Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal
problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic
behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where
economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by
enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of
this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write
better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral
hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for
drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field
traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this
treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues.
General
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