Either creeping through the landscape or mounted in armored cars and Bren carriers, Reconnaissance Regiments became a vital addition to all British infantry divisions. After the disastrous defeat in France in 1940, at the hands of German forces with strong recce units mounted in light armored vehicles, the Bartholomew Committee called for the formation of a British equivalent. This was achieved by forming the new elite Reconnaissance Corps.Their spearhead role meant that they were consistently at the forefront of all dramatic action, and most famously served with the 1st and 6th Airborne at Arnhem and with the Chindits in Burma.Within every theater of war, ranging from the jungles to the deserts, the Reconnaissance Corps made a critical contribution to the Allied war effort. However, with the disbandment of the Corps at the end of the war, their record has been unjustly forgotten.With a selection of rare and unpublished frontline photographs taken from private collections, this fascinating new insight into a forgotten elite unit of the British Army recounts the experiences of those soldiers who operated ahead of the army throughout the course of the war.

This powerful study makes a compelling case about the key U.S. role in state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold War. Long hidden from public view, Operation Condor was a military network created in the 1970s to eliminate political opponents of Latin American regimes. Its key members were the anticommunist dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, later joined by Peru and Ecuador, with covert support from the U.S. government. Drawing on a wealth of testimonies, declassified files, and Latin American primary sources, J. Patrice McSherry examines Operation Condor from numerous vantage points: its secret structures, intelligence networks, covert operations against dissidents, political assassinations worldwide, commanders and operatives, links to the Pentagon and the CIA, and extension to Central America in the 1980s. The author convincingly shows how, using extralegal and terrorist methods, Operation Condor hunted down, seized, and executed political opponents across borders. McSherry argues that Condor functioned within, or parallel to, the structures of the larger inter-American military system led by the United States, and that declassified U.S. documents make clear that U.S. security officers saw Condor as a legitimate and useful 'counterterror' organization. Revealing new details of Condor operations and fresh evidence of links to the U.S. security establishment, this controversial work offers an original analysis of the use of secret, parallel armies in Western counterinsurgency strategies. It will be a clarion call to all readers to consider the long-term consequences of clandestine operations in the name of 'democracy.'

The modern means of communication have turned the world into an information fishbowl and, in terms of foreign policy and national security in post-Cold War power politics, helped transform international power politics. Information operations (IO), in which time zones are as important as national boundaries, is the use of modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior. Contemporary IO differs from traditional psychological operations practiced by nation-states, because the availability of low-cost high technology permits nongovernmental organizations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own as well as facilitates damaging cyber-attacks ("hactivism") on computer networks and infrastructure. As current vice president Dick Cheney once said, such technology has turned third-class powers into first-class threats. Conceived as a textbook by instructors at the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School of the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College and involving IO experts from several countries, this book fills an important gap in the literature by analyzing under one cover the military, technological, and psychological aspects of information operations. The general reader will appreciate the examples taken from recent history that reflect the impact of IO on U.S. foreign policy, military operations, and government organization.

The book that gives an insider's view of some of the great intelligence blunders of recent history. Including Stalin's Operation Barbarossa, Hitler being misled by his own intelligence staff, the bungling that enabled an attack on Pearl Harbor, lack of preparation for the Viet Cong's offensive 1968, Arab Israeli war 1973, Falkland Islands, Gulf War 1991...New material to include: The US failure to run warning system before 9/11; the War on Terrorism; the Islamic Terrorist threat; mis-use of intelligence by UK government in War with Iraq; intelligence problems of Middle East; challenges of 21st century.

In 1939, several hundred people - students, professors, international chess players, junior military officers, actresses and debutantes - reported to a Victorian mansion in Buckinghamshire: Bletchley Park. This was to be 'Station X', the Allies' top-secret centre for deciphering enemy codes. Their task was to break the ingenious Enigma code used for German high-level communications. The settings for the Enigma machine changed continually and each day the German operators had 159 million million million different possibilities. Yet against all the odds this gifted group achieved the impossible, coping with even greater difficulties to break Shark, the U-Boat Enigma, and Fish, the cypher system used by Hitler to talk to his guards.

This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them--with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S. intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups.

While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.

Intelligence operations face the challenging task of predicting the shape of future wars. This task is hindered by their limited ability to warn of peacetime foreign military innovation. Using formerly classified sources in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.

The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.

Uncovering Ways of War substantially revises the perception of how American intelligence performed prior to World War II. Mahnken challenges the assumption that intelligence regarding foreign militaries had little influence on the development of U.S. weapons and doctrine. Finally, he explains the obstacles these agencies must still negotiate as they seek to understand foreign efforts to exploit the information revolution."

