The modern means of communication have turned the world into an information fishbowl and, in terms of foreign policy and national security in post-Cold War power politics, helped transform international power politics. Information operations (IO), in which time zones are as important as national boundaries, is the use of modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior. Contemporary IO differs from traditional psychological operations practiced by nation-states, because the availability of low-cost high technology permits nongovernmental organizations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own as well as facilitates damaging cyber-attacks ("hactivism") on computer networks and infrastructure. As current vice president Dick Cheney once said, such technology has turned third-class powers into first-class threats. Conceived as a textbook by instructors at the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School of the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College and involving IO experts from several countries, this book fills an important gap in the literature by analyzing under one cover the military, technological, and psychological aspects of information operations. The general reader will appreciate the examples taken from recent history that reflect the impact of IO on U.S. foreign policy, military operations, and government organization.

The part played by code-cracking in World War II has been revealed in popular film and has also inspired several accounts by code-crackers. Much less well-known is how code-cracking was used in operational situations. In this account the "Silent Service" speaks through the voice of a young and inexperienced naval officer whose rites of passage to manhood required him to act as a seagoing eavesdropper, a role calling not only for quick intelligence but also for facing up to excitement and danger. Sir Alan Peacock's story is interlaced with graphic accounts of life on the lower deck, being torpedoed in a Channel action, and how to contribute to intelligence information that was required to foil enemy attacks on Russian convoys whilst facing atrocious weather conditions. The influence this intense experience exerted on Peacock's subsequent career in economics is also discussed.

In this new edition of his classic 1970 memoir about the notorious U-2 incident, pilot Francis Gary Powers reveals the full story of what actually happened in the most sensational espionage case in Cold War history. After surviving the shoot-down of his reconnaissance plane and his capture on May 1, 1960, Powers endured sixty-one days of rigorous interrogation by the KGB, a public trial, a conviction for espionage, and the start of a ten-year sentence. After nearly two years, the U.S. government obtained his release from prison in a dramatic exchange for convicted Soviet spy Rudolph Abel. The narrative is a tremendously exciting suspense story about a man who was labeled a traitor by many of his countrymen but who emerged a Cold War hero.

Intelligence operations face the challenging task of predicting the shape of future wars. This task is hindered by their limited ability to warn of peacetime foreign military innovation. Using formerly classified sources in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.

The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.

Uncovering Ways of War substantially revises the perception of how American intelligence performed prior to World War II. Mahnken challenges the assumption that intelligence regarding foreign militaries had little influence on the development of U.S. weapons and doctrine. Finally, he explains the obstacles these agencies must still negotiate as they seek to understand foreign efforts to exploit the information revolution."

Did President Roosevelt and other high-ranking U.S. government officials know about Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor in advance, and fail to warn U.S. Navy leadership in Hawaii? Drawing on recently declassified materials and revelations from other writers, this book traces the flow of intelligence and concludes the imminent attack was known about and was allowed to happen to win the support of the American public in a war against Japan. An epilogue describes the fate of Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the intelligence he received from Washington before the attack, and the intelligence he did not.

Master of Deception is a biography of Peter Fleming, elder brother of Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond. Peter Fleming worked as a travel writer and journalist, serving with distinction throughout World War II and played a crucial role in British intelligence operations in the Far East. This biography ranges from the personal life of Fleming such as his marriage to Celia Johnson, a famous actor of the time, to his extensive military intelligence career which took him from Norway and Greece to the Far East. Framed through the life of Peter Fleming this book offers an in-depth study of British intelligence operations in the Far East during World War II.

A new, fully uncensored edition of the definitive insider's account of the War on Terror 'A former FBI agent's memoir on the War on Terror is declassified after 9 years' Time 'One of the most valuable and detailed accounts of its subject to appear in the past decade' Economist The ultimate insider's account of the battle against terrorism, Ali Soufan's revelatory account of his history-making decade as the FBI's lead investigator into al-Qaeda shaped our understanding of counter-terror operations - and led to hard questions being asked of American and British leaders. When The Black Banners was first published in 2011, significant portions of the text were redacted. After a CIA review those restrictions have been lifted, and the result is this explosive new edition, The Black Banners (Declassified). Alongside a new foreword by Soufan, the declassified documents uncover shocking details on the use of torture on terror suspects, how these 'enhanced interrogation techniques' failed to secure reliable intelligence, and in fact actively derailed the fight against al-Qaeda. By contrast we see Soufan at work using empathy and intelligent questioning - not force or violence - to extract some of the most important confessions in the war. Taking us from the interrogation rooms where Soufan would share food and films with the suspects so he could bond with them, to the hideouts of bin Laden, Ali Soufan reveals with intimate, first-hand knowledge the unbelievable truth about America's security agencies, 9/11, and the global 'War on Terror'.

