This is a unique document published here for the first time, giving new insights into Hitler's personality and how Nazi Germany's military and intelligence apparatus operated. Published for the very first time, the top secret report "Some Weaknesses in German Strategy and Organisation 1933-1945" was prepared by Whitehall's highest intelligence body, the Joint Intelligence Committee, and presented to Britain's Chiefs of Staff in 1946 to 'set down certain aspects of the War whilst there are still sources available who were closely connected with the events described...when it is finally possible to make a balanced historical survey, some of the acutely critical moments which are vividly remembered now are likely to become confused with the passage of time, and there will be a tendency...to underestimate the great and evident strength of the German war machine'. The report encompasses the peculiar idiosyncrasies of Hitler's personality and the failures of Germany's military organisation, and charts the rise and fall of the Third Reich through 200 pages of intelligence reporting. Paul Winter sets this unique and important document in its historical setting, providing biographies of key figures referenced in the report and a timeline of the crucial events of the Second World War.

The history of scientific intelligence - its birth, its importance during the Second World War and its unique wartime qualities - has relied almost entirely on the memories of its pioneer, R.V. Jones. Through scrutiny of Jones' post-war literature (especially his war memoirs, entitled Most Secret War; his archival papers - as well as those of his colleagues and contemporaries - and other mediums he used to promote his account of scientific intelligence), this ground-breaking book constitutes a critique of the genesis of scientific and technical intelligence. Examining chronologically all of the key events Jones became famous for - the Battle of the Beams, the Bruneval Raid, the Radio War, the Battle of the V-Weapons - and comparing Jones' account of these (and many other) events with contemporary documentation, this book provides a rich understanding of the internal machinations within the British wartime air scientific intelligence organisation defined as ADI (Science) and their relationships with the many other political, military and intelligence sections that pursued similar and often closely-linked quests. This book importantly connects science and technology with the collection and collation of intelligence; is an analysis of wartime intelligence of a scientific and technical nature; argues that scientific intelligence was much more than one man's accomplishments, which involved many more individuals and organisations than has been perceived; and was much more crucial to the development of 20th century history than has been portrayed.

Surveying the expanding conflict in Europe during one of his famous fireside chats in 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt ominously warned that "we know of other methods, new methods of attack. The Trojan horse. The fifth column that betrays a nation unprepared for treachery. Spies, saboteurs, and traitors are the actors in this new strategy." Having identified a new type of war -- a shadow war -- being perpetrated by Hitler's Germany, FDR decided to fight fire with fire, authorizing the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to organize and oversee covert operations. Based on an extensive analysis of OSS records, including the vast trove of records released by the CIA in the 1980s and '90s, as well as a new set of interviews with OSS veterans conducted by the author and a team of American scholars from 1995 to 1997, "The Shadow War Against Hitler" is the full story of America's far-flung secret intelligence apparatus during World War II.

In addition to its responsibilities generating, processing, and interpreting intelligence information, the OSS orchestrated all manner of dark operations, including extending feelers to anti-Hitler elements, infiltrating spies and sabotage agents behind enemy lines, and implementing propaganda programs. Planned and directed from Washington, the anti-Hitler campaign was largely conducted in Europe, especially through the OSS's foreign outposts in Bern and London. A fascinating cast of characters made the OSS run: William J. Donovan, one of the most decorated individuals in the American military who became the driving force behind the OSS's genesis; Allen Dulles, the future CIA chief who ran the Bern office, which he called "the big window onto the fascist world"; a veritable pantheon of Ivy League academics who were recruited to work for the intelligence services; and, not least, Roosevelt himself. A major contribution of the book is the story of how FDR employed Hitler's former propaganda chief, Ernst "Putzi" Hanfstengl, as a private spy.

More than a record of dramatic incidents and daring personalities, this book adds significantly to our understanding of how the United States fought World War II. It demonstrates that the extent, and limitations, of secret intelligence information shaped not only the conduct of the war but also the face of the world that emerged from the shadows.