Peter Wilkinson's vivid insider account of the undercover campaigns of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War looks at the foundation and structure of the SOE, as well as his personal experience as an intelligence officer during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Polish Campaign of 1939. The book is a valuable contribution to the secret history of the Second World War. It concludes with an account of the SOE's hazardous attempt under the author's command to infiltrate the Third Reich from 1943-1945.

This classic account of the German Resistance during World War II remains one of the primary sources on a topic that continues to generate controversy more than a half century after the war's end. As OSS (office of strategic services) chief of station in Bern, Switzerland, from 1942 to 1945, Dulles was charged with determining the extent and commitment of the opposition to Hitler. "Germany's Underground" is the most important firsthand account we have of Allied contact with that opposition--and the most concise and readable history of the men and women from every stratum of German society who made up this complex web.

In the years following World War I, America's armed services, industry, and government took lessons from that conflict to enhance the country's ability to mobilize for war. Paul Koistinen examines how today's military-industrial state emerged during that period-a time when the army and navy embraced their increasing reliance on industry, and business accelerated its efforts to prepare the country for future wars. Planning War, Pursuing Peace is the third of an extraordinary five-volume study on the political economy of American warfare. It differs from preceding volumes by examining the planning and investigation of war mobilization rather than the actual harnessing of the economy for hostilities; and it is also the first book to treat all phases of the political economy of wartime during those crucial interwar years. Koistinen first describes and analyzes the War and Navy Departments' procurement and economic mobilization planning-never before examined in its entirety-and conveys the enormity of the task faced by the military in establishing ties with many sectors of the economy. He tells how the War Department created commodity committees to carry on the work of World War I's War Industries Board, and how both military and industrial powers strove to protect their mutual interests against those seeking to avoid war and to reform society. Koistinen then describes the American public's struggle to come to terms with modern warfare through the in-depth explorations of the work of the House Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, the War Policies Commission, and the Senate Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry. He tells how these investigations alarmed pacifists, isolationists, and neo-Jeffersonians, and how they led Senator Gerald Nye and others to warn against the creation of ""unhealthy alliances"" between the armed services and industry. Planning War, Pursuing Peaceclearly shows how the U.S. economy was both directly and indirectly planned based on knowledge gained from World War I. By revealing vital and previously unexplored links between America's World Wars, it further illuminates the political economy of twentieth-century warfare as a complex and continually evolving process.

First published in 1865, Belle Boyd's memoir of her experiences as a Confederate spy has stood the test of time and interest. Belle first gained notoriety when she killed a Union soldier in her home in 1861. During the Federal occupations of the Shenandoah Valley, she mingled with the servicemen and, using her feminine wiles, obtained useful information for the Rebel cause.

In this new edition, Kennedy-Nolle and Faust consider the domestic side of the Civil War and also assess the value of Boyd's memoir for social and literary historians in its challenge to our understanding the most divisive years in American history.

"Changing Enemies is one of the last accounts we shall have by a witness to some of the high-level decision making during the war and its immediate aftermath. . . . Lord Annan's book valuably points to the contribution to German democracy that was distinctively British." Michael R. Beschloss, New York Times Book Review"In this crackling tale, former British intelligence officer Annan offers an insider's view of the military espionage that helped the Allies win the war against Hitler. . . . He vividly describes power struggles among the Allied forces occupying Germany, his work in guiding post-Nazi Germany toward multi-party democracy, and] his friendship with Konrad Adenauer." Publishers Weekly"A graceful and crystal style like Noel Annan's, all but absent from most contemporary political and historical literature, is enough to awaken an American reader's slumbering literary Anglophilia." David Mehegan, Boston Globe"One of the best books ever written about military intelligence during World War II." William Roger Louis, University of Texas, and Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford"

For forty years the Central Intelligence Agency has published an in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, for CIA eyes only. Now the agency has declassified much of this material. This engrossing book, which presents the most interesting articles from the journal, provides revealing insights into CIA strategies and into events in which the organization was involved. The articles were selected by H. Bradford Westerfield, an independent authority who teaches courses on intelligence operations but has never been affiliated with the CIA. Westerfield's comprehensive introduction sketches the history and basic structure of the CIA, sets the articles in context, and explains his process of selection. The articles span a wide range of intelligence activities, including intelligence data gathering inside the United States; analysis of data; interaction between analysts and policymakers; the development of economic intelligence targeted at friendly countries as well as at foes; use of double agents (the personal memoir of a CIA officer who pretended to the Russians to be their agent); evaluation of defectors (the Nosenko case); and coercive interrogation techniques and how to resist them.