GRIPPING, MOVING AND INSPIRING: the remarkable life of a world-leading expert in chemical weapons defence. "His work has saved lives and given hope." - Professor David Nott, bestselling author of War Doctor For thirty years, Hamish has served and volunteered in conflict zones around the world. As the army's foremost chemical weapons expert, he built a unique first-hand understanding of how to prevent attacks and train doctors on the frontline - saving countless lives in the process. After suffering near-death experiences time and again, Hamish discovered he had a ticking time bomb in his own chest: a heart condition called Sudden Death Syndrome that could kill him at any time. But with a new awareness for the fragility of life, he fought harder to make his count. Despite facing extraordinary personal danger, Hamish has unearthed evidence of multiple chemical attacks in Syria and continues to advise the government at the highest level, including after the 2018 Novichok poisoning in Salisbury. Lifting the lid on Hamish's unique world of battlefield expertise and humanitarian work, Chemical Warrior is a thrilling story of bravery and compassion.

In December 1941, Japan attacked multiple targets in the Far East
and the Pacific, including Hong Kong, where Canadian battalions were
stationed. The disaster suggested that the Allies were totally
unprepared for war with Japan. This book dispels that assumption by
offering the first in-depth account of Canadian intelligence gathering
and strategic planning leading up to the crisis.

Timothy Wilford reminds us that Canada was both a Pacific and an
Atlantic power, and the first nation to declare war on Japan. Canadian
intelligence officers and strategists monitored Japan's movements
and worked closely with their US and Allied counterparts to develop a
picture of Japan's intentions and a strategic plan to meet
challenges in the Pacific. Although Canada wanted to avoid conflict
with Japan until US participation was assured, policy makers fully
anticipated action in the Pacific and made preparations for national
and imperial defence, which included the internment of Japanese
Canadians.

Canada's Road to the Pacific War sheds new light on
Canadian decision making, Commonwealth strategic planning, and the
emerging Anglo-American special relationship during a crisis that led
to war in the Pacific, as well as to the creation of the Grand
Alliance.

Timothy Wilford received a doctorate in history from
the University of Ottawa and specializes in twentieth-century military
history.

The United States and Mexico share a history shaped in the 19th century by numerous US forces interventions into Mexican territory and US expropriation of considerable swaths of Mexican territory. However, in spite of structural impediments and a history of resentment by Mexico of US intervention into its affairs and territory, the levels of cooperation and understanding slowly began to improve following a series of international and domestic factors. The decline of the former Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall at a global level, coupled with major political and economic challenges and reforms within Mexico are a starting point from which to assess the evolution of the bilateral defense relationship between the United States and Mexico. The American and Mexican militaries have evolved differently over the past 100 years and they each have very different responsibilities, mission sets, orientations, and capabilities. Yet in recent years, the Mexican armed forces have cooperated more closely with their US counterparts. This may be due to explicit direction coming from senior levels of the Mexican government and to operational requirements of the armed forces themselves as they seek to increase their capability and capacity to confront the growing levels in drug trafficking related violence. Today, both countries are dealing with the effects of this increased violence and insecurity in Mexico. Relying primarily on one-on-one interviews with senior practitioners and analysts on both sides of the border, the text examines the evolution of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral defense relationship to better understand how and why this unique relationship has improved, in fits and starts, over the past 25 years. It offers a new understanding of how defense policymakers from each respective country perceive the other, as well as how the lack of trust and understanding between the two neighbors has delayed greater cooperation.

Intelligence continues to undergo significant changes at a remarkable pace, notably developments related to "Big Data," surveillance, and cyber. Intelligence today involves multiagency, multinational, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing and sense-making, conducted by commerce, academic, government, civil society, media, law enforcement, military, and nongovernmental/nonprofit organizations. Increasingly complex systems, including interrelated technical dimensions, are central to modern defense systems. Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional provides a new framework for generating analysis, exploring how systems to system-of-systems can be harnessed both for and into the future. Intelligence engineering (IE) involves the use of scientific and technical knowledge to artfully create, operate, maintain, and dismantle complex devices, machines, structures, systems, and processes that support and/or disrupt human endeavor occurring in the intelligence context. Spanning both human and technical intelligence realms, IE includes the collection and analysis of information that is of military and/or political value, and that relates to international relations, defense, and national security. Strategic Futures, risk management across to resilience concerns, are similarly engaged.