"MI6 and the Machinery of Spying "traces the development of the agency's internal structure from its inception until the end of the Cold War. The analysis examines how its management structure has been driven by its operational environment on the one hand and its position within the machinery of British central government on the other. Close attention is paid to the agency's institutional links to its consumers in Whitehall and Downing Street, as well as to the causes and consequences of its operational organization and provisions for counter-espionage and security.
The book presents a detailed response to assertions that the SIS was historically chronically mismanaged and badly organized, and to claims that it is unaccountable to political and public oversight. It also argues that where SIS activities have resulted in public disasters and scandals the reason has usually been less its lack of accountability and control than the very high degree of control and direction exercised by opportunistic politicians and the senior Civil Servants.

In this new edition of his classic 1970 memoir about the notorious U-2 incident, pilot Francis Gary Powers reveals the full story of what actually happened in the most sensational espionage case in Cold War history. After surviving the shoot-down of his reconnaissance plane and his capture on May 1, 1960, Powers endured sixty-one days of rigorous interrogation by the KGB, a public trial, a conviction for espionage, and the start of a ten-year sentence. After nearly two years, the U.S. government obtained his release from prison in a dramatic exchange for convicted Soviet spy Rudolph Abel. The narrative is a tremendously exciting suspense story about a man who was labeled a traitor by many of his countrymen but who emerged a Cold War hero.

Intelligence operations face the challenging task of predicting the shape of future wars. This task is hindered by their limited ability to warn of peacetime foreign military innovation. Using formerly classified sources in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.

The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.

Uncovering Ways of War substantially revises the perception of how American intelligence performed prior to World War II. Mahnken challenges the assumption that intelligence regarding foreign militaries had little influence on the development of U.S. weapons and doctrine. Finally, he explains the obstacles these agencies must still negotiate as they seek to understand foreign efforts to exploit the information revolution."

State sponsorship of terrorism is a complex and important topic in today's international affairs - and especially pertinent in the regional politics of the Middle East and South Asia, where Pakistan has long been a flashpoint of Islamist politics and terrorism. In Islamism and Intelligence in South Asia, Prem Mahadevan demonstrates how over several decades, radical Islamists, sometimes with the tacit support of parts of the military establishment, have weakened democratic governance in Pakistan and acquired progressively larger influence over policy-making. Mahadevan traces this history back to the anti-colonial Deobandi movement, which was born out of the post-partition political atmosphere and a rediscovery of the thinking of Ibn Taymiyyah, and partially ennobled the idea of `jihad' in South Asia as a righteous war against foreign oppression. Using Pakistani media and academic sources for the bulk of its raw data, and reinforcing this with scholarly analysis from Western commentators, the book tracks Pakistan's trajectory towards a `soft' Islamic revolution. Envisioned by the country's intelligence community as a solution to chronic governance failures, these narratives called for a re-orientation away from South Asia and towards the Middle East. In the process, Pakistan has become a sanctuary for Arab jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, who had no previous ethnic or linguistic connection with South Asia. Most alarmingly, official discourse on terrorism has been partly silenced by the military-intelligence complex. The result is a slow drift towards extremism and possible legitimation of internationally proscribed terrorist organizations in Pakistan's electoral politics.

During World War II, Britain enjoyed spectacular success in the secret war between hostile intelligence services, enabling a substantial and successful expansion of British counter-espionage which continued to grow in the Cold War era. Hugh Trevor-Roper's experiences working in the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) during the war left a profound impression on him and he later observed the world of intelligence with particular discernment. To Trevor-Roper, who was always interested in the historical dimension of the present and was fully alive to the historical significance of the era in which he lived, the subjects of wartime intelligence and the complex espionage networks that developed in the Cold War period were as worthy of profound investigation and reflection as events from the more-distant past. Expressing his observations through some of his most ironic and entertaining correspondence, articles and reviews, Trevor-Roper wrote vividly about some of the greatest intelligence characters of the age - from Kim Philby and Michael Straight to the Germans Admiral Canaris and Otto John. The coherence, depth and historical vision which unites these writings can only be glimpsed when they are brought together from the scattered publications in which they appeared, and when read beside his unpublished, private reflections. The Secret World unites Trevor-Roper's writings on the subject of intelligence - including the full text of The Philby Affair and some of his personal letters to leading figures. Based on original material and extensive supplementary research by E.D.R Harrison, this book is a sharp, revealing and personal first-hand account of the intelligence world in World War II and the Cold War.

