Since the creation of Israel, during both wartime and peacetime,
many Arab coalitions have formed. Every one of these anti-Israel
coalitions has failed to achieve its goals due to the defection of
one or more major parties. Kober explores the forces behind the
dissemination of these alliances to determine why Arab states chose
defection; whether or not a distinction can be made between
defection patterns in times of war and patterns related to peace
processes; and possible explanations for different behavior
patterns. The multi-polar structure of the Arab subsystem, the
decisions of pivotal members, and the negative reputations earned
by such coalitions have always made defection an easy alternative.
The choice to defect was, Kober contends, nurtured by a sense of
military weakness and by the priority that coalition members
attached to their particular interests over general Arab
concerns.
Kober finds that defection in time of war has arisen mainly
through evasion-passive avoidance of coalition obligations with the
hope of escaping or minimizing expected losses. Defection from
military coalitions often deprived the defector of maximizing
gains, all the while weakening the remaining coalition members.
However, defection during the peace process served not only to
optimize the defector's utilities, but eventually proved beneficial
for the parties left behind. Kober determines that the peace
process, mainly due to superpower involvement, transformed the
scenario from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum game, by rewarding the
parties for signing treaties with Israel. Also, the first
defectors, such as Egypt, established pay-off precedents, creating
the foundation for future negotiations between the Arab players and
Israel.
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