Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War documents the use of antipersonnel chemical weapons throughout the Vietnam War, and explores their effectiveness under the wide variety of circumstances in which they were employed. The short, readable account follows the US program as it progressed from a focus on the humanitarian aspects of non-lethal weapons to their use as a means of augmenting and enhancing the lethality of traditional munitions. It also presents the efforts of the North Vietnamese to both counter US chemical operations and to develop a chemical capability of their own. Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War is a comprehensive and thoroughly fascinating examination of riot-control agents during the Vietnam War.

Between 1964 and 1975, 2.6 million American personnel served within the borders of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, of whom an estimated 1-1.6 million actually fought in combat. At the tip of the spear were the infantry, the "grunts" who entered an extraordinary tropical combat zone completely alien to the world they had left behind in the United States. In South Vietnam, and occasionally spilling over into neighboring Laos and Cambodia, they fought a relentless counterinsurgency and conventional war against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). The terrain was as challenging as the enemy - soaring mountains or jungle-choked valleys; bleached, sandy coastal zones; major urban centers; riverine districts. Their opponents fought them with relentless and terrible ingenuity, on a daily basis with ambushes, booby traps, and mines, then occasionally with full-force offensives on a scale to rival the campaigns of World War II. This pocket manual draws its content not only from essential U.S. military field manuals of the Vietnam era, but also a vast collection of declassified primary documents, including rare after-action reports, intelligence analysis, first-hand accounts, and combat studies. Through these documents the pocket manual provides a deep insight into what it was like for infantry to live, survive, and fight in Vietnam, whether conducting a major airmobile search-and-destroy operation or conducting endless hot and humid small-unit patrols from jungle firebases. The book includes infantry intelligence documents about the NVA and VC threats, plus chapters explaining hard-won lessons about using weaponry, surviving and moving through the jungle, tactical maneuvers, and applications of the ubiquitous helicopter for combat and support.

This book explores how and why Vietnam loomed so large for Humphrey as vice president from 1964 through the 1968 election campaign against Richard Nixon. It assesses how Humphrey's loyalty to Lyndon Johnson, who emerges as the villain of the story in many ways, would negatively affect his political ambitions. And it engages the disconnect between Humphrey's principles and the intricate politics of his convoluted relationship with the president and his unsuccessful presidential campaign. It is a complex and frustrating narrative, the results of which would be tragic, not only for Humphrey's presidential aspirations, but also for the war in Southeast Asia and the future of the United States.

More than thirty years later, the Vietnam War still stands as one of the most controversial events in the history of the United States, and historians have so far failed to come up with a definitive narrative of the wartime experience. With competing viewpoints already in play, Mark Moyara (TM)s recent revisionist approach in Triumph Forsaken has created heated debate over who "owns" the history of Americaa (TM)s war in Vietnam.

Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War collects critiques of Triumph Forsaken from both sides of this debate, written by an array of Vietnam scholars, cataloguing arguments about how the war should be remembered, how history may be reconstructed, and by whom. A lively introduction and conclusion by editors Andrew Wiest and Michael Doidge provide context and balance to the essays, as well as Moyara (TM)s responses, giving students and scholars of the Vietnam era a glimpse into how history is constructed and reconstructed.

More than thirty years later, the Vietnam War still stands as one of the most controversial events in the history of the United States, and historians have so far failed to come up with a definitive narrative of the wartime experience. With competing viewpoints already in play, Mark Moyar 's recent revisionist approach in Triumph Forsaken has created heated debate over who "owns" the history of America 's war in Vietnam.

Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War collects critiques of Triumph Forsaken from both sides of this debate, written by an array of Vietnam scholars, cataloguing arguments about how the war should be remembered, how history may be reconstructed, and by whom. A lively introduction and conclusion by editors Andrew Wiest and Michael Doidge provide context and balance to the essays, as well as Moyar 's responses, giving students and scholars of the Vietnam era a glimpse into how history is constructed and reconstructed.

The involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War has been the most polarizing issue within post-war American history. It was divisive at the time, both domestically and internationally, and debates continue to the present day. At the heart of the disputes has always been the question of 'failure' - why was the United States unable to achieve its objectives? Was failure inherent in the decision to go to war? Was it inherently an unwinnable war, or was failure the result of inept strategy, poor leadership, and a biased media? In Vietnam, Gary R. Hess describes and evaluates the main arguments of scholars, participants, and journalists, both revisionist and orthodox in their approach, as they consider why the United States was unable to achieve its objectives. While providing a clear and well-balanced account of existing historical debate, Hess also offers his own interpretation of the events and opens a dialogue about the usefulness of historical argument in reaching a deeper understanding of the conflict. This concise book is essential reading for students and teachers of the Vietnam War as both a clear and well-balanced account of existing historical debate and a thought-provoking look at the future of historical scholarship.

This book describes and explains Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore's attitudes and policies regarding the Vietnam War. While it is generally known that all three countries supported the US war effort in Vietnam, it reveals the motivations behind the decisions of the decision makers, the twists and turns and the nuances in the attitudes of Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore following the development of the war from the 1950s through to its end in 1975. Although the principal focus is the three supposedly non-aligned countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the perspectives of Thailand and the Philippines - the two Southeast Asian countries which were formally allied with the United States - are discussed at the appropriate junctures. It makes an original contribution to the gradually growing literature on the international history of the Vietnam War and furthers our knowledge of the diplomatic history of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the early independent years, 1945/1949, 1957 and 1965 respectively, which coincided with early years of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.

Nicky Venditti, a U.S. Army helicopter pilot with a love of fast cars and practical jokes, went to Vietnam in 1969 and was dead after 11 days, killed by an explosion during Americal Division training for new arrivals at Chu Lai. The full story of the incident did not come out until the author, David Venditta (a different spelling), Venditti's cousin, made a chance discovery that began a decades-long effort to find out exactly what happened, what the Army did about it and who was held responsible. This book documents the Army's mishandling of the incident and the effects on the families and friends of Venditti and of the two other young soldiers who died with him.

This book is a unique source of information about U.S. troop involvement in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. It stresses that Vietnam was a war without fronts or battle lines-a war different from any that the United States had previously fought.

During the Vietnam War, Vietnamese Buddhist peace activists made extraordinary sacrifices -- including self-immolation -- to try to end the fighting. They hoped to establish a neutralist government that would broker peace with the Communists and expel the Americans. Robert J. Topmiller explores South Vietnamese attitudes toward the war, the insurgency, and U.S. intervention, and lays bare the dissension within the U.S. military. The Lotus Unleashed is one of the few studies to illuminate the impact of internal Vietnamese politics on U.S. decision-making and to examine the power of a nonviolent movement to confront a violent superpower.

This book examines the world confronted by the men of an American combat division during the Vietnam War. It covers several subjects, including the physical surroundings, weaponry, battles big and small, the medical effort, relations with the Vietnamese, and morale.

With first-hand insight into the into the key role of the US Air Force's fighter-bomber from the Vietnam War through to Operation Desert Storm during the First Gulf War, this book is an unmissable account of some of the most dangerous and demanding missions in the two wars. The advent of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) in the early 1950s threatened the whole concept of aerial bombing from medium and high altitude. Countermeasures were developed during the Korean War, but with little initial success. It was only in the closing stages of the Vietnam War, with the F-4Cww Phantom II (Wild Weasel 4), that this equipment started to become successful enough to allow a substantial investment in converting 116 F-4E Phantom IIs into dedicated SEAD aircraft. This move introduced a new generation of anti-radar missiles which became invaluable in later operations including operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Northern Watch over Iraq. This volume features dynamic archival photography from crews who flew the jet, alongside mission accounts and technical details of the development and fielding of the F-4 Wild Weasel in its various iterations. Including specially commissioned artwork of 'sharkmouthed' Phantom IIs in Vietnam jungle camouflage and more modern USAF 'Ghost Gray', this book is the ultimate visual and technical guide to the F-4 Phantom II Wild Weasel Units in combat.

