This book is about the interplay of theory and experimentation on
group decision making in economics. The theories that the book
subjects to experimental testing mostly come from the theory of
games. The decisions investigated in the book mostly concern
economic interaction like strict competition. two-person
bargaining. and coalition formation. The underlying philosophy of
the articles collected in this book is consistent with the opinion
of a growing number of economists and psychologists that economic
issues cannot be understood fully just by thinking about them.
Rather. the interplay between theory and experimentation is
critical for the development of economics as an observational
science (Smith. 1989). Reports of laboratory experiments in
decision making and economics date back more than thirty years (e.g
. Allais. 1953; Davidson. Suppes. and Siegel. 1957; Flood. 1958;
Friedman. 1%3; Kalisch. Milnor. Nash. and Nering. 1954; Lieberman.
1%0; Mosteller and Nogee. 1951; Rapoport. Chammah. Dwyer. and Gyr.
I %2; Siegel and Fouraker. I %0; Stone. 1958). However. only in the
last ten or fifteen years has laboratory experimentation in
economics started its steady transformation from an occasional
curiosity into a regular means for investigating various economic
phenomena and examining the role of economic institutions. Groups
of researchers in the USA and abroad have used experimental methods
with increasing sophistication to attack economic problems that
arise in individual decision making under risk. two-person
bargaining."
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