Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and
chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become
increasingly common and increasingly prominent. Some are based on
demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special
composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal
redundancy, ontological vagueness, or co-location; and others still
come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to
a scientific one. Until now, little has been done to address these
arguments in a unified and systematic way. Ordinary Objects is
designed to fill this gap, demonstrating that the mistakes behind
all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be
traced to a common source. It aims to develop an ontology of
ordinary objects subject to no such problems, providing perhaps the
first sustained defense of a common sense ontology in two
generations. The work done along the way addresses a number of
major issues in philosophy of language and metaphysics,
contributing to debates about analyticity, identity conditions,
co-location and the grounding problem, vagueness,
overdetermination, parsimony, and ontological commitment. In the
end, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist
arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions; examining their
failings also gives us reason to suspect that many apparent
disputes in ontology are pseudo-debates. For it brings into
question widely-held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical
principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are
answerable, and how we should go about addressing such fundamental
questions as "What exists?". As a result, the work of Ordinary
Objects promises to provide not only the route to a reflective
understanding of our unreflective common-sense view, but also a
better understanding of the proper methods and limits of
metaphysics. "Ordinary Objects is well worth reading because it
sheds new light on how to preserve the credibility of familiar
things."-Marianne Djuth, The Review of Metaphysics "In Ordinary
Objects , Amie Thomasson mounts a spirited and vigorous defense of
the reality of ordinary objects."-Terry Horgan, Times Literary
Supplement "Ordinary Objects is a fine book.... [Thomasson] writes
insightfully and persuasively, and she has a realistic view of what
metaphysical arguments can and cannot demonstrate... she approaches
metaphysical theorizing more systematically than many other recent
writers, drawing attention to the ways in which questionable
assumptions in one area of philosophy are undergirding seemingly
powerful arguments in another. Everyone working in metaphysics
should make time for this volume."-R. W. Fischer, Metaphilosophy
"In Ordinary Objects , Thomasson pursues an integrated conception
of ontology and metaontology. In ontology, she defends the
existence of shoes, ships, and other ordinary objects. In
metaontology, she defends a deflationary view of ontological
inquiry, designed to suck the air out of arguments against ordinary
objects. The result is an elegant and insightful defense of a
common sense worldview."-Jonathan Schaffer, Philosophical Books
"Amie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to
irritate many professional metaphysicians. But it is not just
irritating: it is challenging...This book would be good
supplementary text for upper-level metaphysics classes or seminars
in which the sorts of arguments to which Thomasson replies are also
read."-Alan Sidelle, The Philosophical Quarterly
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!