There is an important debate raging about whether Iraq is becoming another Vietnam. Those who deny the similarities most vociferously are often those who know (or remember) the least about Vietnam. Kenneth Campbell knows Vietnam from his thirteen months of fighting there (he received a Purple Heart), and years of political organizing to get the United States out of the war. Here, Campbell lays out the political process of getting into, sinking deeper, hitting bottom, and finally pulling out of the Vietnam quagmire. He traces the chief lessons of Vietnam, which helped the United States successfully avoid quagmires for thirty years, and explains how neoconservatives within the Bush administration cynically used the tragedy of 9/11 to override the "Vietnam syndrome" and drag the nation into a new quagmire in Iraq. In view of where the United States finds itself today-unable to stay but unable to leave-Campbell recommends that the country rededicate itself to the essential lessons of Vietnam: the danger of imperial arrogance, the limits of military force, the importance of international and constitutional law, and the power of morality.

There is an important debate raging about whether Iraq is becoming another Vietnam. Those who deny the similarities most vociferously are often those who know (or remember) the least about Vietnam. Kenneth Campbell knows Vietnam from his thirteen months of fighting there (he received a Purple Heart), and years of political organizing to get the United States out of the war. Here, Campbell lays out the political process of getting into, sinking deeper, hitting bottom, and finally pulling out of the Vietnam quagmire. He traces the chief lessons of Vietnam, which helped the United States successfully avoid quagmires for thirty years, and explains how neoconservatives within the Bush administration cynically used the tragedy of 9/11 to override the "Vietnam syndrome" and drag the nation into a new quagmire in Iraq. In view of where the United States finds itself today-unable to stay but unable to leave-Campbell recommends that the country rededicate itself to the essential lessons of Vietnam: the danger of imperial arrogance, the limits of military force, the importance of international and constitutional law, and the power of morality.

Last Stand at Khe Sanh is a vivid, fast-paced account of the dramatic 1968 confrontation, when 6,000 US Marines held off 30,000 North Vietnamese Army regulars at a remote mountain stronghold. Based on extensive archival research and more than 100 interviews with participants, author Gregg Jones captures the courage and camaraderie of the defenders and delivers the fullest account yet of this epic battle.

This book revisits the American canon of novels, memoirs, and films about the war in Vietnam, in order to reassess critically the centrality of the discourse of American victimization in the country's imagination of the conflict, and to trace the strategies of representation that establish American soldiers and veterans as the most significant victims of the war. By investigating in detail the imagery of the Vietnamese landscape recreated by American authors and directors, the volume explores the proposition that Vietnam has been turned into an American myth, demonstrating that the process resulted in a dehistoricization and mystification of the conflict that obscured its historical and political realities. Against this background, representations of the war's victims-Vietnamese civilians and American soldiers-are then considered in light of their ideological meanings and uses. Ultimately, the book seeks to demonstrate how, in a relation of power, the question of victimhood can become ideologized, transforming into both a discourse and a strategy of representation-and in doing so, to demythologize something of the "Vietnam" of American cultural narrative.

Based on research and personal interviews, this book presents the most successful North Vietnamese pilots' careers from their training years to their missions and aerial victories. There were nineteen aces in the Vietnamese People's Air Force during the war. An additional eight MiG pilots were also successful in dogfights; each claimed four aerial victories. More than 240 illustrations feature rare war-era photography, color MiG profiles, maps of air engagements, and lists of air victories and losses that reconstruct the events that took place over North Vietnam from 1965 to 1973.

Contents:
1. An introduction to Golf Course Wars
2. Construction of Canadian Myths of Identity
3. Displacing the Native in Canadian Histories
4. Cultural Displays: Inside the Canadian Museum of Civilisation
5. At the Barricades
6. Interventions
Conclusion: Myths of Disappearance and Alternative Remembrance

Like many other young men during the Vietnam War, Ed Corlew enlisted in hopes of having some influence regarding assignment-safety and training. Instead he found himself in the dangerous door gunner position and, soon after, the crew chief aboard a CH-47 Chinook, 15 miles from the DMZ in 1967 and 1968. Assigned to the famed 1st Cavalry Division, Corlew was shot down three times: in the Battle of Hue, the Battle of Quang Tri, and the A Shau Valley. This memoir began both as a journal and as counselor-recommended therapy for PTSD. He earned four bronze service stars for his service (an estimated 1000 flying hours) during the war's bloodiest year, enduring enemy mortar and rocket attacks. Engaging, frank, and full of action, Corlew describes his many combat experiences as well as the emotional effects-all through the lens of his Christian faith.