The highly eccentric Alfred Dillwyn Knox, known simply as 'Dilly', was one of the leading figures in the British codebreaking successes of the two world wars. During the first, he was the chief codebreaker in the Admiralty, breaking the German Navy's main flag code, before going on to crack the German Enigma ciphers during the Second World War at Bletchley Park.Here, he enjoyed the triumphant culmination of his life's work: a reconstruction of the Enigma machine used by the Abwehr, the German Secret Service. This kept the British fully aware of what the German commanders knew about Allied plans, allowing MI5 and MI6 to use captured German spies to feed false information back to the Nazi spymasters.Mavis Batey was one of 'Dilly's girls', the young female codebreakers who helped him to break the various Enigma ciphers. She was called upon to advise Kate Winslet, star of the film Enigma, on what it was like to be one of the few female codebreakers at Bletchley Park. This gripping new edition of Batey's critically acclaimed book reveals the vital part Dilly played in the deception operation that ensured the success of the D-Day landings, altering the course of the Second World War.

'This is what an SAS career is really like' AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MAGAZINE Elite SAS Patrol Commander Stuart 'Nev' Bonner takes us inside the extraordinary and dangerous world of secret combat operations in this explosive, behind-the-scenes look at life inside the SAS. A world where capture means torture or death, and every move is trained for with precision detail to bring elite soldiers to the very peak of fighting ability. In a career spanning twenty years, fourteen of them in the SAS, Bonner shares with us the inside story of being out in front - and often behind enemy lines. From patrolling the mountains of East Timor to covert operations in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, from sweeping into the Iraqi desert ahead of invading US forces to cripple Saddam Hussein's communications to patrolling in war-torn Baghdad and being in the middle of the disastrous Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan - this is a no-holds-barred account of what it's like to live, eat and breathe SAS. Now part of the HACHETTE MILITARY COLLECTION.

Intelligence agencies spend huge sums of money to collect and analyze vast quantities of national security data for their political leaders. How well is this intelligence analyzed, how often is it acted on by policymakers, and does it have a positive or negative effect on decision making? Drawing on declassified documents, interviews with intelligence veterans and policymakers, and other sources, The Image of the Enemy breaks new ground as it examines how seven countries analyzed and used intelligence to shape their understanding of their main adversary. The cases in the book include the Soviet Union's analysis of the United States (and vice versa), East Germany's analysis of West Germany (and vice versa), British intelligence in the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Israeli intelligence about the Palestinians, Pakistani intelligence on India, and US intelligence about Islamist terrorists. These rivalries provide rich case studies for scholars and offer today's analysts and policymakers the opportunity to closely evaluate past successes and failures in intelligence analysis and the best ways to give information support to policymakers. Using these lessons from the past, they can move forward to improve analysis of current adversaries and future threats.

This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U.S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U.S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them -- with sometimes disastrous results.

The book begins with a look back at the role of U.S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler, from the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U.S. intelligence analysts passed on to policymakers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities that the U.S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy which could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups.

While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.

Today's intelligence community faces challenges that would have been inconceivable only a dozen years ago. Just as al-Qaeda's destruction of the Twin Towers heralded a revolution in global diplomacy, the events of 9/11 also threw two centuries of spy-craft into turmoil - because this new enemy could not be bought. Gone were the sleepers and moles whose trade in secrets had sustained intelligence agencies in both peacetime and war. A new method of intelligence had been born. The award-winning former Financial Times security correspondent Mark Huband here takes us deep inside this new unseen world of spies and intelligence. With privileged access to intelligence officers from Rome to Kabul and from Khartoum to Guantanamo Bay, he reveals how spies created secret channels to the IRA, deceived Iran's terrorist allies, frequently attempted to infiltrate al-Qaeda, and forced Libya to abandon its nuclear weapons. Using accounts from ex-KGB officers, Huband vividly describes the devastation caused by the West's misreading of Soviet intentions in Africa, and explains how ill-prepared western intelligence agencies were when the Cold War was replaced by the perception of a new terrorist threat. Benefiting from privileged access to intelligence sources across the world, Trading Secrets provides a unique and controversial assessment of the catastrophic failure of spies to grasp the realities of the Taliban's grip on Afghanistan, and draws upon exclusive interviews with serving officers in assessing the ability of the major intelligence agencies to combat the threat of twenty-first century terrorism.

This is a unique document published here for the first time, giving new insights into Hitler's personality and how Nazi Germany's military and intelligence apparatus operated. Published for the very first time, the top secret report "Some Weaknesses in German Strategy and Organisation 1933-1945" was prepared by Whitehall's highest intelligence body, the Joint Intelligence Committee, and presented to Britain's Chiefs of Staff in 1946 to 'set down certain aspects of the War whilst there are still sources available who were closely connected with the events described...when it is finally possible to make a balanced historical survey, some of the acutely critical moments which are vividly remembered now are likely to become confused with the passage of time, and there will be a tendency...to underestimate the great and evident strength of the German war machine'. The report encompasses the peculiar idiosyncrasies of Hitler's personality and the failures of Germany's military organisation, and charts the rise and fall of the Third Reich through 200 pages of intelligence reporting. Paul Winter sets this unique and important document in its historical setting, providing biographies of key figures referenced in the report and a timeline of the crucial events of the Second World War.

Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in the 110th Congress, in part because of the House Democratic majority's pledge to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its 2004 conclusions set the stage for reconsideration of the problems affecting Congress' structure in this area. The commission's unanimous report, as detailed in this book, covers many issues, and concludes that congressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional". This book proposes two distinct solutions:(1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modelled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting both authorisation and appropriations power. This book consists of public domain documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

Though much has been written about the American Civil War itself, little has been written about the spy war that went on within. The chronicling of Civil War intelligence activities challenges historians because of the lack of records, the lack of access to records, and the questionable truth of other records. Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederacy's Secretary of State, burned all the intelligence records he could find as federal troops entered Richmond. Union intelligence records were kept sealed in the National Archives until 1953. A few individuals involved in intelligence gathering burned their personal papers while others chose to publish their memoirs, though greatly embellishing their exploits. Even today, the identities of many spies remain secret. Henry Thomas Harrison, for example, was a Confederate spy whose intelligence set in motion the events that produced the battle of Gettysburg. But neither his first name nor details of his long career as a spy were known until 1986, when historian James O. Hall published an article about him. Though the idea of centralised intelligence gathering was decades away, the age-old resistance to the idea was present even then. Neither side saw the need to create such intelligence organisations, but each side approached the idea of effectively acquiring intelligence in their own way. The Confederacy's Signal Corps, devoted primarily to communications and intercepts, included a covert agency, the Secret Service Bureau. This unit ran espionage and counter-espionage operations in the North. Late in the war, the bureau set up a secret headquarters in Canada and sent out operatives on covert missions in Northern states. The Union's Bureau of Military Information, unlike the Confederacy's Secret Service Bureau, operated for specific generals rather than for the Union Army itself. But here was born the idea of what would eventually become a centralised military intelligence division. Each side still used age-old intelligence techniques, such as code-breaking, deception, and covert surveillance. However, into this modern war came two innovations that would endure as tools of espionage: wiretapping and overhead reconnaissance. What follows is a look at some of the highlights of how the North and the South gathered and used their information, the important missions, and the personalities. From this special view, the focus is not on the battlefield, but on a battle of wits.

The twenty-first century has brought the perfect storm of conditions to create substantive global instability. This contemporary operating environment (COE) is characterized by complexity, ambiguity, volatility, and constant danger. It is a human invention that requires a human solution. Special operations forces (SOF), a group comprised of highly trained personnel with the ability to deploy rapidly and apply special skills in a variety of environments and circumstances, is the logical force of choice to achieve success in the COE. Increasing their effectiveness is cultural intelligence (CQ) – the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours of a group of people and then apply that knowledge toward a specific goal. Empowered by CQ, SOF are positioned to dominate in the COE. Solving the People Puzzle makes a convincing argument for the powerful union of the "force of choice" with the "tool of choice." This book will inspire and inform.

The objective of this study was to provide an analytic framework for intelligence analysis of irregular warfare (IW) environments that could be used as the basis for a subsequent IW intelligence analysis curriculum development effort. The authors conducted a review of recent policy, strategy, doctrinal, and other materials pertaining to IW, concluding that although the term irregular warfare remains somewhat nebulous, situations considered within the realm of IW generally can be thought of in terms of two main stylized types: (1) population-centric IW situations, which include such missions as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and support to insurgency, where the indigenous population is the center of gravity; and (2) counterterrorism operations, whether conducted as one element of a theater commanderas campaign or as part of the U.S. Special Operations Command-led global war on terrorism, where a cellular network is being targeted. The authors identify the intelligence and analytic requirements associated with each of these two stylized forms of IW and describe a top-down framework, or analytic procedure, that can be used for assessing IW environments. Also included is a list of references to IW-relevant doctrinal publications.

While other books have speculated on the history and nature of Britain's intelligence services, this is the first to tell the story through the documents themselves. Only ten years ago access to these original sources would have been impossible, but now experts Twigge, Hampshire and Macklin draw on the spies' and spymasters' own words from the National Archives' unique intelligence files - including the very latest remarkable releases from MI5. Historical narrative is interwoven with colourful tales from the past that highlight some of the greatest successes - and failures - along the way, as well as the motives and machinations of those responsible for them. And readers who want to explore sources for themselves are given all the guidance they need. As the Iraq War and its aftermath bring the intelligence profession back into the spotlight, "British Intelligence" is compelling reading for anyone interested in the shadowy world of 20th-century espionage.