Did President Roosevelt and other high-ranking U.S. government officials know about Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor in advance, and fail to warn U.S. Navy leadership in Hawaii? Drawing on recently declassified materials and revelations from other writers, this book traces the flow of intelligence and concludes the imminent attack was known about and was allowed to happen to win the support of the American public in a war against Japan. An epilogue describes the fate of Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the intelligence he received from Washington before the attack, and the intelligence he did not.

Master of Deception is a biography of Peter Fleming, elder brother of Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond. Peter Fleming worked as a travel writer and journalist, serving with distinction throughout World War II and played a crucial role in British intelligence operations in the Far East. This biography ranges from the personal life of Fleming such as his marriage to Celia Johnson, a famous actor of the time, to his extensive military intelligence career which took him from Norway and Greece to the Far East. Framed through the life of Peter Fleming this book offers an in-depth study of British intelligence operations in the Far East during World War II.

When Neville Chamberlain made his famous Peace in Our Time statement in 1938, after the Munich Agreement with Hitler, he may, or may not, have been aware that the new Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service was already making plans to mount an all-out political and sabotage war against Nazi Germany. This was a new form of warfare, encompassing bribery, black propaganda and sabotage by agents described as having no morals or scruples. To the horror of many, it disregarded the conventions of neutrality and was prepared to hit the Nazi state wherever it could do most damage. Malcolm Atkin reveals how Section Ds struggle to build a European wide anti-Nazi resistance movement was met with widespread suspicion from government, to the extent of a systematic destruction of its reputation. It was, however, a key pioneer of irregular warfare that led to the formation of the famous Special Operations Executive (SOE). His study is the first in-depth account of it to be published since the release of previously secret documents to the National Archives.

The complete story of how the German Enigma codes were broken. Perfect for fans of THE IMITATION GAME, the new film on Alan Turing's Enigma code, starring Benedict Cumberbatch. Breaking the German Enigma codes was not only about brilliant mathematicians and professors at Bletchley Park. There is another aspect of the story which it is only now possible to tell. It takes in the exploits of spies, naval officers and ordinary British seamen who risked, and in some cases lost, their lives snatching the vital Enigma codebooks from under the noses of Nazi officials and from sinking German ships and submarines. This book tells the whole Enigma story: its original invention and use by German forces and how it was the Poles who first cracked - and passed on to the British - the key to the German airforce Enigma. The more complicated German Navy Enigma appeared to them to be unbreakable.

In this thoroughly updated second edition, Derek S. Reveron provides a comprehensive analysis of the shift in US foreign policy from coercive diplomacy to cooperative military engagement. The US military does much more than fight wars; it responds to humanitarian crises and natural disasters, assists advanced militaries to support international peace, and trains and equips almost every military in the world. Rather than intervening directly, the United States can respond to crises by sending weapons, trainers, and advisers to assist other countries in tackling their own security deficits created by subnational, transnational, and regional challengers. By doing so, the United States seeks to promote partnerships and its soft power, strengthen the state sovereignty system, prevent localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect its national security by addressing underlying conditions that lead to war. Since coalition warfare is the norm, security cooperation also ensures partners are interoperable with US forces when the US leads international military coalitions. Exporting Security takes into account the Obama administration's foreign policy, the implications of more assertive foreign policies by Russia and China, and the US military's role in recent humanitarian crises and nation-building efforts.

A highly valuable resource for students of intelligence studies, strategy and security, and foreign policy, this volume provides readers with an accessible and comprehensive exploration of U.S. espionage activities that addresses both the practical and ethical implications that attend the art and science of spying. Essentials of Strategic Intelligence investigates a subject unknown to or misunderstood by most American citizens: how U.S. foreign and security policy is derived from the information collection operations and data analysis by the sixteen major U.S. intelligence agencies. The essays in this work draw back the curtain on the hidden side of America's government, explaining the roles of various intelligence missions, justifying the existence of U.S. intelligence agencies, and addressing the complex moral questions that arise in the conduct of secret operations. After an introductory overview, the book presents accessibly written essays on the key topics: intelligence collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, and intelligence accountability. Readers will understand how intelligence directly informs policymakers and why democracies need secret agencies; learn how the CIA has become deeply involved in the war-like assassination operations that target suspected foreign terrorists, even some individuals who are American citizens; and appreciate how the existence of-and our reliance on-these intelligence agencies poses challenges for democratic governance. Provides a comprehensive, up-to-date examination of all aspects of intelligence by experts in the field, from collection-and-analysis and counterintelligence to covert action and accountability Probes into how the United States' intelligence agencies attempt to protect the nation from cyberattacks by foreign nations and terrorist groups-and documents the successes and failures Documents the involvement of the National Security Agency (NSA) in bulk "metadata" collection of information on the telephone records and social media communications of American citizens Examines the effects that have resulted from major leaks in the U.S. government, from Wikileaks to the NSA Snowden leaks