For three years during World War II, future Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commanded the OSS mission in Bern, Switzerland. From Hitler's Doorstep provides an annotated selection of his reports to Washington from 1942 to 1945.

Dulles was a leading source of Allied intelligence on Nazi Germany and the occupied nations. The messages presented in this volume were based on information received through agents and networks operating in France, Italy, Austria, Eastern Europe, and Germany itself. They deal with subjects ranging from enemy troop strength and military plans to political developments, support of resistance movements, secret weapons, psychological warfare, and peace feelers. The Dulles reports reveal his own vision of grand strategy and presage the postwar turmoil in Europe.

One of the largest collections of OSS records ever published, these telegrams and radiotelephone transmissions from the National Archives provide an exciting account of the course of the European war, offer insight on the development of American intelligence, and illuminate the origins of the Cold War. They will interest diplomatic and military historians as well as specialists on modern Europe. This volume is almost unique as document-based intelligence history and serves as a badly needed bridge between diplomatic history and intelligence studies.

In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

No major twentieth-century power has so short a history of national intelligence agencies or activities as does the United States, and few have been as public or as tumultuous. A major debate has now opened over the future structure, size, and role of U.S. intelligence in the aftermath of the cold war. This unique and fully updated book is a history of the U.S. intelligence community--as well as a detailed description of the organization and function of the major components of the community as they existed at the beginning of 1992. A welcome and timely update of one of the most concise and objective guides to the history and structure of U.S. intelligence. "Representative Dave McCurdy, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of RepresentativeS"

The history of the intelligence community can be divided into three distinct periods. From its creation in 1947 until the revelations and investigations of 1974-1975, the intelligence community operated under fairly broad grants of authority based on trust. After the Nixon administration, a previously dormant Congress was galvanized to write new oversight provisions and also took on a greater role as a shaper and consumer of intelligence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war in 1991, the intelligence community found its role and even its necessity questioned due to the sudden absence of its major target. Lowenthal emphasizes that a competent and challenged intelligence capability is an essential part of the U.S. national security structure, despite the status of external events or threats. The major requirement of this structure, he says, is providing timely, objective, and pointed analysis to policymakers across a wide range of issues.

Sensitive security information (SSI) is a category of sensitive but unclassified information under the United States government's information sharing and control rules. SSI plays a crucial role in all types of security. It is information obtained in the conduct of security activities which, if publicly disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, reveal trade secrets, share privileged or confidential information, harm transportation security, or allow hostile elements to avoid security controls. Divided into seven sections, the Sensitive Security Information Certified (R) (SSI) Body of Knowledge provides a comprehensive source that helps you prepare for certification in SSI protection. It reviews and discusses relevant topics in The history and definition of SSI Espionage, security breaches, and detection Personal information security Corporate security Government security Legislation and regulations Identity theft Within the sections, the book covers a wide range of subjects related to aiding protection of SSI, including Good information practices The psychology of spies Methods to detect potential betrayal Methods for handling sensitive information Establishing security plans for sensitive information Monitoring techniques such as the use of closed-circuit video cameras In a world of ever-changing technology with massive amounts of information available to the public in a matter of seconds, government, businesses, and individuals must take extra precautions in securing their SSI. This book equips you with the essential knowledge to become certified in SSI protection, and will serve as a valuable reference afterward in remaining an effective security professional charged with protecting SSI.

Much has been written about U.S. intelligence operations. However, intelligence, as it is conducted in the U.S. domestic environment, has usually been treated in a fractured and sensationalistic manner. This book dispassionately assesses the U.S. domestically oriented intelligence enterprise by first examining its individual components and then showing how those components, both federal and non-federal, work in conjunction to form an often unacknowledged structure that is more than the sum of its parts. The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise: History, Development, and Operations takes a unique, in-depth approach that assesses not only the current state of affairs but also the evolution of the domestic intelligence enterprise. To accomplish this, it examines the origins and progress of the major agencies to show why they operate in the way that they do. By providing this perspective, the book promotes an understanding of the factors to consider when developing effective intelligence policy. The book is divided into several thematic sections: The evolution of the domestically oriented intelligence enterprise The collection capabilities of the enterprise The role that domestically-developed intelligence has in the analytical process, which informs decision making The use of intelligence to implement decisions via disruption of threat actors The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise intends to prompt a rethinking of intelligence within the domestic environment. It takes into account the political realities, the organizational cultures, and the evolving missions that have shaped those agencies responsible for positive and negative intelligence and disruption of threats on American soil. This will hopefully provide a counterweight to future knee-jerk reactions and, instead, inspire a thoughtful approach to the advancement of U.S. strategic interests while protecting the rights of Americans.

