Originally published in 1985, the level of anxiety and suspicion
between the USA and the USSR had rarely been higher. Many advocates
of arms control believed that effective verification would reduce
tensions and lessen the risk of war. This book analyses the two
main issues of verification. One is technological: what are the
present capabilities of various verification techniques and what is
their potential? The devices and methods currently employed by the
two major nuclear powers and by international organizations to
monitor the compliance of states with arms control or disarmament
treaties are examined. The second issue is political: how do US and
Soviet approaches compare, what are the roles of domestic and
bureaucratic politics, and on what criteria can a workable standard
of adequacy be based? In short, how much is enough? Although the
study concludes that a number of significant arms control measures
can already be adequately verified, modern weapons are becoming
more mobile and it is becoming easier to conceal them. There is a
danger that the ability to hide weapons will outstrip the ability
to find them. Verification cannot promise to detect all violations;
a workable standard of adequacy in verification must derive from
the ability to detect militarily significant violations.
General
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