On a chilly autumn night in 1942, a German spy was rowed ashore from a U-boat off the GaspT coast to begin a deadly espionage mission against the Allies. Thanks to an alert hotel-keeper's son, Abwehr agent 'Bobbi' was captured and forced by the RCMP to become Canada's first double-agent. For nearly fifty years the full story of the spy case, code-named Watchdog, was suppressed. Now, author Dean Beeby has uncovered nearly five thousand pages of formerly classified government documents, obtained through the Access to Information Act from the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Department of Justice, the National Archives of Canada, and Naval Intelligence. He has supplemented this treasure trove with research among still heavily censored FBI files, and interviews with surviving participants in the Watchdog story. Although British records of the case remain closed, Beeby also interviewed the MI5 case officer for Watchdog, the late Cyril Mills. The operation was Canada's first major foray into international espionage, predating the Gouzenko defection by three years. Watchdog, as Beeby reveals, was not the Allied success the RCMP has long claimed. Agent 'Bobbi' gradually ensnared his captors with a finely spun web of lies, transforming himself into a triple-agent who fed useful information back to Hamburg. Beeby argues that Canadian authorities were woefully unprepared for the subtleties of wartime counter-espionage, and that their mishandling of the case had long-term consequences that affected relations with their intelligence partners throughout the Cold War.

'An intriguing page-turning and personal account of that most secretive of wartime institutions, Bletchley Park, and of the often eccentric people who helped to win the war' - Beryl Bainbridge Bletchley Park, or 'Station X', was home to the most famous codebreakers of the Second World War. The 19th-century mansion was the key centre for cracking German, Italian and Japanese codes, providing the allies with vital information. After the war, many intercepts, traffic-slips and paperwork were burned (allegedly at Churchill's behest). The truth about Bletchley was not revealed until F. Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret was published in 1974. However, nothing until now has been written on the German Air Section. In Cracking the Luftwaffe Codes, former WAAF (Women's Auxiliary Air Force) Gwen Watkins brings to life the reality of this crucial division. In a highly informative, lyrical account, she details her eventful interview, eventual appointment at the 'the biggest lunatic asylum in Britain', methods for cracking codes, the day-to-day routine and decommissioning of her section.

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) is a systematic technique for predicting short-term, unique behaviors. Using primarily qualitative empirical data, LAMP allows the analyst to predict the most likely outcomes for specific research questions across a wide range of intelligence problems, such as cyber threats in the U.S., the possibility of an Al Qaeda attack, the likelihood of Iran providing nuclear capability to terrorist groups, or the future actions of the Mexican drug cartel. LAMP offers an innovative and powerful method for organizing all available information based on the perceptions of the national actors, using it to make relevant predictions as to which alternate future is most likely to occur at a given moment in time. Its transparent structure enables anyone to see how an analyst gets from point A to point B to produce an intelligence estimate. LAMP differs from other analytical techniques in that it is based on determining the relative probability of a range of alternate futures, rather than attempting to determine the quantitative probability of their occurrence. After explaining its theoretical framework, the text leads the reader through the process of predictive analysis before providing practical case studies showing how LAMP is applied against real world problems, such as the possible responses of Israel, the U.S., and Lebanon to the behavior of Hezbollah or the competing visions of the future of Afghanistan. Evaluation of the method is provided with the case studies to show the effectiveness of the LAMP predictions over time. The book is complemented by a website with downloadable software for use by students of intelligence in conducting their own predictive analysis. It will be an essential tool for the analyst and the student, not only for national security issues but also for competitive intelligence.