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A Companion to the Vietnam War "contains twenty-four definitive essays on America's longest and most divisive foreign conflict. It represents the best current scholarship on this controversial and influential episode in modern American history.
Highlights issues of nationalism, culture, gender, and race.
Covers the breadth of Vietnam War history, including American war policies, the Vietnamese perspective, the antiwar movement, and the American home front.
Surveys and evaluates the best scholarship on every important era and topic.
Includes a select bibliography to guide further research.

The "Silent Majority" Speech treats Richard Nixon's address of November 3, 1969, as a lens through which to examine the latter years of the Vietnam War and their significance to U.S. global power and American domestic life. The book uses Nixon's speech - which introduced the policy of "Vietnamization" and cited the so-called bloodbath theory as a justification for continued U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia - as a fascinating moment around which to build an analysis of the last years of the war. For Nixon's strategy to be successful, he requested the support of what he called the "great silent majority," a term that continues to resonate in American political culture. Scott Laderman moves beyond the war's final years to address the administration's hypocritical exploitation of moral rhetoric and its stoking of social divisiveness to achieve policy aims. Laderman explores the antiwar and pro-war movements, the shattering of the liberal consensus, and the stirrings of the right-wing resurgence that would come to define American politics. Supplemental primary sources make this book an ideal tool for introducing students to historical research. The "Silent Majority" Speech is critical reading for those studying American political history and U.S.-Asian/Southeast Asian relations.

Set as deeply in his mind as in the depths of the Southeast-Asian jungle, a young American soldier embarks on an evocative journey to a war that, for him, will never be over. I am that American soldier. It's 1969. 18 and living in New York City the world was a playground for Mickey, a naive Irish-American kid bored with his life who felt he was ready for the adventures of war. His father served in World War II, his brother a Marine in Vietnam it was now his turn. His 365 days, in the hell that was Vietnam, builds in torment until an attack on a bunker complex in Cambodia where everything goes terribly wrong. Wounded, his friend captured, he becomes a tormented survivor knowing he is always just a heartbeat away from death. His adventure turned nightmare brings a visceral understanding of the words penned by Thoreau, those very same words with which his father imparted enduring wisdom throughout his youth: ""Most men live lives of quiet desperation,"" especially those at war. This emotional journey of self-realisation chronicles the key perspective-shaping experiences of a U.S. Army grunt fighting in Vietnam.

This book is a unique source of information about U.S. troop involvement in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. It stresses that Vietnam was a war without fronts or battle lines-a war different from any that the United States had previously fought.

Originally published in 1998 by the U.S. Army Center of Military History "Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive" chronicles the onset of offensive operations by the U.S. Army after eighteen months of building up a credible force on the ground in South Vietnam and taking the first steps toward bringing the war to the enemy. The compelling story by George L. MacGarrigle begins in October 1966, when General William C. Westmoreland believed that he had the arms and men to take the initiative from the enemy and that significant progress would be made on all fronts over the next twelve months. Aware of American intentions, North Vietnam undertook a prolonged war of attrition and stepped up the infiltration of its own troops into the South. While the insurgency in the South remained the cornerstone of Communist strategy, it was increasingly overshadowed by main-force military operations. These circumstances, according to MacGarrigle, set the stage for intensified combat. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units retained the advantage, fighting only when it suited their purposes and retreating with impunity into inviolate sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. With Westmoreland feeling hamstrung by political constraints on his ability to wage war in the vast hostile areas along the border, 1967 ended with a growing uncertainty in the struggle to secure the countryside. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, MacGarrigle has crafted a well-balanced account of this year of intense combat. His volume is a tribute to those who sacrificed so much in a long and irresolute conflict, and soldiers engaged in military operations that place great demands on their initiative, skill, and devotion will find its thought-provoking lessons worthy of reflection.