel Annan's, all but absent from most contemporary political and historical literature, is enough to awaken an American reader's slumbering literary Anglophilia." David Mehegan, Boston Globe"One of the best books ever written about military intelligence during World War II." William Roger Louis, University of Texas, and Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford"

For three years during World War II, future Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commanded the OSS mission in Bern, Switzerland. From Hitler's Doorstep provides an annotated selection of his reports to Washington from 1942 to 1945.

Dulles was a leading source of Allied intelligence on Nazi Germany and the occupied nations. The messages presented in this volume were based on information received through agents and networks operating in France, Italy, Austria, Eastern Europe, and Germany itself. They deal with subjects ranging from enemy troop strength and military plans to political developments, support of resistance movements, secret weapons, psychological warfare, and peace feelers. The Dulles reports reveal his own vision of grand strategy and presage the postwar turmoil in Europe.

One of the largest collections of OSS records ever published, these telegrams and radiotelephone transmissions from the National Archives provide an exciting account of the course of the European war, offer insight on the development of American intelligence, and illuminate the origins of the Cold War. They will interest diplomatic and military historians as well as specialists on modern Europe. This volume is almost unique as document-based intelligence history and serves as a badly needed bridge between diplomatic history and intelligence studies.

In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

No major twentieth-century power has so short a history of national intelligence agencies or activities as does the United States, and few have been as public or as tumultuous. A major debate has now opened over the future structure, size, and role of U.S. intelligence in the aftermath of the cold war. This unique and fully updated book is a history of the U.S. intelligence community--as well as a detailed description of the organization and function of the major components of the community as they existed at the beginning of 1992. A welcome and timely update of one of the most concise and objective guides to the history and structure of U.S. intelligence. "Representative Dave McCurdy, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of RepresentativeS"

The history of the intelligence community can be divided into three distinct periods. From its creation in 1947 until the revelations and investigations of 1974-1975, the intelligence community operated under fairly broad grants of authority based on trust. After the Nixon administration, a previously dormant Congress was galvanized to write new oversight provisions and also took on a greater role as a shaper and consumer of intelligence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war in 1991, the intelligence community found its role and even its necessity questioned due to the sudden absence of its major target. Lowenthal emphasizes that a competent and challenged intelligence capability is an essential part of the U.S. national security structure, despite the status of external events or threats. The major requirement of this structure, he says, is providing timely, objective, and pointed analysis to policymakers across a wide range of issues.

Much has been written about U.S. intelligence operations. However, intelligence, as it is conducted in the U.S. domestic environment, has usually been treated in a fractured and sensationalistic manner. This book dispassionately assesses the U.S. domestically oriented intelligence enterprise by first examining its individual components and then showing how those components, both federal and non-federal, work in conjunction to form an often unacknowledged structure that is more than the sum of its parts. The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise: History, Development, and Operations takes a unique, in-depth approach that assesses not only the current state of affairs but also the evolution of the domestic intelligence enterprise. To accomplish this, it examines the origins and progress of the major agencies to show why they operate in the way that they do. By providing this perspective, the book promotes an understanding of the factors to consider when developing effective intelligence policy. The book is divided into several thematic sections: The evolution of the domestically oriented intelligence enterprise The collection capabilities of the enterprise The role that domestically-developed intelligence has in the analytical process, which informs decision making The use of intelligence to implement decisions via disruption of threat actors The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise intends to prompt a rethinking of intelligence within the domestic environment. It takes into account the political realities, the organizational cultures, and the evolving missions that have shaped those agencies responsible for positive and negative intelligence and disruption of threats on American soil. This will hopefully provide a counterweight to future knee-jerk reactions and, instead, inspire a thoughtful approach to the advancement of U.S. strategic interests while protecting the rights of Americans.

