In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

Much has been written about U.S. intelligence operations. However, intelligence, as it is conducted in the U.S. domestic environment, has usually been treated in a fractured and sensationalistic manner. This book dispassionately assesses the U.S. domestically oriented intelligence enterprise by first examining its individual components and then showing how those components, both federal and non-federal, work in conjunction to form an often unacknowledged structure that is more than the sum of its parts. The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise: History, Development, and Operations takes a unique, in-depth approach that assesses not only the current state of affairs but also the evolution of the domestic intelligence enterprise. To accomplish this, it examines the origins and progress of the major agencies to show why they operate in the way that they do. By providing this perspective, the book promotes an understanding of the factors to consider when developing effective intelligence policy. The book is divided into several thematic sections: The evolution of the domestically oriented intelligence enterprise The collection capabilities of the enterprise The role that domestically-developed intelligence has in the analytical process, which informs decision making The use of intelligence to implement decisions via disruption of threat actors The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise intends to prompt a rethinking of intelligence within the domestic environment. It takes into account the political realities, the organizational cultures, and the evolving missions that have shaped those agencies responsible for positive and negative intelligence and disruption of threats on American soil. This will hopefully provide a counterweight to future knee-jerk reactions and, instead, inspire a thoughtful approach to the advancement of U.S. strategic interests while protecting the rights of Americans.

Since World War I, Cyprus has played a crucial role in British defence strategy. Panagiotis Dimitrakis here introduces new research which reveals the true role of British intelligence on the island throughout the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, the 1955-59 Archbishop Makarios and EOKA-led revolt and the 1974 Turkish invasion. He sheds fresh light on the stance of both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan towards Greece and Turkey in the turbulent 1970s, and provides important new perspectives on the 1978 Egyptian hostage crisis at Larnaca Airport and the research is based throughout on primary sources including previously unpublished declassified papers from British diplomats and intelligence officers. This is a valuable study for scholars of contemporary strategy and military history and for those interested in military intelligence and the history of Cyprus.

An analysis of the insider information and insights that over eighty Soviet intelligence officer defectors revealed during the first half of the Soviet period Identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officer defectors for the period 1917 to 1954, representing a variety of specializations; the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date. Shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system. Shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government. Compiles for the first time corroborative primary sources in English, Russian, French, German, Finnish, Japanese, Latvian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state. This book identifies a group of those defectors from the Soviet elite - intelligence officers - and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Stalin's strategic priorities and concerns, thus to open a window into Stalin's impenetrable national security decision making. This book uses their information to define Soviet threat perceptions and national security anxieties during Stalin's time as Soviet leader.

The Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) was the political police of the German Army during World War Two. Its members were drawn from both the regular German police, including detectives, as well as personnel from various Nazi security organizations. The mission of the GFP was numerous: protecting important political and military leaders, investigating black market activities, as well as acts of sabotage and espionage; tracking down deserters, examining anti-German activists, and hunting down partisans and partisan suspects. An additional role of the GFP was to act as liaison between the German Army and the Nazi SS. While performing some of these duties, members of the GFP eventually involved themselves directly in criminal activities. The GFP committed numerous crimes to both the Jewish community and the general population of Greece. Its leadership cadre was composed of dedicated Nazis and in one instance, included a former concentration camp commander! As the war progressed, their crimes in Greece increased in intensity and volume. The behavior of the GFP in Greece was a combination of the manner in which they operated in the West and East.

In December 1941, Japan attacked multiple targets in the Far East
and the Pacific, including Hong Kong, where Canadian battalions were
stationed. The disaster suggested that the Allies were totally
unprepared for war with Japan. This book dispels that assumption by
offering the first in-depth account of Canadian intelligence gathering
and strategic planning leading up to the crisis.

Timothy Wilford reminds us that Canada was both a Pacific and an
Atlantic power, and the first nation to declare war on Japan. Canadian
intelligence officers and strategists monitored Japan's movements
and worked closely with their US and Allied counterparts to develop a
picture of Japan's intentions and a strategic plan to meet
challenges in the Pacific. Although Canada wanted to avoid conflict
with Japan until US participation was assured, policy makers fully
anticipated action in the Pacific and made preparations for national
and imperial defence, which included the internment of Japanese
Canadians.

Canada's Road to the Pacific War sheds new light on
Canadian decision making, Commonwealth strategic planning, and the
emerging Anglo-American special relationship during a crisis that led
to war in the Pacific, as well as to the creation of the Grand
Alliance.

Timothy Wilford received a doctorate in history from
the University of Ottawa and specializes in twentieth-century military
history.

"A Classic in Counterintelligence -- Now Back in Print"

Originally published in 1987, "Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad" is a unique primer that teaches the principles, strategy, and tradecraft of counterintelligence (CI). CI is often misunderstood and narrowly equated with security and catching spies, which are only part of the picture. As William R. Johnson explains, CI is the art of actively protecting secrets but also aggressively thwarting, penetrating, and deceiving hostile intelligence organizations to neutralize or even manipulate their operations.

Johnson, a career CIA intelligence officer, lucidly presents the nuts and bolts of the business of counterintelligence and the characteristics that make a good CI officer. Although written during the late Cold War, this book continues to be useful for intelligence professionals, scholars, and students because the basic principles of CI are largely timeless. General readers will enjoy the lively narrative and detailed descriptions of tradecraft that reveal the real world of intelligence and espionage. A new foreword by former CIA officer and noted author William Hood provides a contemporary perspective on this valuable book and its author.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.

