As societies progress, old generations of social agents die and are
replaced by new ones. This book explores what happens in this
transition as the old guard instructs the new arrivals about the
wisdom of their ways. Do new entrants listen and follow the advice
of their elders or dismiss it? Is intergenerational advice welfare
improving or can it be destructive? Does such advice enhance the
stability of social conventions or disrupt it? Using the concept of
an Intergenerational Game and the tools of game theory and
experimental economics, this study delves into the process of
social leaning created by intergenerational advice passed from
generation to generation. This book presents a unique theoretical
and empirical study of the dynamics of social conventions not
offered elsewhere.
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