Since World War I, Cyprus has played a crucial role in British defence strategy. Panagiotis Dimitrakis here introduces new research which reveals the true role of British intelligence on the island throughout the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, the 1955-59 Archbishop Makarios and EOKA-led revolt and the 1974 Turkish invasion. He sheds fresh light on the stance of both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan towards Greece and Turkey in the turbulent 1970s, and provides important new perspectives on the 1978 Egyptian hostage crisis at Larnaca Airport and the research is based throughout on primary sources including previously unpublished declassified papers from British diplomats and intelligence officers. This is a valuable study for scholars of contemporary strategy and military history and for those interested in military intelligence and the history of Cyprus.

An analysis of the insider information and insights that over eighty Soviet intelligence officer defectors revealed during the first half of the Soviet period Identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officer defectors for the period 1917 to 1954, representing a variety of specializations; the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date. Shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system. Shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government. Compiles for the first time corroborative primary sources in English, Russian, French, German, Finnish, Japanese, Latvian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state. This book identifies a group of those defectors from the Soviet elite - intelligence officers - and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Stalin's strategic priorities and concerns, thus to open a window into Stalin's impenetrable national security decision making. This book uses their information to define Soviet threat perceptions and national security anxieties during Stalin's time as Soviet leader.

The Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) was the political police of the German Army during World War Two. Its members were drawn from both the regular German police, including detectives, as well as personnel from various Nazi security organizations. The mission of the GFP was numerous: protecting important political and military leaders, investigating black market activities, as well as acts of sabotage and espionage; tracking down deserters, examining anti-German activists, and hunting down partisans and partisan suspects. An additional role of the GFP was to act as liaison between the German Army and the Nazi SS. While performing some of these duties, members of the GFP eventually involved themselves directly in criminal activities. The GFP committed numerous crimes to both the Jewish community and the general population of Greece. Its leadership cadre was composed of dedicated Nazis and in one instance, included a former concentration camp commander! As the war progressed, their crimes in Greece increased in intensity and volume. The behavior of the GFP in Greece was a combination of the manner in which they operated in the West and East.

On February 23, 1945, U.S. Marines claimed victory in the battle of Iwo Jima, one of the most important battles in the Pacific islands during World War II. Instrumental to this defeat of Japanese forces was a group of specialized Marines involved in a secret program. Throughout the war, Japanese intelligence agencies were able to intercept and break nearly every battlefield code the United States created. The Navajo Code Talkers, however, devised a complex code based on their native language and perfected it so that messages could be coded, transmitted, and decoded in minutes. The Navajo Code was the only battlefield code that Japan never deciphered. Unsung Heroes of World War II details the history of the men who created this secret code and used it on the battlefield to help the United States win World War II in the Pacific.

"A Classic in Counterintelligence -- Now Back in Print"

Originally published in 1987, "Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad" is a unique primer that teaches the principles, strategy, and tradecraft of counterintelligence (CI). CI is often misunderstood and narrowly equated with security and catching spies, which are only part of the picture. As William R. Johnson explains, CI is the art of actively protecting secrets but also aggressively thwarting, penetrating, and deceiving hostile intelligence organizations to neutralize or even manipulate their operations.

Johnson, a career CIA intelligence officer, lucidly presents the nuts and bolts of the business of counterintelligence and the characteristics that make a good CI officer. Although written during the late Cold War, this book continues to be useful for intelligence professionals, scholars, and students because the basic principles of CI are largely timeless. General readers will enjoy the lively narrative and detailed descriptions of tradecraft that reveal the real world of intelligence and espionage. A new foreword by former CIA officer and noted author William Hood provides a contemporary perspective on this valuable book and its author.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.

The book that gives an insider's view of some of the great intelligence blunders of recent history. Including Stalin's Operation Barbarossa, Hitler being misled by his own intelligence staff, the bungling that enabled an attack on Pearl Harbor, lack of preparation for the Viet Cong's offensive 1968, Arab Israeli war 1973, Falkland Islands, Gulf War 1991...New material to include: The US failure to run warning system before 9/11; the War on Terrorism; the Islamic Terrorist threat; mis-use of intelligence by UK government in War with Iraq; intelligence problems of Middle East; challenges of 21st century.