This book examines U.S. foreign policy decision-making and
conduct from a psychological perspective that focuses on the
structures as well as the content of mental images held
collectively and individually by the foreign policy elite. Two case
studies, arms sales to Morocco in the context of the Western Sahara
war and liquefied natural gas contracts with Algeria, are used to
illustrate the usefulness of this perspective. The methodological
tool used is of Cognitive Mapping, which consists of reconstructing
mental images relevant to the issues examined by way of a
sophisticated method that dissects policy statements, breaks them
down into concepts with causal linkages, and then feeds them into a
computer program that uncovers important characteristics for each
image. The author then makes interesting inferences linking these
technical characteristics of cognitive maps, or images, to policy
orientations and action.
The case studies analyzed with this method relate to U.S.
foreign policy with regard to North Africa. The author tries to
find answers to a set of empirical questions that have not often
been addressed: Why have U.S. foreign policy makers ignored North
African countries for so long in spite of their strategic location
and natural resources? Why do radical images persist when there
have been opportunities to negotiate rationally with the countries
of that region? And why did the U.S. government reverse itself in
1979 when it decided to sell offensive weapons to Morocco in spite
of U.S. and international restrictions, and in spite of some
obvious potential negative effects of these sales on regional
conflicts and on U.S. standing in the area? Also, why did the
biggest economic deal the U.S. has ever had with a Third World
country (Algeria) fail as soon as President Reagan came into
office? These empirical questions are tackled along with
theoretical concerns dealing with the subjective domain of foreign
policy making. The framework used for the analysis of the
historical data and the interviews conducted yielded interesting
conclusions as to how foreign policy makers viewed the North
African region, its countries, and the issues at stake. The
methodology used explains, through simple graphs and indices of
complexity and simplicity of mental structures, how situations were
defined and responded to by various U.S. administrations. The
results show how unconscious thought processes and specific
categories of cognitive structures may affect the choice of a
policy alternative, and demonstrate the role of images as
intervening variables between the international environment and
state behavior. This book should appeal to students and scholars of
foreign policy, international relations, negotiations, and North
African politics. Political scientists interested in computer
modeling will also find in it interesting propositions.
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