The belief that U.S. presidents' legislative policy formation
has centralized over time, shifting inexorably out of the executive
departments and into the White House, is shared by many who have
studied the American presidency. Andrew Rudalevige argues that such
a linear trend is neither at all certain nor necessary for policy
promotion. In "Managing the President's Program," he presents a far
more complex and interesting picture of the use of presidential
staff. Drawing on transaction cost theory, Rudalevige constructs a
framework of "contingent centralization" to predict when presidents
will use White House and/or departmental staff resources for policy
formulation. He backs his assertions through an unprecedented
quantitative analysis of a new data set of policy proposals
covering almost fifty years of the postwar era from Truman to
Clinton.
Rudalevige finds that presidents are not bound by a relentless
compulsion to centralize but follow a more subtle strategy of staff
allocation that makes efficient use of limited bargaining
resources. New items and, for example, those spanning agency
jurisdictions, are most likely to be centralized; complex items
follow a mixed process. The availability of expertise outside the
White House diminishes centralization. However, while
centralization is a management strategy appropriate for engaging
the wider executive branch, it can imperil an item's fate in
Congress. Thus, as this well-written book makes plain, presidential
leadership hinges on hard choices as presidents seek to
simultaneously manage the executive branch and attain legislative
success.
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