During the 1980s a fable circulated within the US Army concerning
Soviet planning for a potential war with the United States. In the
most common version, a Soviet general is alleged to have declared
in frustration, "It is impossible to plan against the Americans
because they don't follow their own doctrine." Many readers of this
book will have heard (or said) that "doctrine is only a guide."
Indeed, the tactical agility demonstrated by the US Army on the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan is due in no small part to a
cultural imperative that prizes solutions above all else. While not
disputing the value of unorthodox solutions to difficult
challenges, the organizational culture that underpins this
perspective has resulted in a widespread lack of knowledge of Army
doctrine by company and field grade officers and mid-level and
senior noncommissioned officers. Recognizing this, the Army has
dramatically re-engineered its doctrine to distill the timeless
principles into a series of accessible, easily read documents. This
process has led to a larger discussion of what should and should
not be called "doctrine," and has also included discussion of how
we as members of the profession of arms conceptualize warfare.
Unfortunately, this conversation has not yet included the bulk of
the Army's mid-level leaders. Dr. Jackson's monograph is an
excellent contribution to remedy that shortfall. Its greatest value
lies in the fact that it forces the reader to reconsider basic
assumptions about the purpose and utility of doctrine, and what a
nation's military doctrine says about its military institution.
Jackson's arguments are well reasoned, his assertions are
provocative, and his conclusions are profound.
General
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