During World War II, Britain enjoyed spectacular success in the secret war between hostile intelligence services, enabling a substantial and successful expansion of British counter-espionage which continued to grow in the Cold War era. Hugh Trevor-Roper's experiences working in the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) during the war left a profound impression on him and he later observed the world of intelligence with particular discernment. To Trevor-Roper, who was always interested in the historical dimension of the present and was fully alive to the historical significance of the era in which he lived, the subjects of wartime intelligence and the complex espionage networks that developed in the Cold War period were as worthy of profound investigation and reflection as events from the more-distant past. Expressing his observations through some of his most ironic and entertaining correspondence, articles and reviews, Trevor-Roper wrote vividly about some of the greatest intelligence characters of the age - from Kim Philby and Michael Straight to the Germans Admiral Canaris and Otto John. The coherence, depth and historical vision which unites these writings can only be glimpsed when they are brought together from the scattered publications in which they appeared, and when read beside his unpublished, private reflections. The Secret World unites Trevor-Roper's writings on the subject of intelligence - including the full text of The Philby Affair and some of his personal letters to leading figures. Based on original material and extensive supplementary research by E.D.R Harrison, this book is a sharp, revealing and personal first-hand account of the intelligence world in World War II and the Cold War.

Since World War I, Cyprus has played a crucial role in British defence strategy. Panagiotis Dimitrakis here introduces new research which reveals the true role of British intelligence on the island throughout the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, the 1955-59 Archbishop Makarios and EOKA-led revolt and the 1974 Turkish invasion. He sheds fresh light on the stance of both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan towards Greece and Turkey in the turbulent 1970s, and provides important new perspectives on the 1978 Egyptian hostage crisis at Larnaca Airport and the research is based throughout on primary sources including previously unpublished declassified papers from British diplomats and intelligence officers. This is a valuable study for scholars of contemporary strategy and military history and for those interested in military intelligence and the history of Cyprus.

Building on Goldman's Words of Intelligence and Maret's On Their Own Terms this is a one-stop reference tool for anyone studying and working in intelligence, security, and information policy. This comprehensive resource defines key terms of the theoretical, conceptual, and organizational aspects of intelligence and national security information policy. It explains security classifications, surveillance, risk, technology, as well as intelligence operations, strategies, boards and organizations, and methodologies. It also defines terms created by the U.S. legislative, regulatory, and policy process, and routinized by various branches of the U.S. government. These terms pertain to federal procedures, policies, and practices involving the information life cycle, national security controls over information, and collection and analysis of intelligence information. This work is intended for intelligence students and professionals at all levels, as well as information science students dealing with such issues as the Freedom of Information Act.

Words of Intelligence: An Intelligence Professional's Lexicon for Domestic and Foreign Threats is intended for the intelligence and national security men and women at the federal, state, and local levels. The intelligence community has undergone massive changes since it developed after World War II. Intelligence work now involves several different processes, including the planning, collection, analysis, and production of information. It also requires extensive expertise in its terminology. And in the post-9/11 era, the intelligence community has expanded, requiring the transmission of information to state and local public administrators, health officials, and transportation planners in times of a possible domestic attack. The number of people who need to know the specialized terminology of the intelligence community continues to grow. This dictionary is an invaluable tool for those requiring a working knowledge of intelligence-related issues from both a foreign intelligence perspective and a local perspective for law enforcement officials. The number of terms, abbreviations, and acronyms has more than doubled for this new edition, and it includes a topical index and extensively cross-referenced entries. This book explains terms that relate to intelligence operations, intelligence strategies, security classifications, obscure names of intelligence boards and organizations, and methodologies used to produce intelligence analysis. Both entry-level and experienced intelligence professionals in the domestic and foreign intelligence communities find this book useful. This book is more than just a reference book; it is a book to read and enjoy, and from which to learn the art and science of intelligence analysis.

Words of Intelligence: A Dictionary is intended for the intelligence and national security men and women who are fighting the Global War on Terrorism at all levels: local, state, and federal. The intelligence community has undergone massive changes since the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the Department of Defense were created, and recently, with the establishment of Homeland Security and a Director of National Intelligence, it has taken on even more duties and responsibilities. Intelligence now must be transmitted to state and local public administrators, health officials, and transportation planners (to name just a few) in times of a possible domestic attack. Containing over 600 terms related to theoretical aspects of intelligence, intelligence operations, intelligence strategies, security classification of information, obscure names of intelligence boards and organizations, and homeland security, this dictionary is an invaluable tool for those requiring a working knowledge of intelligence-related issues. A topical index is also included.

Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking appropriate action to avert disaster.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.