The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster explores the questions of why, if the United States knew the Japanese codes, did we not anticipate the December 7, 1941 surprise attack and how did the Japanese spy system in Hawaii operate? As a chief of research and planning in the Special Warfare Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the author had access to both Japanese and American classified material to write this study. The author's intent was to independently ascertain the validity of earlier claims that the Pearl Harbor attack could have been avoided. The result is an eminently readable and engrossing story of the relationship between America and Japan in the interwar years and the relentless cat-and-mouse intelligence game conducted by both sides. Despite more recent suppositions that there was a conspiracy among American and British officials to ignore warnings of a Japanese attack that had been gleaned from deciphered diplomatic codes in order to force America into a world war, the author confirms that human error and misjudgment and the actual state of intelligence interpretation at the time made an accurate assessment of Japanese intentions impossible.

The twenty-first century has brought the perfect storm of conditions to create substantive global instability. This contemporary operating environment (COE) is characterized by complexity, ambiguity, volatility, and constant danger. It is a human invention that requires a human solution. Special operations forces (SOF), a group comprised of highly trained personnel with the ability to deploy rapidly and apply special skills in a variety of environments and circumstances, is the logical force of choice to achieve success in the COE. Increasing their effectiveness is cultural intelligence (CQ) – the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours of a group of people and then apply that knowledge toward a specific goal. Empowered by CQ, SOF are positioned to dominate in the COE. Solving the People Puzzle makes a convincing argument for the powerful union of the "force of choice" with the "tool of choice." This book will inspire and inform.

As of early 2010, more than two million U.S. troops have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the American public is neither much engaged in the issues of these two wars nor particularly knowledgeable about the troops experiences, which have ranged from positive and energizing to searing and debilitating. Based on scores of interview--some culled from the Library of Congress Veterans History Project and others conducted by the author himself--"Through Veterans Eyes" presents a composite narrative of the experiences of U.S. service personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Minear quotes more than 175 veterans by name and includes a dozen of their own photos from the conflict theaters. Thematic chapters cover duty and service, politics, cultural and ethical challenges, relationships to local populations, and reentry into American society. Neither pro-war nor anti-war, Minear s approach encourages veterans to express their views on issues critical to the nation. What has motivated U.S. military personnel to enlist? What specific challenges have they faced in Iraq and Afghanistan? What have been the impacts of deployment on their families and communities? Is their experience changing their views of their country and the world? What lessons may be learned from their stories? Veterans candid responses to these and other probing questions deserve pondering.

Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in the 110th Congress, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its 2004 conclusions set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress' structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, as detailed in this book, covers many issues, and concludes that congressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional". This book proposes two distinct solutions:(1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modelled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorisation and appropriations power. This book consists of public domain documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

Though much has been written about the American Civil War itself, little has been written about the spy war that went on within. The chronicling of Civil War intelligence activities challenges historians because of the lack of records, the lack of access to records, and the questionable truth of other records. Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederacy's Secretary of State, burned all the intelligence records he could find as federal troops entered Richmond. Union intelligence records were kept sealed in the National Archives until 1953. A few individuals involved in intelligence gathering burned their personal papers while others chose to publish their memoirs, though greatly embellishing their exploits. Even today, the identities of many spies remain secret. Henry Thomas Harrison, for example, was a Confederate spy whose intelligence set in motion the events that produced the battle of Gettysburg. But neither his first name nor details of his long career as a spy were known until 1986, when historian James O. Hall published an article about him. Though the idea of centralised intelligence gathering was decades away, the age-old resistance to the idea was present even then. Neither side saw the need to create such intelligence organisations, but each side approached the idea of effectively acquiring intelligence in their own way. The Confederacy's Signal Corps, devoted primarily to communications and intercepts, included a covert agency, the Secret Service Bureau. This unit ran espionage and counter-espionage operations in the North. Late in the war, the bureau set up a secret headquarters in Canada and sent out operatives on covert missions in Northern states. The Union's Bureau of Military Information, unlike the Confederacy's Secret Service Bureau, operated for specific generals rather than for the Union Army itself. But here was born the idea of what would eventually become a centralised military intelligence division. Each side still used age-old intelligence techniques, such as code-breaking, deception, and covert surveillance. However, into this modern war came two innovations that would endure as tools of espionage: wiretapping and overhead reconnaissance. What follows is a look at some of the highlights of how the North and the South gathered and used their information, the important missions, and the personalities. From this special view, the focus is not on the battlefield, but on a battle of wits.