The book that gives an insider's view of some of the great intelligence blunders of recent history. Including Stalin's Operation Barbarossa, Hitler being misled by his own intelligence staff, the bungling that enabled an attack on Pearl Harbor, lack of preparation for the Viet Cong's offensive 1968, Arab Israeli war 1973, Falkland Islands, Gulf War 1991...New material to include: The US failure to run warning system before 9/11; the War on Terrorism; the Islamic Terrorist threat; mis-use of intelligence by UK government in War with Iraq; intelligence problems of Middle East; challenges of 21st century.

This is the first study to investigate the interlinked problems of domestic security and national defence in Ireland, from independence to the present day. Using a wealth of newly released material from Irish and foreign archives, Professor O'Halpin describes the development of the army and police since 1922, and examines how the emerging Irish state tried to balance an absolute commitment to military neutrality and independent defence with the need for close co-operation with Britain in dealing with perceived republican and communist threats.

This classic account of the German Resistance during World War II remains one of the primary sources on a topic that continues to generate controversy more than a half century after the war's end. As OSS (office of strategic services) chief of station in Bern, Switzerland, from 1942 to 1945, Dulles was charged with determining the extent and commitment of the opposition to Hitler. "Germany's Underground" is the most important firsthand account we have of Allied contact with that opposition--and the most concise and readable history of the men and women from every stratum of German society who made up this complex web.

Head of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) during World War II, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887-1945) has been both damned as Hitler's master spy and praised as the true hero of the German anti-Nazi resistance. What emerges in Heinz Hohne's definitive biography is a panoramic view of the rise and fall of Nazism as reflected in the destiny of one man who hoped, for patriotic purposes, to harness evil temporarily, only to be destroyed by it.

A thoroughly updated revision of the first comprehensive overview of intelligence designed for both the student and the general reader, "Silent Warfare" is an insider's guide to a shadowy, often misunderstood world. Leading intelligence scholars Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt clearly explain such topics as the principles of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action, and their interrelationship with policymakers and democratic values. This new edition takes account of the expanding literature in the field of intelligence and deals with the consequences for intelligence of vast recent changes in telecommunication and computer technology-the new "information age." It also reflects the world's strategic changes since the end of the Cold War. This landmark book provides a valuable framework for understanding today's headlines, as well as the many developments likely to come in the real world of the spy.

The debonair Special Operations Executive agent Richard "Dick" Mallaby was the first Briton to be sent to Italy as an SOE operative, parachuted unceremoniously into Lake Como in August 1943. Arrested and initially tortured by the Italian authorities, he managed to sweet-talk his way out of trouble and helped Marshal Pietro Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel III escape to the Allied lines. He also helped negotiate the armistice with Italy, for which he was awarded the Military Cross.

He was back in action in 1945, when he crossed into Fascist-controlled northern Italy from Switzerland but was swiftly captured and interrogated by the SS. Narrowly avoiding a firing squad once again, he helped to secure the surrender of 800,000 German forces in Italy in May 1945.

Based on 20 years of research, Gianluca Barneschi has uncovered the true story of a real-life James Bond.

Communicating with Intelligence was the first book to teach the skills needed to make sure that papers, reports, and other products be correctly written by intelligence students and professionals. It also responded to the increased number of degrees in intelligence and national security offered in academic institutions. Aimed at students, faculty, and practitioners, the book is designed to provide all necessary information on how to prepare, write, and read intelligence publications: .Foundations of successful intelligence communication .Differences between academic and intelligence writing .How to use arguments .Framework for analysis .Writing toolkit .How the briefing process works .Guide to creating citations .How to handle classified materials .Samples of individual and group exercises This fully revised and expanded edition will be an essential tool for anyone who needs to learn or hone their skills in how to communicate with intelligence effectively."

This biography of Britain's leading wartime codebreaker by one of the top female codebreakers offers a portait of a great British eccentric and a fascinating and detailed behind-the-scenes look into the hidden side of war.

The story of the intelligence war in South Africa during the Second World War is one of suspense, drama and dogged persistence. In 1939, when the Union of South Africa entered the war on Britain’s side, the German government secretly reached out to the anti-war political opposition, and to the leadership of the pro-fascist Ossewabrandwag.

The Nazis’ aim was to spread sedition in South Africa and to undermine the Allied war effort. To this end, they even offered to supply weapons to the Ossewabrandwag. But the critical strategic importance of the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope meant that the Germans were also after naval intelligence. Soon U-boat packs were sent to operate in South African waters, to deadly effect.

With the help of the Ossewabrandwag, a network of German spies was established to gather important political and military intelligence and relay it back to the Reich. Agents would use a variety of channels to send coded messages to Axis diplomats in nearby Mozambique. Meanwhile, police detectives and MI5 agents hunted in vain for illegal wireless transmitters.

Drawing on numerous primary and archival sources, Hitler’s South African Spies presents an unrivalled account of the German intelligence networks that operated in wartime South Africa and investigates the true threat level presented by Nazi Germany. It includes a fascinating account of the Royal Navy’s signals intelligence network in southern Africa and also details the hunt in post-war Europe for witnesses to help the South African government bring charges of high treason against key Ossewabrandwag members.